Monday, 30 December 2013


The current security crisis in Southern Sudan is a good lesson for both Museveni and those opposed to his 27 years dictatorship. Of recent both Ugandan oposition and the general population have developed a conscesus that its only use of force that can put an end to Museveni's dictatorship. No doubt, forceful removal of Museveni implies the use of arms as is the case in Southern Sudan. It means disabling and allienating the dictator from the armed forces. It is the role of a few elites whether civillian or military to effectively utilise the existing armed forces. In such a situation, the much aclaimed "the people"
does not matter. Its the men in uniform and their handlers who matter.

However, drawing lessons from the current Southern Sudan crisis, advocates of forceful removal of Museveni should organise a decisive plan of action that can dislodge Museveni within a period of between one hour and the next one week. On the contrary a poorly planned and protracted armed action will simply play into the hands of dictator Museveni thus throwing the country into carnage.

Like everyone else, Museveni is very much aware that the situation in Uganda is more more riper for armed confrontation than Southern Sudan. He has stocked all sorts of military arsenal and succeeded privatising the armed forces by positioning his ethinic cohorts at the helm of strategic military positions. Drawing from the experience of recent events in Southern Sudan, he is going to intensify intelligence surveillance on his own Military Commanders. His Southern Sudan counterpart had similar arrangements but has only been saved by external intervention coupled by poor planning by the armed opposition. It is this desire for a regional military alliance that explains the idea behind Museveni's desperate push for regional intergration. The current events in Southern Sudan have sent him more panicking than Silva Kirr. His NRA units now in Southern Sudan will soon devise a means of committing a big massacre that will be blamed on the rebelling group. This will be designed to brand the belligerents as terrorists and at worst subjected to indictement by the ICC inorder to cripple their genuine fight against Silva Kir's dictatorship.

Above all, Museveni's military intervention in Juba is dictated by his historical urge to contain his own nothern Uganda Luo influence. He did the same move in Kenya but of recent Railla Odinga has warned him to keep off Kenya's internal affairs. Earlier he had wanted to keep the Southern Sudan occupied with war with Khartoum but this could not work for him. For his designs, the current situation in Southern Sudan fits well if only it can keep the new nation unstable securitywise.

Therefore, a Southern Sudan like situation is innevitable in Uganda and there are lessons to learn.


Tuesday, 24 December 2013


Right from the regimes of Obote 1, Iddi Amin, Obote 11 and now Museveni, Uganda had been a key ally of the struggling Southern Sudanese people. Starting with the Anyanya rebellion in the 1960s and 70s to the SPLA during the 80s and 90s, successive Ugandan goverments offered support to the Southern Sudanese struggle.

However, its during Museveni's reign that Uganda's support took discrimatory dimensions - "our southern christian brothers". According to Museveni, the struggle was against the Arab Islamic regime of Kharatoum that was bent on spreading Islamic Fundamentalism orchestrated by Hassan Ali Tourabi. The truith is that Museveni opportunistically wanted to detach the people of northern and West Nile regions from any dirrect link with their cousins in Southern Sudan. Northern and West Nile regions had rejected the Museveni government right from its inception and had gone into armed rebellion with rear bases in Southern Sudan. The Museveni government refered to the people from northern Uganda and west Nile as Anyanyas in reference to the Southern Sudan liberation struggle.

Khartoum decided to offer retaliatory support to Uganda dissidents based in Southern Sudan. Relations between Kampala and Khartoum deteriorated to the extent that during the early 90s the NRA assaulted the Sudan embasy in Kampala with armoured personel carriers (APC) leading to shivering diplomatic relations.

The USA threw its weight behind the Uganda's support for the SPLA. A full fledged supply line was established and coordinated by the Gen. Joram Mugume the then NRA Chief of Combat Operations (CCO) and Fred Tolit the then Director of Military Intelligence (DMI). Actually Fred Tolit was just a figure head DMI meant to hoodwink the Acholis. He was a mere head of the Sudan desk concerned with matters of Southern Sudan and the LRA. The real DMI was instead his deputy, Aronda Nyakairima. Worst of all, Tolit was viewed as a General Tinyefuza confidant since its the later who had brought him to the fore.

This did not deter the Ugandan armed groups from getting support from some sections of the SPLA fighters. One of the deceptive ways was for the SPLA to pretend that the LRA had overan its camps and seized arms. As the South was heading towards gaining full autonomy from Khartoum, the legendary SPLA leader John Garang had to die in a helcopter crash provided to him by Museveni. No doubt, like all revolutionaries an autonomous state of Southern Sudan under Garang would have sought to support other liberation movements that already had bases in its teritory. Garang had a softer approach towards Khartoum - Museveni's arch enemy and a bait for USA support. Garang's successor, Silva Kiir set up a Museveni client regime in Southern Sudan. Being an internal figure, Johm Garang would not have taken orders from Museveni without question. In return Museveni has been fighting hard to have it incorporated into the East African Community solely in order to secure the northern border.

It is against this background that Museveni has had to move very fast to to intervene and save his client regime of Silva Kiir. In the same vein of keeping the ethinic Luo influence in check, Museveni intervened in Kenya against a Railla Odinga victory. Earlier, during the early 90s, he had denied Kenyan dissident Col. Odong's FERA bases in Uganda against the Arap Moi government.


Saturday, 14 December 2013


Twenty seven years now, Museveni has manifestly demonstrated beyond doubt that he has no intention of relinquishing power peacefully. He has always relied on the military and the power of money to retain power. He has enjoyed the company of non militant political opposition players to legtimise his hold on power.

It is groups like the recently concluded Uganda Conference in the Hague that Museveni enjoys. The actions of such groups fit into his popular proverb "Kahenddkye teita Mbogo" (mere wishing of a buffallo to break its leg does not guarantee its death).

It is only Dr. Besigye who came on the scene as a threat to Museveni's hold on power. However, since Dr. Besigye has for a decade now not transformed the armed option into reality, he joins the likes of Semogerere, Bwanika, Mayanja, Mao, Agrey Awori, Otunu, Miria Obote etc. The only difference with Dr. Besigye is that he has done alot of mobilisation of Ugandans and the international community by exposing Museveni's hidden agenda.

Being a former NRA, Ugandans had anticipated Dr. Besigye to break into Museveni's power base - the Military and dislodge Museveni from power. He had stated that use of military force remained an option and this generated alot of hope for Ugandans who believe 99.9% (apart from Mao and Muntu) that Museveni can only be militarily dislodged.

Dr. Besigye now remains a key opposition leader with majority following but who cannot capture power because he has no army. With time most of his simpathisers are to revert back to the Museveni camp. With public resources at Museveni's disposal, fence sitters will be lured back and come 2016, he will win with 95%.

Ugandans are so disgusted and desperate that they are ready to support any armed uprising that can dislodge Museveni. The level of despair is so great that even if it was Joseph Kony's LRA, they are willing to support it.

It is in the midist of this uncertainity, that Gen David Tinyefuza came to the scene a few months ago. With his group, they have not wasted time but instead they have outrightly told the world that Museveni will not leave power peacefully. They are running short of making a declaration that the group will use force. Thats what Ugandans want to hear and the earlier they arm Ugandans the better because Ugandans are more than ready.

Unlike Besigye and Muntu, Tinyefuza has the capacity to eat deeper into Museveni power base - the military leaving it crumbling. Once it crumbles, it is only Tinyefuza who can reorganise it into a peoples' army by taming the politically ambitious Generals to avert the country degenerating into fragmentation. Most important is that a Tinyefuza led military assault will eat into his predominantly elite Hima NRA command structure.

During his service, Tinyefuza demonstrated his capacity to reason beyond tribal/ethinic leanings. His only weakness is that when it comes to combat, he forgets that he is a General and fights fiercely like an ordinary soldier - the Fred Rwigyema way. With such a scenario, Museveni will be left with no option but to put Gen. Saleh in-charge of NRA. Again, Gen. Saleh is dissatisfied with the status quo but only holding on to Museveni for protection against the ICC for the Congo expedition.

Although Museveni delibarately denied Tinyefuza the opportunity to advance his military knowledge, there is no match for him in the NRA. He is a genius as far as political and military campaign is concerned. Besides Saleh, Gen. Tumwine is as a civillian General as Gen. Otafiire.

Armed with current intelligence and exploiting the situation on the ground that has been prepared by Besigye and group, once Tinyefuza and group rolls into action, the war theatre wont last long before Museveni is dislodged and Uganda regaining its lost glory.


Friday, 6 December 2013


Fellow Ugandans,
As we mourn the departure of of Cde Nelson Mandela (RIP), let us take cognisance of the unwithering determination of the anti-apatheid activists, the SA masses and the international community. It is their concerted efforts that kept the struggle alive and was a lifeline to the incacerated thus leading to Mandela's release and rebirth of a new SA.

Cde Mandela has passed on at a time when our own icon of democracy and human rights, Dr. Kiiza Besigye is under incerceration without the due court process. Regratably, to the great pleasure of the brutal Museveni regime, our enthuathism for the struggle he is spearheading seem to be dwindling. We have left him vulnerable. That being the situation, the repressive regime is trying to exploit his vulnerability by innitiating negotiations over his freedom.

As a tribute and to honour the values for which Cde Mandela stood for, let us reflect on the fate of Dr.Besigye. Leaders should moblise the masses to observe a vigil close to Dr. Besigye's residence. Let us also rename Dr. Besigyes residence where he is incercerated as ROBEN ISLAND.


Friday, 29 November 2013



1. Voting paterns have since time in memorial indicated that Kampala City is an opposition stronghold. To Museveni, opposition is an enemy who should be fought and defeated.

2. Museveni has been taking over personal control of public bodies that generate huge revenues. Kampaka City like other public bodies generates alot of revenue. Therefore, he is interested in the KCCA revenue for personal use.

3. Kampala City has the most expensive pieces of land held by Baganda and the Buganda Kingdom in particular. In his efforts to economically criple them he has to seize their land under cover of developing the city.

4. Despite intense presure, Museveni has no intention of relinguishing power. In his strategic security plan that keeps him in power, militarily security Kampala City is his focal point. He fears that an opposition Mayor Lukwago can ally with Dr. Besigye to lead massive protests to storm the city centre in an attempt to take over government the Tunisia and Egypt way. Museveni knows that if the masses dared, he would brutally crush them but is mindful of repercussions from the ICC. Once he succeeds in his sceme to undermine the ICC operations in Africa, then he will have a free day in crushing such popular uprisings. Removal of street vendors, relocation markets and car parks, and boda boda raiders from the city centre are some of the schemes in this regard. Such sectors are dominated by the economically disadvantaged sections of the society who are desperate for change.

5. Dislodging Lukwago from the Kampala Mayorship has been a gradual process ever since he took over office. Desgination of KCCA, appointment of both the KCCA Executive Director and a Minister in-charge of Kampala have been part of the protracted scheme to undermine the authority of the Lord Mayor.
Until Thursday this week, Museveni has scored 3-0 against Lukwago at the 85th minute. The relief that the High Court granted to Lukwago on the same day can be equated to a penalty which if well planned can only afford Lukwago one goal. At the end of the match, Museveni will win with 3-1. However, what can only save Lukwago is a 'storm' that will see the match cancelled indefinetely or lightening to strike the entire Museveni team. Otherwise, the Thursday's Jubillant processions through Kampala can be said to have been a farewell one for the Lord Mayor Lukwago. That is why there was no scuffle between the Police and jubillating processions. With Museveni's Cadres Judicial officers strategically positioned in the highest court hieracy, outgoing Mayor Lukwago will get no tangible court redress.

6. The Lukwago Must Go Task Force is chaired by Frank Tumwebaze. He is deputised by the KCCA E.D and composed of all Division RDCs and Internal Security Officers. A number of Law Firms headed by the one of Edwin Karugire are providing the legal expertise. O. Opondo and Nyombi Tembo are mere spokespersons.
The Task Force is backed by a strong Security sub-committee headed by Aronda and deputised by Kaihura. This sub- committee is composed of among others, all the Chiefs of Intelligence, Commander of the SFG, Commandant of Military Police and all the DPCs in Kampala region.

The Task Force is keeping Museveni updated throughout. It has its operations base in Kololo from where the E.D is partly managing KCCA business.

Therefore, the desperate Museveni has lost all shame and is acting like a wounded buffallo. Next he will seek to replace the Kabaka.

Thursday, 28 November 2013



Fellow countrymen and women,

I humbly seek your approval in appealing to members of the legal fraternity to boycott courts of law in Uganda. This move will be a show of solidarity with the Lawyer who fell victim to Police brutality at City Hall in Kampala early this week. The boycott should demand for an explanation, apology and security guarantee from the executive arm of government.

If you sincerely believe that the said Lawyer is an innocent victim of a series of state inspired brutality, you can sign the petitition by way of adding your voice in form of a positive comment. For those who are not members of UAH, you are urged to make your voice heard by use of any other means available to you.

By taking thd path of a boycot, this particular incident and other past, present and future similar incientr will be highlighted. On the contrary, silence to such heinous crimes by the state is what the tyranical regime in Kampala has thrived on.

Your approval of this petitition will make a very big difference in the struggle to free the country from Museveni's tyrany.

To all Lawyers in Uganda the message is; TODAY ITS HIM AND TOMOROW ITS YOU.

Thank you.


Monday, 25 November 2013


Colonial agents like Emin Pasha, Samuel Baker and Capt F. D. Lugard set up colonial armies in Uganda using Sudanese Nubians. Later on the trend of enlisting the Luos and Nilotics gained ground throughout the colonial era. It is not true that the colonial administration preffered those ethinic groups to serve in the army at the exclusion of other ethinic groups. It is a fact Bantu ethinic groups were reluctant to join military service. A number of southerners served in the pre-independence army. Buganda's king Muteesa and Tooro George Rukidi were soldiers. Many other ex-service men (Kawonawos) of the KAR from among the Ugandan Bantu communities even fought in the World War II.

By the time Uganda gained independence in 1962, though the new Uganda Army was dominated by the Luos and Nilotics, a significant number of Bantu speaking had enlisted into the army. The misconceptions that surrounded the events of 1966 that saw the army invade and send the Buganda King Mutesa into exile aggravated the situation. The consenquental abolition of Bantu Kingdoms by the UPC government led by Milton Obote - a Luo left the army tagged to the Nilotics and Luos. In particular, the Baganda found no pride in serving in the army. NRA's Brig. Kasirye Gwanga has publicly stated that he cant render his military service beyond Karuma Bridge - to Northern Uganda.

This trend of events was not confined to military service alone but affected the Police and Prisons services too. Since security service was voluntary, those Bantus who enlisted into security services made very successful careers. There is no evidence of any government policy that aimed at eliminating Bantus from security services. Circumstancial evidence shows that the Bantus did and continue to find military service a vigorous and tiresome exercise. Interestingly, the Bantus embraced the less tiresome intelligence or secret services during the post independence regimes. Several Bantus including Rwandese migrants made succesful careers in Secret Service. Museveni too after University enlisted in the Intelligence services under the Obote I government. With time, the Nilotics/Luos developed a liking for security services coupled by their traditional worior-like nature. That is why they even dominate the private security services - a service viewed by Bantus as demeaning. The former are generally prefered by property owners as being reliable and trustworthy.

During the time of Amin a number of Bantus made successful careers in the security services. There was nothing like his elimination or restricting of Bantus from security services. After the fall of the Iddi Amin government though military service was voluntary, the Bantus still shunned enlisting in the military. This is what Museveni set out to exploit by preaching the secterian gospel of how leaders from northern Uganda were building a Luo/Nilotic army as a power base. He embarked on building a secterian southern Bantu army. However, a number of Bantus had embrraced the new post Iddi Amin national army including the Rwandese refugees and immigrants. Upon launching his five years bloody rebellion, Museveni took a good number of these Bantus/westerners to the bush. By the time he took over power in 1985, his NRA was a purely composed of Bantus from central and western Uganda.

The defeated former soldiers from West Nile, Northern and North eastern regions were refered to as Anyanyas. The NRA propaganda was that it had reversed the colonial trend of the Nilotics/Luos domination of military service. The NRA got overwhelming enlistment from the Luo/Nilotic regions. The insurgency in these regions that ensued left people economically stranded. With no education facilities in place many children and youths had no option but to join the NRA in order to provide for their families. NRA's reprisal harassment and arbitrary arrests on suspicion of being insurgents also led many to enlist in the NRA. Some defeated former UNLAs too enlisted as fresh recruits and others even forfeited their previous ranks. The auxillary forces formed by the NRA in these regions helped boost the NRA strength too. Surrendering former insurgents from various armed groups in these regions have also been joining the NRA.

Since coming to power, the state of welfare in the NRA has been appalling due to the thieving leadership that enjoy the Museveni's protection. Lower ranks of the NRA hailing from the peaceful and economically prosperious southern and western regions would desert in big numbers. For the impoverished NRAs from West Nile, Northern and North Eastern region, the rate of desertion was very low. During the re-enlistment of former combatants (Veterans) for the Congo expedition, the turn up from the Luo/Nilotic regions was overwhelming and many were retained in the NRA.

Currently they dominate the lower rank and file of NRA. Their rise to command positions has been systematically contained. SFG is their no-go area.


Friday, 15 November 2013


It is not clear if Kazini was ever a soldier under the Iddi Amin regime. What is clear is that during the Obote II government he was with the Moses Ali rebel group in Sudan as a Museveni agent. In 1984 he escaped from Sudan to Nairobi. In 1985 he was connected to the NRA when it was in control of western Uganda. Kazini together with Dan Byakutaaga then aides to Salim Saleh and were stationed in Mbarara charged with security of Museveni's mother.

Upon taking over government, Kazini was appointed the C.O of 14th Batallion based in Arua. In Arua, he used his position to harass former members of the Moses Ali group who had lost out on the war. Moses Ali who was a Cabinet Minister intervened and Capt. Kazini was transferred to Kampala as a C.O in Lubiri barracks. During that time Moses Ali was detained for years in the underground cells of Lubiri barrack under the constant torment of Kazini.

In 1989 he was made a Major and appointed the C.O of Military Police replacing Lt. Col. Oliver Odweyo whom he had framed up with allegations of treason. Odweyo later died in detention. During this time, he jumped out and instead reported about a smuggling racket that involved senior officers including his own brother, Col. Jet Mwebaze. He came to prominence when he brutally suppressed a riot by Moslems of the Tabliq sect in Kampala. During the same time, he used his position to antagonise with many senior army officers through uncalled for harassment. Military police in Makindye almost clashed with the Lubiri based NRA under Kazoora.

In 1991 as a Lt. Col he was posted to the Masaka based Mechanised unit to replace Col. Kiiza Besigye. He felt insecure and harassed his qualified Deputy David Lyangombe who was put on Katebe. He took the initiative to deploy tanks to the Presidential Protection Unit to boost Museveni's security following the murder of the Burundi President. He dismissed from the army some junior officers on accusations of having inquired about the tanks sent to the PPU. At the same time, he was tasked to coordinate the monitoring of Gen Tinyefuza's alleged subversive activities in Sembabule. He was being assisted by his unit I.O Capt. Godfrey Lule and DMI's Banson Mande under Aronda's supervision.

He was moved to the army headquarters as the Camp Commandant. At his, he antagonised with all senior officers including civilian MOD employees. Because of his high handedness, the operations of the GQ almost came to a halt before Museveni intervened. Museveni sent him to West Nile to handle the WNBF of Juma Oris and UNRF II of Bamuze. In West Nile, he was soon embroiled in settling his historical personal grievances with West Nilers. He was replaced by Katumba Wamala to take charge of West Nile.

In 1996, he was made a Colonel and sent to Gulu under Chief Ali who was the 4th Div. C.O. Kaziini’s role was not clearly spelled out. He was made the 4th Div. C.O but not to include Katumba Wamala's West Nile region. Katumba Wamala successfully handled the West Nile rebellion. Chief Ali was made a figure head Chief of Staff. Shortly after Kaziini was sent to Kasese to fight ADF rebels. Soon he undermined Chief Ali using the latter’s ADC, Nuwe Kyepaka by alleging that Chief Ali was involved in subversion.

Kazini was made a Brigadier and appointed Chief of Staff (COS). As COS, he undermined Charles Angina's efforts to fight the ADF in Rwenzori mountain by denying him logistics. As COS, he spearheaded the invasion of Congo where he replaced Muheesi. Shortly after he was made the commander of Operation Safe Heven (OSH) in the Congo.

His role in the Congo is well documented. He oversaw the killings and plunder in both the Congo and Central African Republic. The UN, the Justice Porter Commission and the joint Uganda/Rwanda investigation team found Kaziini culpable of orchestrating atrocities in the Congo. Instead, Museveni promoted him to Maj. Gen and made him the overall Army Commander (AC).

As COS and AC, he helped a lot in privatising the army through irregular recruitment, promotions, deployments and appointments. At the same time sidelining and persecuting into exile the unwanted ones. By relieving him of duties in 2003 and his subsequent court martialing, Museveni was trying to delink himself from the latter’s misdeeds in the Congo. 

The flimsy charges of creating ghost soldiers was a sham. That is why the court martial granted him bail upon an exceptionary presentation of a civilian surety and then allowed to proceed to Ghana for a course. The three years’ conviction was a mere design meant to hoodwink the Ugandans and donors. His alleged subversion never existed. The 7000 recruits were raised, trained and deployed with Museveni's blessing. 

The Brigade in Arua was under Museveni's former body Guard Sam Kavuma and it was a standby force to help Congo's Bemba topple Kabila. Up to the time of his death Museveni had assigned Kazini to South Sudan.  

It's ICC's ringing bells that made Kazini a dead scapegoat.


Wednesday, 6 November 2013

Andrew Mwenda - a member of NRM?

First published on Change of Guards Blog on November 6, 2013

Throughout the 80s, 90s and until recently Museveni's major 'obstacle' to his autocratic designs has been the free press. Gross abuse of human rights, corruption and abuse of office have been exposed by the independent press though operating in a very tough environment.

While at The Monitor, Andrew Mwenda distinguished himself as a Journalist who could withstand Museveni's intimidation. Besides his superb superior capacity to provide an accurate analysis of political and economic situation from a geopolitical and global perspective, he excelled in security matters. In that way, he gained a lot of fame at local and international level. But more so, he won the confidence of whistle blowers and patriotic individuals who through him volunteered a lot of sensitive information. 

Behind the scenes, Andrew Mwenda was in bed with the first family. He engaged as a fiancé the first lady's cousin sister, Fifi who lives in the USA. He became closer to the first son Muhoozi as a friend. His elder brothers Major Baguma of ISO and Col. Kayanja Muhanga formerly of JATT and now the Commandant of Military Police are Museveni's close confidants in the NRA. His sister Margret Muhanga was in the New Vision before she became the NRM woman representative for Kabarole district. He husband was the NRM district chairman before being appointed as the head of the National Forestry Authority. His mother was an NRM local council leader and is now a leading low NRM opinion leader in Kabarole. His father (RIP) was historically a UPC member until the NRM came on the scene but still he did neither showed open support nor opposition to the NRM.

Starting with getting closer to former Rwanda's head of External Intelligence, Col. Patrick Karegeya during the height of tensions between Uganda and Rwanda, Mwenda caught the attention of Paul Kagame. After he quit The Monitor at a time when Col. Karegeya had fallen out with Kagame, Mwenda was thought to be feeding Kagame with information pertaining to the movements and activities of the dissident army Generals. The run-away Generals had to cut off all links with Mwenda. Later, using his magazine The Independent he openly tooted up the task of whitewashing the Kagame administration in a public relations campaign. It is believed he brokered a deal that saw relations between Museveni and Kagame rejuvenated to the present honeymoon in Eastern Congo and the EAC.

The likes of Mwenda are what are refered to in intelligence as Agents Provocatuers. They disguise as ardent critics so as to attract, trap and compromise (expose) dissenters. Therefore, is Mwenda a top member of NRM or an opportunist?


Tuesday, 29 October 2013


The answer lies in what Museveni's brother, Gen. Saleh stated sometime back. In a media interview, the General warned that it would be dangerous for Museveni to leave power insisting that "two years from now Uganda will be faced with a geopolitical dilema - where is Uganda, who surrounds it and what is its problem?". As usual, Ugandans did not accord that statetement the scrutiny it deserved and it just passed unnoticed.

Shortly after, the M23 emerged and Museveni was behind it despite the repeated denials. Currently, Museveni is manipulating Uhuru Kenyata, Silva Kiir and Paul Kagame into the fast tracking of the East African political federation so that he becomes its first president.

The curving out of another state out of Eastern DRC that would be part of East African Community seems to be delaying. Tanzania under the AU Brigade is delaying this plan by defeating the M23. As has always been the case, a new version of M23 will soon emerge and restart the distablisation process. But for now the M23 will establish bases in the Virunga Mountains from where they will adopt guerilla tactics with direct support from both Kagame and Museveni.

In the long run, Kagame and Museveni will interfere into Tanzania's internal affairs by sowing seeds of discontent and secessionist sentiments among the communities of North-western Tanzania. This is what Kagame alluded to sometime back in reference to the standoff with Tanzania when he stated that "I wait and hit you at the right time".

Both Museveni and Kagame know that their dounfall will come from accross the border with DRC. Incidentally, the same eastern DRC is supposed to be their safe heavens in case they are militarily pushed out of power. Eastern DRC will only stablise when the two leaders are no longer in power.

Are we witnessing a geopolitical dilema that Gen. Saleh predicted?


Thursday, 24 October 2013


The Buganda Kingdom was reinstated by the army council sitting in Gulu under the Chairmanship of Museveni. All along, Prince Mutebi was provided security by the NRA. Among his security detail was one Cpl. Sabuni from Ibanda. Cpl. Sabuni was from DMI under Counter Intelligence department who had been trained in intelligence by the North Koreans at Kireka. Cpl. Sabuni had the task of reporting on Prince Mutebi's movements and associates.

Later, as cracks between Buganda and Museveni came to the surface, intelligence services infiltrated the Lukiko. A member of the Lukiko, Salongo Ssenkayi was recruited as a mole in the Lukiko. With Ssenkayi, security services were kept updated on developments in Mengo. However, as time went by, the Buganda establishment discovered that Ssenkayi was a mole. To enhance his personal security, Ssenkayi was issued with a pistol. Since he did not know how to operate it he was taken through a short orientation course by Pte Fred Aheirwe, the in-charge of arms at DMI. For perfection, Ssenkayi did his practicals by firing of rounds into the pit latrine at Basiima house.

Later, when Aronda was the Deputy Director of Military Intelligence he used a one Ssalongo Lulika (Son of Mzei Katende of Makulubita and a Lukiko member) to spy on suspected Mengo's dealings with Gen. Tinyefuza.

That was in the early and mid 90s and given the souring relationship since then, guess how many moles Museveni runs within the Mengo establishment! No doubt, in every security agency there is a Buganda Desk responsible for monitoring every move by the Mengo establishment.


Tuesday, 22 October 2013


Around 1987/88, South African freedom fighters relocated to Uganda from Tanzania. The group of about 100 comprised of both ANC and PAC holders of the Refugee Convention travel documents.

In Uganda, they were innitially handled by the External Security Organisation (ESO) who to them to Kabamba military training school in Mubende district. At Kabamba the South Africans commoly refered to as 'Comrades', were enrolled for basic infantry training together with the Ugandan recruits.

Towards late 1990, as more ANC freedom fighters came to Uganda, a separate camp exclusively for them was set up at Kaweweta in Luwero district. The management of the trainees shifted to DMI. Officers like Capt. Byaruhanga as the C.O, Lt. Muwonge Kagwa as the Admin Officer, Lt. Joseph Balikudembe as the Quartermaster were put in charge of the camp.

By 1990, the three had been recalled back to DMI headquarter over gross theft of cash and supplies meant for the ANC trainees. As usual, no disciplinary action was taken against them except they were allowed to enjoy their loot. Capt Byaruhanga retired but was killed in Kisangani during clashes with RDF where he was on a smuggling mission. Capt Kagwa Muwonge rose to become a Capt and a lead spy on Baganda Nkoba Zambogo group at Makere university before he passed away. Lt. Joseph Balikudembe from Bunyaruguru in Bushenyi district has risen to the rank of Colonel and one of the top NRA commanders in CAR, Somalia and the Northern and eastern Uganda. Col. Joseph Balikudembe todate continues the theft that started from the ANC camp in Luwero.


Thursday, 17 October 2013


A good number of NRA officers who have been involved in thieving and outright robberies have been rewarded by Museveni with promotions and reappointments to positions of greater responsibility. This has been possible only to those whose personal loyalty to Museveni is not in doubt aka political clarity in NRM circles.

The few examples are as follows: -

1. Gen Saleh who confessed to taking bribes from the purchase of junk helicopters is a senior Presidential Advisor and Museveni's closest confidant.

2. Gen. John Mugyenyi started by supplying air to the NRA in the late 80s when he was the Director of Administration. He went on to aid drug trafficking when stationed at Entebbe airport as anti terrorism officer under CMI. He is one of the wealthiest officers. Was recently elevated to the rank of General.

3. Maj. Otema Awany was the Director of Transport who stole a lot. He is now a Brigadier, Division Commander and Museveni's confidant in Acholiland.

4. Lt Mawa Dula was the O.C of the Military Police Detach based at Karuma when he robbed from Arua destined goods truck. He was charged in the Court martial but jumped. He sought Kaziini's protection who in turn appointed him commander of the Alpine Brigade in Congo. While in Beni he stole a land cruiser which he airlifted to Uganda. He is now a Colonel and a top NRM leader in Kasese.

5. Capt. Patrick Kiyingi robbed from a truck load of merchandise destined for Arua. He was court martialled and sentenced to 2 years’ imprisonment which automatically meant dismissal from service. Instead, he was reinstated, deployed in Congo and promoted to the rank of Lt. Colonel.

6. The 28 senior officers were suspended for swindling of billions through the creation of ghost soldiers. The move was meant to hoodwink the public and no one was conclusively tried. Save for Brig. Tumukunde whose political clarity was questionable; all the rest were promoted and redeployed.

7. Capt. Kayanja Muhanga was the head of JATT when he extorted from victims. He was simply replaced and is now a Colonel and Commanding office of Military Police.

8. Lt Segamwenge and Lt Memory Bariyo robbed Congolese coffee transiting through Uganda. They were simply arrested, released, promoted to Lt. Col and Major respectively and redeployed.

9. Maj Bright Rwamirama the former Chief Controller of Finance swindled billions. He was suspended and the case amazingly taken to the civilian Court where it was dismissed. Rwamirama was instead appointed a cabinet Minister.

10. A number of Junior soldiers stole a lot of money but were instead promoted and many now hold positions of responsibility under what is termed as the 'new blood'.

The list is endless. It is very common to find the city of Kampala divided into zones i.e. those working in the NRA Finance department owning estates in Busega, those from Supplies department owning estates in Kyebando, those in Medical owning estates in Bweyogerere etc.
To Museveni, these are the kind of officers he hopes will defend him to retain power because they have property to protect. He believes that the past armies would simply withdraw from Kampala because they had nothing to lose since they owned no property but stayed in government houses.
Therefore, Museveni favours thieving by NRA officers.


Wednesday, 16 October 2013


Museveni not shocked by his private army thieving in Somalia.

He can’t be shocked because it is an established institutionalised practice in his private army. Museveni may have no time to know that there is no medicine in the government hospital but would not go to bed before he gets a situation report from even the smallest section of the army. All along he knew about the thieving in Somalia and at home but to him its a means of ensuring personal loyalty.

He pretends to take action when its the wrong person involved, he wants to make a replacement or he wants to hoodwink donors and Ugandans. He conspired to persecute Maj. Sabiiti Mutengesa who attempted to unearth the ghost soldiers scam. What of Cpl Paddy Gita who was court martialled for making revelations about financial scandals. Lt. Kachope maliciously dismissed from the army for reporting about 3inancial impropriety in NEC-LIME and the beneficiaries Capt. Ssekidde and company now own a chain of business empires.

Rampant creation of ghost soldiers, supply of air, inflated procurement of logistics (helicopters and undersize uniforms), theft of money meant for widows, pension and gratuity of former soldiers and retired ISO and ESO staff, are some of the few examples he is very much aware of. More so, no conviction in 27 yrs.

Initially, in order to hoodwink the public, the NRM/NRA portrayed itself as an incorruptible organisation. However, in recent years, corruption, abuse of office and misuse of public resources by the Museveni regime has come to the limelight. By the time he took over power, his NRM/NRA was composed of the men in army uniform who had fought the government to bring him to power. After capturing power many civilians were brought in to man different structures of the government.

Because there was a lot of mass indoctrination (politicisation) by NRM cadres, those civilians were fearful of getting involved in theft of public resources. The few who did were either historically associated with the bush war or had to hide behind the men in uniform. That is why those cabinet ministers and District Commissioners who served under the regime during 1986 - 1990 did not enrich themselves.

Within the men in uniform (NRA), politicisation condemned theft and misuse of public resources. It was the responsibility of Political Commissars (PCs) and Military Intelligence Officers (I. Os) at different levels of the army structures to check the vice. Military Intelligence and Political Commissariat Departments were highly respected within the army. However, some very powerful senior army officers who knew Museveni's secret agenda did not waste time for they immediately embarked on enriching themselves through shoddy deals and outright diversion of resources meant for their troops.

Some commanders looted personal and public property from the northern and eastern region. Matayo Kyaligonza ferried truck loads of cattle from Teso to his home in Hoima. Jim Muhweezi and his Lieutenants swept ISO clean. Those in the Finance, Supplies, Barracks and stores stole what ever they could land their hands on. Those who decided to remain clean or tried to rise these issues would be branded subversives seeking cheep popularity.

PCs and I. Os who risked to investigate and forward reports to higher echelons were disappointed and frustrated for lack of action. Many joined the looting spree while some simply quit. The once powerful and respected Political Commissariat department in the army faded out. Military Intelligence became preoccupied with the lead task of ensure that Museveni remains in power.

By mid 90s, it had become an official policy of the privileged NRA personnel to grab anything that could give them personal wealth. Both senior and junior officers accumulated immense wealth. The scramble for quick wealth bread intrigue and the ordinary soldier suffered.  Strict disciplinarians like Mugisha Muntu were frustrated by Museveni's reluctance to fight the vice.  As Army Commander, he had taken steps by suspending some senior officers but Museveni could not sanction prosecution and recovery but instead introduced the system of indefinite suspension (Katebe).  This bred hatred, contempt and ridicule against Muntu and Museveni could not come to his rescue.

The frustrated Muntu opted to retire. He refused a Minister of Defence portfolio and as a send off Museveni offered him fifty million cash send off to inject into his stone stone quarry project.  Museveni knew that Muntu almost owned nothing completely while many senior and junior officers held immense wealth. This accumulation of wealth has been used to attract new entrants into the NRA.  Learning from the examples set by the 'vanguards of the revolution (NRA)', the civilian NRMs picked the courage and also went on a looting spree.

Museveni by separately meeting ordinary soldiers and pretending to be shocked by their revelations is trying to play cheap popularity. The move will cover the entire army just to win back lost confidence at a time when the force's cohesion is shaky.


Sunday, 6 October 2013


"....for three months we have been waiting for him. ......he knows my address." This was Museveni's reaction to the press regarding Gen. Tinyefuza's threats of using force against him. The tone used by Museveni depicts an underlying anger and panic.

For the last three months they have not only been waiting for him but have also been preparing for his coming. Here below are some of the contigency plans:

1. Moblising NRA Veterans from the western, central and eastern regions against being lured into rebellion.

2. Establishing a Tinyefuza task force headed by Aronda with a tast of providing perodical assessment of the threat level and the operational effectiveness of all security agencies.

3. Intelligence agencies using both human and techinical means to intensify surveillance on Senior goverment officials, security officers, and Buganda Kingdom officials.

4. Finalising the process of declaring him an army deserter. Presurising Parliament into declaring vacant the General's seat in parliament.

5. Charging the General with desertion and treason in absentia.

6. Arresting and interrogating Dr. Besigye over the meeting he had with Tinyefuza in London with view of bringing up charges of either treason or misprison of treason. This will discourage others from meeting him in future thus issolating the exiled General.

7. Observing and scrutinising all trips to London made by prominient Ugandans. Bear in that other insignificant Ugandas may be used as couriers.

8. Sending more spies to USA, South Africa, Canada, UK and the Scandinavia disguised as asylum seekers so as to reinforce the monitoring of the activities of Ugandans in the diaspora.

9. Identifying and assigning capable cadres to counter negative propaganda on social networks and private radio stations while emphasising the Tinyefuza's misconducts during the insurgency in northern Uganda.

10. Echoeing the historical Acholi/Langi differences so as to detatching Col. Ogole from the Acholis.

11. State house intelligence spearheading the hit squad coordinated by the London embassy of a friendly country.
12. Linking the activities of protests and strikes in the country with the General's threats of war.

13. Issuing of terror alerts to disuade mass gatherings. In case of a terror attack, the nation will be diverted and united in grief while the international community will express solidarity and renewed support.

14. Monitoring of the storage, utilisation and movement of war materials to counter internal sabotage.

15. Streamling of counter intelligence operations in order to detect and deter enemy infiltration.

16. Ensuring that all Chiefs, Directors, Division C.Os, Brigade C.Os, Battalion C.Os, and Heads of Independent Units at all times to account for the whereabouts of the officers and men under their command.

The above measures are subject to review depending on the situation.


That is the writing on the poster hanged on the wall of one of the torture chambers in Museveni's safe house at Kololo.

The safe house located in the posh suburb of Kololo is the headquarters of the anti-terrorim outfit, JATT. The storyed house overlooking Bukoto and Naguru hills accross a valley is adjacent to the Danish Ambasador's residence. It is a rented house owned by an Engineer from Ibanda working with the Ministry of Works. He is short, light skinned, bearded man in his late 50s or early 60s. He knows that his house is is used as a detention facility by his tennant. The landlord makes regular weekend inspections to his house.

Stairs lead from what was meant to be a sitting room on the ground floor through a tiny corridor to the top floor. The diffent rooms on both the ground and top floor are used for detention. On the top floor there are also offices and an exit door. Opposite this exit door at about 10 metres there is a servants quarters and a garrage that is also used as a detention room.

The boys quarters house the interrogation room. Adjacent to it is the communications centre on the right. On the left facing into the Ambassadors bed room, are the showers and toilet. Its from here that at one time a victim jumped over the fence into the Ambasador's residence before he was recaptured by CMI operatives. In the torture chamber located at the servants quarter all sorts of torture gadgets are strategically mounted. One of the gadgets is that poster about war that sends any victims mind into deep thoughts. The captors start by informing you that they are neither politicians nor Generals but men who are fighting a war that was started by politicians and planned by Generals for them to execute. The go further to inform you that their masters (politicians and Generals) have tasked them to extract information from you. Thereafter, the hell breaks out. To neutralise the sound of yellings, they switch on the heavy Generator and play loud music.

Museveni is a politician, a General and a foot soldier. As he stated last week "let him come. He knows my address. For three months we have been waiting for him". Is Tinyefuza a politician, a General and a foot soldier too?


Friday, 4 October 2013


With the security forces involvement in election rigging, bribing of impoverished voters, cadre Judges in Courts of law, and NRM cadres in all structures of central and local government, there is no doubt Museveni cannot be dislodged from power through constitutional means. He is so much power hungry that he can not even relinquish it to his son. He is simply grooming his son to take command of a special force that will protect his grip on power. However, should he succeed in gaining the Presidency of the East African Community (EAC), he will hand over to a figurehead president as he retains the Presidency behind the scenes.
Institutionalised abuse of office, corruption, gross violation of human rights, nepotism and theft of public resources have made Ugandans of all shades to bury their artificial differences and are united as one oppressed community. Museveni's old tactics of fomenting ethnic and regionalism is no longer tenable. The masses have lost faith in the electoral process. Its only Muntu and Mao who are focusing on the 2016 elections.
The opposition has done enough in rallying the masses to demand for their rights. A mass uprising in form of protests will be brutally crushed by Museveni's private security apparatus. Some Ugandans who sensed the danger of Museveni's governance resorted to unconstitutional means to dislodge him from power. However, Museveni managed to suffocate the groups by playing the sectarian card. UNRF 1 and 2, HSM, LRA, UPA were branded Anyanyas. ADF branded Islamic fundamentalists. Itongwa's NDA linked with Buganda's demand for Federalism. Its only the PRA that was nationalistic in character. Had it not been let down by the LRA, Congolese and Rwanda's sudden change of foreign policy, the PRA was to set to evolve into a national armed liberation movement.

Its now a decade since the conditions that gave rise to PRA came to the surface and the situation has now grown from worse to worst. But had the Rwanda backed PRA succeeded, would it not have become a situation similar to what happened with Rwanda backed Kabila (Sr)!
Owing to the fact that the masses are more than ready for any means that can dislodge Museveni there is no need of a protracted war. Since the Andrew Kayiira coup attempt of 1986 and the NRA Artillery based Capt. Mugarra foiled coup attempt of 1988, Museveni has not faced any real coup threat. However, he has kept a close eye on General Tinyefuza as a potential coup plotter. His being sidelined from the mainstream military service alludes to that fear. The situation was worsened by the General's failed attempt to retire from the army. Since then the General has been a subject of intelligence surveillance. When he seemed to reconcile with Museveni, he was simply trying to entice Museveni to get him closer to security circles. No way, Museveni who is a master of deceit instead assigned him as Coordinator of Intelligence Services. Tinyefuza did not coordinate any intelligence but was instead a subject of 24 hours intelligence surveillance.
During his tenure, the General is reported to have actively offered technical advice to Museveni's efforts to suppress dissenters. The General thought that he would win the confidence of Museveni who would return him to the mainstream military in the hope that he would use it to kick out his Commander in Chief. When the General lost all hope, he went wild with controversial public statements. Though these outbursts amounted to using a 'wrong forum', Museveni opted to ignore him. However, Tinyefuza is either not sincere or ignorant when he put himself in the same group with Aronda when he stated that they were targets of assassinations for opposing the Muhoozi project. Aronda will never part ways with Museveni. Museveni must have known that the General intended to flee but looked the other side in the hope that it is easy to manage him in exile than when he is close to his army.

In exile, the General has declared intentions of overthrowing Museveni. He is mobilising Ugandans for that purpose. There is no doubt Tinyefuza's declarations are a big threat to Museveni. Therefore, Museveni's main preoccupation now is how to 'deal with' Tinyefuza in the same way the Rwanda government tried to deal with its own renegade General Kayumba in South Africa.

It is only a timely and well planned decisive military strike that will seen Museveni's NRA defect en masse leaving Muhoozi's SFG to battle it alone. Rwanda if not occupied with its own strike will send its infantry to Museveni's aid. Kenya will send its air force. Southern Sudan's intervention will depend on the nature and composition of the strike. Tanzania will not intervene. On the contrary, a botched-up plan will spell doom for Ugandans. Most disappointed will be members of the security services who since the days of PRA have been on standby for that opportunity. It’s worthy noting that Museveni can’t easily flee unless he has caused untold damage on the country.

Tuesday, 1 October 2013


The 1995 Uganda Constitution Schedule 20 lists Banyarwanda as one of the tribes in Uganda. The events of 1959 in Rwanda led many Tutsis to flee to mainly Burundi, Tanzania, Congo and Uganda. In Uganda they were granted refugee status in compliance with the 1951 Geneva Convention for which Uganda is a signatory. In 1982, even when Rwakasisi attempted to move parliament to revoke the refugee status held by these refugees, the UPC government stood its ground and continued to accord them international protection. Upto 1990, allmost all these refugees still enjoyed international protection. All those people like the Rwigyemas, Kagame etc have never denied that they were refugees in Uganda. Infact to enhance their physical security, Museveni had allowed them to hold firearms by enilisting them in his private security company - NRA.

When these refugees felt it safe to return home, and since they knew the route they simply drove towards the Uganda/Rwanda border and returned to Rwanda. It took four years to complete the voluntary repatriation process. In the process they founded the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). The RPF took over government in Rwanda and together with its armed wing the RDF as a strong, motivated and proffessional army, the former Refugees find no shame in identifying themselves as Rwandese of Rwanda.

However, according to Museveni the Banyarwanda who were in the NRA escaped and invaded Rwanda.




Right from the days of post Iddi Amin UNLF government, Museveni knowingly swelled the ranks of his personal army with a number of Rwandese refugees. When they were eliminated from the new national army because of their refugee status, as Minister of Defence he retained them as hir private army.

When he launched the bush war, these Rwandese refugees were the most loyal and trusted among the fighters. When he took over goverment, the Rwandese because of their sound education background and undisputed loyality dominated vital command positions and key departments like Intelligence, Supplies, Finance and Presidential Protection/VIP protection etc. Fred Rwigyema who had been a Duputy Army Commander and Deputy Minister of Defence was Museveni's most trusted top army officer more than even his own brother Gen. Saleh.

Museveni still wanted these Rwandese in the NRA to gurrantee his security. Museveni also feared that Fred Rwigyema would also attract alot of non Rwandese NRAs into the war in Rwanda. However, there was growing feeling of animosity towards Museveni's overreliance on Rwandese. A number of Senior NRA officers were disgusted with their presence. For the same reasons, the current plans by Gen. Tinyefuza must equally be bad news in Kigali. Museveni got reports that the Rwandese were planning to go to Rwanda by force. Museveni tasked then Sgt Rwakitarate of DMI to investgate the preparations that were going on at Bihanga training school under the supervision of Capt Musitwa. Museveni rendered Rwigyema redundant and Paul Kagame was humilliated with a demotion in terms of responsibility before sending him on a course overseas. Museveni also feared that the RPF invasion and taking over of power in Rwanda would lead to an exodus of Rwandese from Uganda to Rwanda. In this way it would harm those other Rwandese in Uganda who for some reasons do not want to identify with Rwanda.

The Rwandese in NRA realised that Museveni was bent on triming their influence to the minimum while continuing to use them to gurantee his security. They decided to make a hasty invassion. Given their secretive nature, it is most likely that Fred Rwigyema did not tell his close friend Saleh.

When the invasion suffered a setback, Museveni very much aware that the retreating RPF nolong had space in the NRA, decided to militarily support them. If he did not it would have become a situation similar to how Rwanda is now stuck with the M23 fighters.

Even when they took over power, Museveni did not want Kagame to take over as President. He prefered a Pasteur Bizimungu type of leader who would regard Museveni as a godfather as opposed to Kagame who had to defiantly humilliate him in battle before he came to accept Rwanda's independence.
Therefore, Museveni opposed the invasion but supported the war. As he had an agreement with the Baganda, could he have had an agreement with the Rwandese but was reluctant to honour it and the RPF defiantly moved to enforce it!


Monday, 30 September 2013


Like all other oppressive regimes around the world, Museveni too was taken by suprise when NATO directly intervened in Libya. Dictators all over had got used to mere condemnations, sanctions, travel bans and at worst unenforceable UN resolutions. Such actions only affect the citizens with little impact on the dictator and his cohorts. This is exactly what Museveni has always refered to as "Kahendekye teita mbogo" literally meaning that merely wishing a buffalo to break its leg does not guarantee its death.

Such dictatorial regimes believed that so long as they have built personal armies to keep them in power, there is nothing the oppressed masses could do to free themselves. They exploit the international law of non interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. If the oppressed masses try to rise up they are brutally suppressed and branded reactionaries, negative forces and terrorists.

When Museveni was fighting, his ideology clearly stated that he was struggling against agents of Western Imperialism. He refered to the Israelis as Zionists ane the West and USA as imperialists. These were the core subjects in his schools of indoctrination refered to as political schools that produced Cadres. During his armed war, his role models were Chairman Mao, Fidel Castrol, Comrade Joseph Stalin etc. Gadafi supported Museveni during the bush war with logistical and training opportunities. After taking over power, his cadres were ferried to Libya day and night for political indoctrination. Thousands of Copies of Gadafi's Green Book and other Jamahiria literatures were the major resource materials in the NRA political schools. Though he stated that he was pro-Uganda, there is no doubt Musevendi was pro-East. During the early days of his taking over government, Cuba, Soviet Union and North Korea were the major destinations for his Cadres training. Two intakes of Intelligence training - one led by Paul Kagame and another led by Dhamuzungu Oguli were in Cuba. The North Koreans conducted the first Military Intelligence course at Kireka. Among those that attended was Rwanda's Jack Nziiza. Long courses of upto five years were conducted by Soviet Union and attended by among others Major Mambo Bazarrabusa. Batter trade between Cuba and Uganda failed in its infancy. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Museveni switched sides. He excelled as an ally of the West first against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism from Khartoum and later agaist global fight against terrnrism. With the emergence of China on the world stage, Museveni and his club members are now attacking the west left and right.

It is Gadafi who promoted Museveni's son Muhoozi to the rank of Major. During the same occassion, Gadafi made a statement to the effect that revolutionaries dont leave power. However, as usual Museveni opposed Gadafi on the African Union because he wanted the East African Union in anticipation of being its first President.

It is against this background that when NATO intervened in Libya, Museveni stated thus "this military intervention by the West is a new phenomena......and if that is the case now, we shall have another Vietnam". Shortly after, he left for Moscow to meet Putin. He must be very supportive of Syria's Assaad and his Moscow backers. The world should also pick interest in what is taking place in his Luwero Military Industries to avoid a future catastrophe. There is a reason he had to deploy his close confidant Brig. James Mugina as the Managing Director of the same industries. He is currently moblising African states against the ICC which he knows will at one time indict him. It is unfortunate the west embrassed him without reservations. With his current influence among Somalis right from the time of his close friend and War lord Muhamad Farrah Ideed, he will be able to attack and inflict damage on any of the western interests anywhere. By the time the west realises, it will be costly in terms of human and logistical resources.

Museveni therefore playing hide and seek between east and west in order to make them clash. To be able to apprehend this argument, a Syria like situation is likely to emerge in Uganda, and then you will see how he plays about the west against the east and vice versa.


Sunday, 29 September 2013


Outright theft and diversion of financial and logistical resources in the NRA is as old as the NRA itself. During preparations to launch the rebellion by attacking Kabamba in 1981, an RPG launcher was stolen under Museveni's nose. In the bush the fighters would feed on the people's gardens, chicken and goats without paying. Its only the Balalo who were promised compensation for their cows eaten by the NRA as if the Cassava, beans, Kainja, chicken and goats had no owner!
Some Commanders were so greedy that they would grab for themselves too much of the scarce resources at the expense of the suffering ordinary fighters. Museveni defended the practice thus "it is better to maintain a healthy command structure". In 1985 during the interim administration of the NRA controlled western region, senior commanders embarked on grabbing for themselves government and cooperative society's property sparking off internal bickering.
Upon taking over government, swindling of cash, food and other supplies became the norm. 'Supply of air' for food and non-food items by companies registered in the names of relatives and friends of senior commanders enriched the few lucky ones. Private companies like Cristex, Eladam and a few others involved in locally making uniforms for the NRA connived with army officers to steal the national coffers.
Elly Rwakakoko the then NYTIL MD connived with the then Defence Secretary, Ben Mbonye to swindle huge amounts of cash through inflated production of Uniforms. The same applied to BATA that was supplying foot wear for the soldiers. NRA's Phenecas Keitirima looted clean all the equipment that had been imported to boost the NRA's Production Unit but was left lying in Luzira. He became one of the little known first richest members of the NRA. The NRA Construction Unit presided over by Eng. Sabiiti - brother to Central Bank Governor was another den of thieves.
The creation of National Enterprises Corporation (NEC) - a subsidiary of the Defence Ministry created another avenue for wanton theft. Museveni grabbed NEC's Kisozi ranch, while Amama Mbabazi's wife, Jacqueline stole from NEC industries in Luwero as Capt. Ssekidde and group helped themselves with the NEC Lime mining in Kasese. Inflated and uncontrolled payment of salaries to the NRA the other auxiliary forces gave rise to creation of ghost soldiers.
Because of NRA's political indoctrination, those who had crossed to the NRA from other armies had initially feared to join the stealing. After realising that the NRA was not practicing what it preached, they too joined the looting spree. That is how the likes of Otema Awany managed to accumulate wealth. Some NRA personnel who chose to remain clean like Chihandae, Muntu, Nanyumba, Dr. Ochen, Muntu, Mande, Tinyefuza and a few others were alienated. Museveni knew that the more the wealth his army officers acquired, the more they would not question his leadership.
The introduction of Ration Cash Allowance (RCA) as a direct payment of cash helped to reduce on 'supply of air' for food items. As a compensation, Commanders in the war-torn areas devised a means of creating war like situations whereby they would continue to locally procure food items for the troops on the frontline. As if this was not enough they went ahead to create 'ghost soldiers' in order to siphon off that extra payment.
Expenditure on medical, housing, water and electricity bills were always inflated for the benefit of just a few lucky ones. Maintenance, servicing and repair military transport and procuring and maintenance of military equipment in general was another avenue for outright theft. The departments responsible for checking on these anomalies were Military Intelligence, Army Inspectorate, and the Army Political Commissariat. They too joined the looting especially after experiencing lack of will by the top leadership to fight the vice. A one Charles Tusiime of DMI who headed the Criminal Investigations unit was such a naturally dense fellow that he was only fit to be a motor vehicle mechanic.
He headed a team of Lawyers whose efforts he frustrated before finally sending then to the Military Police under the newly created Special Investigation Bureau (SIB) headed by a graduate in Music, Mathew Gureme. Members of SIB were and remain professionally corrupt. That marked the end of any semblance of fighting graft in the NRA. Everyone in his position set out to acquire personal wealth at all costs. Those who could not steal from the NRA, turned guns on civilian property.
However, not everyone enjoyed the protection from above. While others were put on Katebe, ISO's John Kazoora was framed and imprisoned while NRA financial managers, Arthur Musinguzi and Bright Rwamirama were strangely taken to a civilian court to have the charges dropped. Tadeo Kanyankole was humiliated to death while the famous Ghost Soldiers group were suspended to hoodwink Ugandans the donors but instead were later promoted and reassigned.


Friday, 27 September 2013


During the early 90s when the Somali war lords brought down a USA army helcopter, killed marines and took others hostage, Museveni being a war monger admired the bravery and courage of Somalis. Being a pro-east, no doubt Museveni must have celebrated the humilliation of "western imperialists (USA)". That is why he keeps saying that his NRA is succeeding where the USA failed thus African solution to African problems. Since then he developed a special liking for Somalis residing in Uganda.

When the fight against global terrorism took centre stage, Museveni jumped into the theatre in order to win the support of the West and USA in particular. When his NRA led the peace mission in Somalia, his knew that the Conflict would last decades. He also knew that during that period he would be a regional strategic ally of the west such that it would not question his autocracy in Uganda. To prolong the Somali mission, his NRA led AMISOM had for years not been able to gain any major successes against the militants save for securing the airport and the Presidential palace. Still, the militants would occassionally carry out attacks not only on those two key installations but even on any part of Mogadishu. Its for this reason that when the UN sought the contribution of other countries, Museveni suggested that Uganda alone can provide the all the required troops and the UN should only increase provision of financial and logistical support.

In 2011 he was faced with the dilema of declaring if he was to run for another round of office as the world its breath. Coincidentally, Kampala suffered a terror attack that left over seventy people dead. Within a few hours after the attack Museveni was at the scene of attack giving briefs and captured by the international media houses. The attention of the international community and the West in particular was diverted. The whole world and Uganda in particular were in grief. Even leading world leaders who had shunned him had to telephone with promisses of increased support. In the ensuring confusion, Museveni did not need to declare intention to run for another term but simply entered the Presidential race. Interestingly, suspects were easily rounded up and they confessed faster than those in Guantanamo, courtesy of Museveni's 'superb intelligence'. Burundi which also has troops in Somalia, its capital Bujumbura - a softer target than Kampala has never been targeted. When the UN report implicated NRA'S involvement in DRC, he threatened to pull out of Somalia and the UN backed down.

Since then the threat of a potential terror attack has been used by Museveni to clamp down on dissenting voices. The right and freedoms of citizens to move and assemble has been curtailled using the scare of a concocted potential terror threat. Issuing of terror alerts in Uganda always corresponds with the agitation by citizens to freedom of association and assembly. The current draconian laws being enacted i.e the Public Order Bill are also enacted and will be enforced against the background of concocted terrorism threats. As usual the NRA is using the Somali mission as a money making venture through irregular contracts, flawed procurements and diversion of financial and logistical resources.

When Kenya intervened in Somalia and made great succeces against the militants, Museveni's NRA under AMISOM in Somalia also improved in their operations by moving beyond the Airport and the Presidential palace. Museveni strongly pushed for the Kenya troops to be incorporated into the AMISOM command structure. He had hoped that in this way the progress of the Kenya troops would be bogged down. Kenya troops have made tremendous success against the militants by securing Kisimayo and other key areas of tactical. But still calls for Kenya troops to leave Somalia have persistently come from both the militants and most recently the Somali government. If it was not for the new found marriage of convenience between Museveni and Kenyatta for the sake fighting the ICC and first tracking the EAC political federation, the NRA would clash with Kenya army as was the case with Rwanda in DRC's Kisangani.

As Museveni's new found friend Uhuru Kenyata was battling international issolation over criminal charges against him in the ICC, alleged Somali militants attacked a Nairobi shopping mall. The incident has been marked by information black out as to who and how did the attack take place. As the Kenya goverment security Minister was the lead mouth piece in updating the world, in Uganda the Commander of the army took the lead in informing the world how the attack was masterminded by ADF's Jamil Mukulu. He also went ahead to issue terror alerts. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Police in particular opted to keep mum. Coincidentally, Museveni was attending the UN General Assembly in New York. He used the occasion to put up a defence against the breaved Uhuru Kenyata's trial by the ICC. Will the Nairobi attack save Uhuru?

Friday, 20 September 2013


The former controversial Mayor of Kampala City, Naser Ntege Ssebagala supported the opposition against Museveni during the 2001 presidential elections. Ssebagala had defeated two of the Museveni sponsored candidates for the mayoral race. Ssebagala had won on the ticket of the traditional anti-Museveni Kampala dwellers more especially the urban unemployed youth and the common low income people.

During the controvercial 2001 elections in which Dr. Besigye gave Museveni a tough challenge, Ssebagala was a symbol of opposition in Kampala city which proved to be an opposition stronghold. During the 1996 elections Kampala city had also demonstrated opposition to Museveni in favour of Paul Ssemwogerere. Then Captain Hudsom Mukasa - Muganda Commanding Officer of the then Mbuya based 7th Batallion had to be reprimanded when it was discoved that his unit was sympathetic to the opposition. Indeed as the Unit was ordered out Kampala, the convoy bemused residents when it chantet pro-opposition songs thus Ssemogerere gira ofuganda Museveni tumukoye.

During 2001 elections Naser Ssebagala while attendinding Hon Ken Lukyamuzi's wedding publicly predicted that the elections would end up in a rerun and then Museveni would loose. He warned that if Museveni refused to hand over power, he would be overthrown by peoples protests citing the case of Yugoslavia's Slobadan Milosevic. As the polling day drew nearer, it became clear that Mayor Ssebagala was busy mobilising his youth brigades in Kampala to storm the city with protests immediately after the resusts would show that Museveni had won. Museveni who was by then residing in the city centre panicked alot. At the time the Police had not yet become a branch of his NRA. His security detail was still manned by the somehow ethinically balanced PPU and had not yet detached itself from the mainstream Army. Above all Col Besigye had claimed that he had 90% support of the army and Museven had threatened to send him six feet underground. Museveni's intelligence estimates indicated that Mayor Nasser Ssebagala's plans of youth protests was a formidable threat. Museveni sanctioned Gen Tinyefuza to talk to Ssebagala with view of convicing him to abandon the youth protests. On the eve of the elections Tinyefuza drove to Ssebagala's residence in Bugolobi in the evening. After a lengthy meeting a deal was reached for the Lord Mayor to abandon the planned protests. Ssebagala without giving reason communicated to the youth who had been on standby to standdown. Museveni at the time breathed a sigh of relief but embarked on a long task of barricading himself against future popular protests.

Following the post 2011 election protests in Kampala, Museveni is hiding behind the cover of modernising the city to get rid of potential protesters. The desgination of Kampala as an autonomous Authority, the creation of the position of the Executive Director, undermining the Lord Mayor and plans to expand Kampala into the teritory of Buganda are all long term manouvers of recapturing Kampala city from being an opposition stronghold. The current controvercial moves to rid the city centre of vendors, bodaboda riders and the common urban unemployed youths coupled by preventive detention of opposition leaders are all desperate manouvers to disable their ease of mobility into an Arab Spring kind of resistance. Museveni believes that at the slightest blink of the eye, Dr. Besigye can lead protesters to take over the city centre hence the 24 hours security survallance around him.

Museveni's worry is that should such a scenarior arise, his security forces will quell it after killing hundreds of the protesters. In turn he will be made a subject of ICC indictment. Hower, if he succeeds in manipulating the AU into withdrawing from the ICC, he will have a free day in gruesomely comitting human rights violations unabetted. He is aware that he has already comitted indictable attrocities in Uganda. He is also aware that he is not yet spared from the ICC indictment over attrocities in the Congo thus the hasty championing of a withdrawing from the ICC by African countries. Criminal proceedings are never time bared. Gadafi survived the ICC but was indicted by God.


Thursday, 19 September 2013


During the bush war of all the commanders who dared to challenge Museveni's leadership, its only Tinyefuza who survived and emerged from the bush. Towards the fall of Kampala he was completing an 18 months detention sentence for disobedience of lawful orders. After release he commanded the Kyenjojo, Hoima, Masindi, Karuma, Gulu and West Nile axis during the final battles with government. After capturing power, Tinyefuza served as the Kampala based 163 Brigade Commander - one of the first three NRA brigades. Later on he became the Chief of Combat Operations still based in Kampala. Therefore, when he claims that he knows who killed Kayiira he should be taken seriously because he was the incharge of security in central region and Kampala city in particular. When formal ranks were introduced in the NRA Tinyefuza fell in level three from the top. Level one was Lt. Gen Museveni. Level two were Maj. Generals Rwigyema, Tumwine and Saleh. Level thre were Brigadiers Tinyefuza, Kyaligonza and Kanyankole. Level four had Colonels Muntu, Cheif Ali, Lumumba, Chihandae and Pecos Kutesa. At the time Tinyefuza knew that with his education background and military capability he would no doubt surpass the Maj. Generals in level two and get next to the Museveni.

When he was the Minister of State for Defence Muntu who had earlier been his junior was the Army Commander! Museveni assigned Tinyenfuza the to lead an operation against the LRA. He hanged his civillian mnisterial suit in the office and went to the field to conduct combat operations against the LRA. Therefore it wont be a surprise for Gen. Aronda as Minister of Internal Affairs to don the combat attire and head for military operations. Tinyefuza's operation against LRA though brutal to some extent was almost a success story before Museveni recalled him from the field. Tinyefuza's success had been because of zero tollerance to diversion of supplies and theft of soldier's pay by field commanders. With improved welfare, the morale of troops was high and hence exemplary performance on the battle front. Museveni feared that Tinyefuza's growing popularity with the rank and file of the troops could entice him (Tinyefuza) to turn guns aganst him. Actuall scanty intelligence at the time indicated that Tinyefuza had that plan.

Tinyefuza lost the minesterial position and was instead placed on Katebe (redudant) as a Presidential Advisor. During the Constituent Assembly Tinyefuza together with Besigye and Serwanga Lwanga more often expressed independent views. To Museveni that amounted to being counter revolutionary (Bipingamizi). When appearing before the parliamentary committee on Defence Tinyefuza used the opportunity to criticise the NRA leadership over mismanagement of the war in the northern Uganda. Museveni threatened to reprimand him and (Tinyefuza) sought to leave the army. He won the first round of the court petition but lost in the Museveni influenced Supreme Court. All this took place during a time when he had become a subject of intelligence collection over his presumed secret dealings with some 'disgruntelled' army officers and Buganda Kingdom. Museveni suspected that Buganda intended to back Tinyefuza's Presidential bid if he was allowed to leave the army. Indeed if Tinyefuza had been allowed to leave the army at that time he would have ran for the Presidency thus tearing the NRA between himself and Museveni.

As Museveni was focussing on Tinyefuza, the likes of Kiiza Besigye and Mugisha Muntu sneaked out of the NRA. In his estimation Museveni rightly did not anticipate Besigye and Muntu to dirrectly form a formidable opposition atleast not the kind that would eat into his power base - the military. Museveni believed that its only opposition by Tinyefuza that could encroach on the military. Tinyefuza had also deceived him with reconciliatory statements in the hope that Museveni would bring him closer to the army but no way instead he deceived him with the designation of Coordinator of Intelligence services. Tinyefuza knew that the assignment was simply to keep him under watch. However, as he has openly stated that he harbours presidential ambitions, during the course of time he took measures like suppressing the opposition in the hope that he would win Museveni's favour by bringing him closer to the army. Museveni who understands Tinyefuza's capabilities very well could not rellent. Instead he concentrated on expanding and strengthening the Special Forces under the command of his son as Tinyefuza's influence in the NRA faded. That is why his controvercial statements shortly before he fled were simply being ignored.

Tinyefuza at one time described the opposition as confused implying that Museveni can't be dislodged by the ballot. Therefore what Besigye did to Museveni was supposed to have been done by Tinyefuza much earlier but what Museveni has done to Besigye he could not do it to Tinyefuza!! THEY BROUGHT HIM AND TOGETHER THEY WILL TAKE HIM.

Tuesday, 17 September 2013


Had the original East African Community (EAC) not collapsed in 1977, Tanzania would not have invaded Uganda to overthrow Iddi Amin in. Rwanda, Burundi and Congo too all along had in place a similar arrangement that preceded the current International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). Their original regional arrangement had its secretariat based in Goma. That regional body was a success story because it successfuly resolved any misunderstanding that arose between any state party. It managed to contain any attempt by Rwandese Tutsis exiled in Congo and Burundi from any hostile activities against the Hutu government in Rwanda. Similary the same body contained Burundi Hutus who were exiled in Rwanda from any hostility against the Tutsi government in Burundi. That way, the hostility that ignited that region's blody conflict had to come from outside the regional arrangement - Uganda. In 1990 the Rwandese Tutsis from Uganda invaded Rwanda and the long time constrined Rwandese Tutsis in Congo and Burundi flocked Uganda to join hands with RPF. In 1993, Burundi got the first democratically elected Hutu President but was slaughtered by the Tutsi army three months later. A Hutu had taken over power in Burundi at a time when the Tutsi RPF was battling the Hutu government of Rwanda. Had he not been slaughtered and power reverted back to the Tutsi army, the then Hutu government of Rwanda would have got a strong ally in Burundi thus strengthening its resistance against the RPF. With the pro-Uganda RPF taking over power in Rwanda in 1994, that regional body collapsed. The final nail was hardly two years later when the RPF invaded Congo and overthrew Mobutu.

Museveni had all along envied that body but also feared that his presidency would be challenged from Congo. That is why just a few hours after being sworn in as President in 1986, he flew to Congo to meet Congos Mobutu, Rwanda's Habyarimana and Kenya's Arap Moi. He wanted that regional body to be expanded to include Uganda and Kenya in order to secure a regional military alliance. Kenya had since the time of Iddi Amin haboured Ugandan dissidents. During the Obote II regime Kenya was the major base of the NRA external operations. After Museveni took over power, still Kenya was a base of Uganda dissidents. Around 1997, an all out war was about to break out after the NRA made an incursion into Kenya. Dissident Ugandan Amon Bazira was shot dead in Nairobi by ESO operatives. In early 1990s Kenyan dissident Col Odong who had formed the February Eighteenth Resistance Army (FERA) was a state guest in Kampala and handled by Aronda before relocating to Ghana. During the controvercial elections in Kenya Museveni was opposed to the Raila Oginga victory for fear that the later's goverment would ally with the Nilotes/Luos in Uganda. He had supported the SPLA in Southern Sudan but intelligence reports indicated that that it often supplied LRA with logistics and intelligence. Museveni's main fear was that once John Garang had secured Southern Sudan's independence, he could seek to support his cousins in Nothern Uganda. John Garang died in a Ugandan Helcopter crash shortly before the countrie's independence.

In advocating for the fast tracking of the EAC political federation, Museveni seeks to secure a military alliance that will guarantee his stay in power. To this end he sough to include a provision in the defence pact thus "an attack on a member state shall be an attack against all member states. An armed attack against a party state party shall be considered a threat to regional security. Such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action by all state parties". This provision was defeated by Tanzania prompting Museveni to lower his tone on his much aclaimed EAC Stand by Brigade and instead concentrate on strengthening his son's SFG. Another interest lies in attaining the first Presidency of the EAC federation so that he hands over Uganda's Presidency to his chosen successos. That is why he opposed Ghadafi on the idea of African Union. With Tanzania's reluctancy to fast track the EAC federation coupled by presure to relinguish the presidency in Uganda, Museveni is desparately trying to secure a faster regional federation without Tanzania. In his calculation, if he already has the support of Rwanda, Kenya and South Sudan. In future he expects to bring on board Somalia and the yet to be created state of Kivu in eartern DRC.

Therefore, Tanzania's deployment into DRC against Rwanda/Uganda backed M23 was a fatal blow to Museveni's schemes. The situation is worserned by recent expulsion of Rwandese from Tanzania. To Museveni the federation and the Swahili language was also meant to cover up for the Banyarwanda identity especially the pastroll comunities that are randomly scattered all over the region. These pastrol communities of Tanzania's Kagera Region had assisisted Museveni during the fight against Amin. Now they are securing the southern border.