Monday, 30 September 2013


Like all other oppressive regimes around the world, Museveni too was taken by suprise when NATO directly intervened in Libya. Dictators all over had got used to mere condemnations, sanctions, travel bans and at worst unenforceable UN resolutions. Such actions only affect the citizens with little impact on the dictator and his cohorts. This is exactly what Museveni has always refered to as "Kahendekye teita mbogo" literally meaning that merely wishing a buffalo to break its leg does not guarantee its death.

Such dictatorial regimes believed that so long as they have built personal armies to keep them in power, there is nothing the oppressed masses could do to free themselves. They exploit the international law of non interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. If the oppressed masses try to rise up they are brutally suppressed and branded reactionaries, negative forces and terrorists.

When Museveni was fighting, his ideology clearly stated that he was struggling against agents of Western Imperialism. He refered to the Israelis as Zionists ane the West and USA as imperialists. These were the core subjects in his schools of indoctrination refered to as political schools that produced Cadres. During his armed war, his role models were Chairman Mao, Fidel Castrol, Comrade Joseph Stalin etc. Gadafi supported Museveni during the bush war with logistical and training opportunities. After taking over power, his cadres were ferried to Libya day and night for political indoctrination. Thousands of Copies of Gadafi's Green Book and other Jamahiria literatures were the major resource materials in the NRA political schools. Though he stated that he was pro-Uganda, there is no doubt Musevendi was pro-East. During the early days of his taking over government, Cuba, Soviet Union and North Korea were the major destinations for his Cadres training. Two intakes of Intelligence training - one led by Paul Kagame and another led by Dhamuzungu Oguli were in Cuba. The North Koreans conducted the first Military Intelligence course at Kireka. Among those that attended was Rwanda's Jack Nziiza. Long courses of upto five years were conducted by Soviet Union and attended by among others Major Mambo Bazarrabusa. Batter trade between Cuba and Uganda failed in its infancy. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Museveni switched sides. He excelled as an ally of the West first against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism from Khartoum and later agaist global fight against terrnrism. With the emergence of China on the world stage, Museveni and his club members are now attacking the west left and right.

It is Gadafi who promoted Museveni's son Muhoozi to the rank of Major. During the same occassion, Gadafi made a statement to the effect that revolutionaries dont leave power. However, as usual Museveni opposed Gadafi on the African Union because he wanted the East African Union in anticipation of being its first President.

It is against this background that when NATO intervened in Libya, Museveni stated thus "this military intervention by the West is a new phenomena......and if that is the case now, we shall have another Vietnam". Shortly after, he left for Moscow to meet Putin. He must be very supportive of Syria's Assaad and his Moscow backers. The world should also pick interest in what is taking place in his Luwero Military Industries to avoid a future catastrophe. There is a reason he had to deploy his close confidant Brig. James Mugina as the Managing Director of the same industries. He is currently moblising African states against the ICC which he knows will at one time indict him. It is unfortunate the west embrassed him without reservations. With his current influence among Somalis right from the time of his close friend and War lord Muhamad Farrah Ideed, he will be able to attack and inflict damage on any of the western interests anywhere. By the time the west realises, it will be costly in terms of human and logistical resources.

Museveni therefore playing hide and seek between east and west in order to make them clash. To be able to apprehend this argument, a Syria like situation is likely to emerge in Uganda, and then you will see how he plays about the west against the east and vice versa.


Sunday, 29 September 2013


Outright theft and diversion of financial and logistical resources in the NRA is as old as the NRA itself. During preparations to launch the rebellion by attacking Kabamba in 1981, an RPG launcher was stolen under Museveni's nose. In the bush the fighters would feed on the people's gardens, chicken and goats without paying. Its only the Balalo who were promised compensation for their cows eaten by the NRA as if the Cassava, beans, Kainja, chicken and goats had no owner!
Some Commanders were so greedy that they would grab for themselves too much of the scarce resources at the expense of the suffering ordinary fighters. Museveni defended the practice thus "it is better to maintain a healthy command structure". In 1985 during the interim administration of the NRA controlled western region, senior commanders embarked on grabbing for themselves government and cooperative society's property sparking off internal bickering.
Upon taking over government, swindling of cash, food and other supplies became the norm. 'Supply of air' for food and non-food items by companies registered in the names of relatives and friends of senior commanders enriched the few lucky ones. Private companies like Cristex, Eladam and a few others involved in locally making uniforms for the NRA connived with army officers to steal the national coffers.
Elly Rwakakoko the then NYTIL MD connived with the then Defence Secretary, Ben Mbonye to swindle huge amounts of cash through inflated production of Uniforms. The same applied to BATA that was supplying foot wear for the soldiers. NRA's Phenecas Keitirima looted clean all the equipment that had been imported to boost the NRA's Production Unit but was left lying in Luzira. He became one of the little known first richest members of the NRA. The NRA Construction Unit presided over by Eng. Sabiiti - brother to Central Bank Governor was another den of thieves.
The creation of National Enterprises Corporation (NEC) - a subsidiary of the Defence Ministry created another avenue for wanton theft. Museveni grabbed NEC's Kisozi ranch, while Amama Mbabazi's wife, Jacqueline stole from NEC industries in Luwero as Capt. Ssekidde and group helped themselves with the NEC Lime mining in Kasese. Inflated and uncontrolled payment of salaries to the NRA the other auxiliary forces gave rise to creation of ghost soldiers.
Because of NRA's political indoctrination, those who had crossed to the NRA from other armies had initially feared to join the stealing. After realising that the NRA was not practicing what it preached, they too joined the looting spree. That is how the likes of Otema Awany managed to accumulate wealth. Some NRA personnel who chose to remain clean like Chihandae, Muntu, Nanyumba, Dr. Ochen, Muntu, Mande, Tinyefuza and a few others were alienated. Museveni knew that the more the wealth his army officers acquired, the more they would not question his leadership.
The introduction of Ration Cash Allowance (RCA) as a direct payment of cash helped to reduce on 'supply of air' for food items. As a compensation, Commanders in the war-torn areas devised a means of creating war like situations whereby they would continue to locally procure food items for the troops on the frontline. As if this was not enough they went ahead to create 'ghost soldiers' in order to siphon off that extra payment.
Expenditure on medical, housing, water and electricity bills were always inflated for the benefit of just a few lucky ones. Maintenance, servicing and repair military transport and procuring and maintenance of military equipment in general was another avenue for outright theft. The departments responsible for checking on these anomalies were Military Intelligence, Army Inspectorate, and the Army Political Commissariat. They too joined the looting especially after experiencing lack of will by the top leadership to fight the vice. A one Charles Tusiime of DMI who headed the Criminal Investigations unit was such a naturally dense fellow that he was only fit to be a motor vehicle mechanic.
He headed a team of Lawyers whose efforts he frustrated before finally sending then to the Military Police under the newly created Special Investigation Bureau (SIB) headed by a graduate in Music, Mathew Gureme. Members of SIB were and remain professionally corrupt. That marked the end of any semblance of fighting graft in the NRA. Everyone in his position set out to acquire personal wealth at all costs. Those who could not steal from the NRA, turned guns on civilian property.
However, not everyone enjoyed the protection from above. While others were put on Katebe, ISO's John Kazoora was framed and imprisoned while NRA financial managers, Arthur Musinguzi and Bright Rwamirama were strangely taken to a civilian court to have the charges dropped. Tadeo Kanyankole was humiliated to death while the famous Ghost Soldiers group were suspended to hoodwink Ugandans the donors but instead were later promoted and reassigned.


Friday, 27 September 2013


During the early 90s when the Somali war lords brought down a USA army helcopter, killed marines and took others hostage, Museveni being a war monger admired the bravery and courage of Somalis. Being a pro-east, no doubt Museveni must have celebrated the humilliation of "western imperialists (USA)". That is why he keeps saying that his NRA is succeeding where the USA failed thus African solution to African problems. Since then he developed a special liking for Somalis residing in Uganda.

When the fight against global terrorism took centre stage, Museveni jumped into the theatre in order to win the support of the West and USA in particular. When his NRA led the peace mission in Somalia, his knew that the Conflict would last decades. He also knew that during that period he would be a regional strategic ally of the west such that it would not question his autocracy in Uganda. To prolong the Somali mission, his NRA led AMISOM had for years not been able to gain any major successes against the militants save for securing the airport and the Presidential palace. Still, the militants would occassionally carry out attacks not only on those two key installations but even on any part of Mogadishu. Its for this reason that when the UN sought the contribution of other countries, Museveni suggested that Uganda alone can provide the all the required troops and the UN should only increase provision of financial and logistical support.

In 2011 he was faced with the dilema of declaring if he was to run for another round of office as the world its breath. Coincidentally, Kampala suffered a terror attack that left over seventy people dead. Within a few hours after the attack Museveni was at the scene of attack giving briefs and captured by the international media houses. The attention of the international community and the West in particular was diverted. The whole world and Uganda in particular were in grief. Even leading world leaders who had shunned him had to telephone with promisses of increased support. In the ensuring confusion, Museveni did not need to declare intention to run for another term but simply entered the Presidential race. Interestingly, suspects were easily rounded up and they confessed faster than those in Guantanamo, courtesy of Museveni's 'superb intelligence'. Burundi which also has troops in Somalia, its capital Bujumbura - a softer target than Kampala has never been targeted. When the UN report implicated NRA'S involvement in DRC, he threatened to pull out of Somalia and the UN backed down.

Since then the threat of a potential terror attack has been used by Museveni to clamp down on dissenting voices. The right and freedoms of citizens to move and assemble has been curtailled using the scare of a concocted potential terror threat. Issuing of terror alerts in Uganda always corresponds with the agitation by citizens to freedom of association and assembly. The current draconian laws being enacted i.e the Public Order Bill are also enacted and will be enforced against the background of concocted terrorism threats. As usual the NRA is using the Somali mission as a money making venture through irregular contracts, flawed procurements and diversion of financial and logistical resources.

When Kenya intervened in Somalia and made great succeces against the militants, Museveni's NRA under AMISOM in Somalia also improved in their operations by moving beyond the Airport and the Presidential palace. Museveni strongly pushed for the Kenya troops to be incorporated into the AMISOM command structure. He had hoped that in this way the progress of the Kenya troops would be bogged down. Kenya troops have made tremendous success against the militants by securing Kisimayo and other key areas of tactical. But still calls for Kenya troops to leave Somalia have persistently come from both the militants and most recently the Somali government. If it was not for the new found marriage of convenience between Museveni and Kenyatta for the sake fighting the ICC and first tracking the EAC political federation, the NRA would clash with Kenya army as was the case with Rwanda in DRC's Kisangani.

As Museveni's new found friend Uhuru Kenyata was battling international issolation over criminal charges against him in the ICC, alleged Somali militants attacked a Nairobi shopping mall. The incident has been marked by information black out as to who and how did the attack take place. As the Kenya goverment security Minister was the lead mouth piece in updating the world, in Uganda the Commander of the army took the lead in informing the world how the attack was masterminded by ADF's Jamil Mukulu. He also went ahead to issue terror alerts. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Police in particular opted to keep mum. Coincidentally, Museveni was attending the UN General Assembly in New York. He used the occasion to put up a defence against the breaved Uhuru Kenyata's trial by the ICC. Will the Nairobi attack save Uhuru?

Friday, 20 September 2013


The former controversial Mayor of Kampala City, Naser Ntege Ssebagala supported the opposition against Museveni during the 2001 presidential elections. Ssebagala had defeated two of the Museveni sponsored candidates for the mayoral race. Ssebagala had won on the ticket of the traditional anti-Museveni Kampala dwellers more especially the urban unemployed youth and the common low income people.

During the controvercial 2001 elections in which Dr. Besigye gave Museveni a tough challenge, Ssebagala was a symbol of opposition in Kampala city which proved to be an opposition stronghold. During the 1996 elections Kampala city had also demonstrated opposition to Museveni in favour of Paul Ssemwogerere. Then Captain Hudsom Mukasa - Muganda Commanding Officer of the then Mbuya based 7th Batallion had to be reprimanded when it was discoved that his unit was sympathetic to the opposition. Indeed as the Unit was ordered out Kampala, the convoy bemused residents when it chantet pro-opposition songs thus Ssemogerere gira ofuganda Museveni tumukoye.

During 2001 elections Naser Ssebagala while attendinding Hon Ken Lukyamuzi's wedding publicly predicted that the elections would end up in a rerun and then Museveni would loose. He warned that if Museveni refused to hand over power, he would be overthrown by peoples protests citing the case of Yugoslavia's Slobadan Milosevic. As the polling day drew nearer, it became clear that Mayor Ssebagala was busy mobilising his youth brigades in Kampala to storm the city with protests immediately after the resusts would show that Museveni had won. Museveni who was by then residing in the city centre panicked alot. At the time the Police had not yet become a branch of his NRA. His security detail was still manned by the somehow ethinically balanced PPU and had not yet detached itself from the mainstream Army. Above all Col Besigye had claimed that he had 90% support of the army and Museven had threatened to send him six feet underground. Museveni's intelligence estimates indicated that Mayor Nasser Ssebagala's plans of youth protests was a formidable threat. Museveni sanctioned Gen Tinyefuza to talk to Ssebagala with view of convicing him to abandon the youth protests. On the eve of the elections Tinyefuza drove to Ssebagala's residence in Bugolobi in the evening. After a lengthy meeting a deal was reached for the Lord Mayor to abandon the planned protests. Ssebagala without giving reason communicated to the youth who had been on standby to standdown. Museveni at the time breathed a sigh of relief but embarked on a long task of barricading himself against future popular protests.

Following the post 2011 election protests in Kampala, Museveni is hiding behind the cover of modernising the city to get rid of potential protesters. The desgination of Kampala as an autonomous Authority, the creation of the position of the Executive Director, undermining the Lord Mayor and plans to expand Kampala into the teritory of Buganda are all long term manouvers of recapturing Kampala city from being an opposition stronghold. The current controvercial moves to rid the city centre of vendors, bodaboda riders and the common urban unemployed youths coupled by preventive detention of opposition leaders are all desperate manouvers to disable their ease of mobility into an Arab Spring kind of resistance. Museveni believes that at the slightest blink of the eye, Dr. Besigye can lead protesters to take over the city centre hence the 24 hours security survallance around him.

Museveni's worry is that should such a scenarior arise, his security forces will quell it after killing hundreds of the protesters. In turn he will be made a subject of ICC indictment. Hower, if he succeeds in manipulating the AU into withdrawing from the ICC, he will have a free day in gruesomely comitting human rights violations unabetted. He is aware that he has already comitted indictable attrocities in Uganda. He is also aware that he is not yet spared from the ICC indictment over attrocities in the Congo thus the hasty championing of a withdrawing from the ICC by African countries. Criminal proceedings are never time bared. Gadafi survived the ICC but was indicted by God.


Thursday, 19 September 2013


During the bush war of all the commanders who dared to challenge Museveni's leadership, its only Tinyefuza who survived and emerged from the bush. Towards the fall of Kampala he was completing an 18 months detention sentence for disobedience of lawful orders. After release he commanded the Kyenjojo, Hoima, Masindi, Karuma, Gulu and West Nile axis during the final battles with government. After capturing power, Tinyefuza served as the Kampala based 163 Brigade Commander - one of the first three NRA brigades. Later on he became the Chief of Combat Operations still based in Kampala. Therefore, when he claims that he knows who killed Kayiira he should be taken seriously because he was the incharge of security in central region and Kampala city in particular. When formal ranks were introduced in the NRA Tinyefuza fell in level three from the top. Level one was Lt. Gen Museveni. Level two were Maj. Generals Rwigyema, Tumwine and Saleh. Level thre were Brigadiers Tinyefuza, Kyaligonza and Kanyankole. Level four had Colonels Muntu, Cheif Ali, Lumumba, Chihandae and Pecos Kutesa. At the time Tinyefuza knew that with his education background and military capability he would no doubt surpass the Maj. Generals in level two and get next to the Museveni.

When he was the Minister of State for Defence Muntu who had earlier been his junior was the Army Commander! Museveni assigned Tinyenfuza the to lead an operation against the LRA. He hanged his civillian mnisterial suit in the office and went to the field to conduct combat operations against the LRA. Therefore it wont be a surprise for Gen. Aronda as Minister of Internal Affairs to don the combat attire and head for military operations. Tinyefuza's operation against LRA though brutal to some extent was almost a success story before Museveni recalled him from the field. Tinyefuza's success had been because of zero tollerance to diversion of supplies and theft of soldier's pay by field commanders. With improved welfare, the morale of troops was high and hence exemplary performance on the battle front. Museveni feared that Tinyefuza's growing popularity with the rank and file of the troops could entice him (Tinyefuza) to turn guns aganst him. Actuall scanty intelligence at the time indicated that Tinyefuza had that plan.

Tinyefuza lost the minesterial position and was instead placed on Katebe (redudant) as a Presidential Advisor. During the Constituent Assembly Tinyefuza together with Besigye and Serwanga Lwanga more often expressed independent views. To Museveni that amounted to being counter revolutionary (Bipingamizi). When appearing before the parliamentary committee on Defence Tinyefuza used the opportunity to criticise the NRA leadership over mismanagement of the war in the northern Uganda. Museveni threatened to reprimand him and (Tinyefuza) sought to leave the army. He won the first round of the court petition but lost in the Museveni influenced Supreme Court. All this took place during a time when he had become a subject of intelligence collection over his presumed secret dealings with some 'disgruntelled' army officers and Buganda Kingdom. Museveni suspected that Buganda intended to back Tinyefuza's Presidential bid if he was allowed to leave the army. Indeed if Tinyefuza had been allowed to leave the army at that time he would have ran for the Presidency thus tearing the NRA between himself and Museveni.

As Museveni was focussing on Tinyefuza, the likes of Kiiza Besigye and Mugisha Muntu sneaked out of the NRA. In his estimation Museveni rightly did not anticipate Besigye and Muntu to dirrectly form a formidable opposition atleast not the kind that would eat into his power base - the military. Museveni believed that its only opposition by Tinyefuza that could encroach on the military. Tinyefuza had also deceived him with reconciliatory statements in the hope that Museveni would bring him closer to the army but no way instead he deceived him with the designation of Coordinator of Intelligence services. Tinyefuza knew that the assignment was simply to keep him under watch. However, as he has openly stated that he harbours presidential ambitions, during the course of time he took measures like suppressing the opposition in the hope that he would win Museveni's favour by bringing him closer to the army. Museveni who understands Tinyefuza's capabilities very well could not rellent. Instead he concentrated on expanding and strengthening the Special Forces under the command of his son as Tinyefuza's influence in the NRA faded. That is why his controvercial statements shortly before he fled were simply being ignored.

Tinyefuza at one time described the opposition as confused implying that Museveni can't be dislodged by the ballot. Therefore what Besigye did to Museveni was supposed to have been done by Tinyefuza much earlier but what Museveni has done to Besigye he could not do it to Tinyefuza!! THEY BROUGHT HIM AND TOGETHER THEY WILL TAKE HIM.

Tuesday, 17 September 2013


Had the original East African Community (EAC) not collapsed in 1977, Tanzania would not have invaded Uganda to overthrow Iddi Amin in. Rwanda, Burundi and Congo too all along had in place a similar arrangement that preceded the current International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). Their original regional arrangement had its secretariat based in Goma. That regional body was a success story because it successfuly resolved any misunderstanding that arose between any state party. It managed to contain any attempt by Rwandese Tutsis exiled in Congo and Burundi from any hostile activities against the Hutu government in Rwanda. Similary the same body contained Burundi Hutus who were exiled in Rwanda from any hostility against the Tutsi government in Burundi. That way, the hostility that ignited that region's blody conflict had to come from outside the regional arrangement - Uganda. In 1990 the Rwandese Tutsis from Uganda invaded Rwanda and the long time constrined Rwandese Tutsis in Congo and Burundi flocked Uganda to join hands with RPF. In 1993, Burundi got the first democratically elected Hutu President but was slaughtered by the Tutsi army three months later. A Hutu had taken over power in Burundi at a time when the Tutsi RPF was battling the Hutu government of Rwanda. Had he not been slaughtered and power reverted back to the Tutsi army, the then Hutu government of Rwanda would have got a strong ally in Burundi thus strengthening its resistance against the RPF. With the pro-Uganda RPF taking over power in Rwanda in 1994, that regional body collapsed. The final nail was hardly two years later when the RPF invaded Congo and overthrew Mobutu.

Museveni had all along envied that body but also feared that his presidency would be challenged from Congo. That is why just a few hours after being sworn in as President in 1986, he flew to Congo to meet Congos Mobutu, Rwanda's Habyarimana and Kenya's Arap Moi. He wanted that regional body to be expanded to include Uganda and Kenya in order to secure a regional military alliance. Kenya had since the time of Iddi Amin haboured Ugandan dissidents. During the Obote II regime Kenya was the major base of the NRA external operations. After Museveni took over power, still Kenya was a base of Uganda dissidents. Around 1997, an all out war was about to break out after the NRA made an incursion into Kenya. Dissident Ugandan Amon Bazira was shot dead in Nairobi by ESO operatives. In early 1990s Kenyan dissident Col Odong who had formed the February Eighteenth Resistance Army (FERA) was a state guest in Kampala and handled by Aronda before relocating to Ghana. During the controvercial elections in Kenya Museveni was opposed to the Raila Oginga victory for fear that the later's goverment would ally with the Nilotes/Luos in Uganda. He had supported the SPLA in Southern Sudan but intelligence reports indicated that that it often supplied LRA with logistics and intelligence. Museveni's main fear was that once John Garang had secured Southern Sudan's independence, he could seek to support his cousins in Nothern Uganda. John Garang died in a Ugandan Helcopter crash shortly before the countrie's independence.

In advocating for the fast tracking of the EAC political federation, Museveni seeks to secure a military alliance that will guarantee his stay in power. To this end he sough to include a provision in the defence pact thus "an attack on a member state shall be an attack against all member states. An armed attack against a party state party shall be considered a threat to regional security. Such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action by all state parties". This provision was defeated by Tanzania prompting Museveni to lower his tone on his much aclaimed EAC Stand by Brigade and instead concentrate on strengthening his son's SFG. Another interest lies in attaining the first Presidency of the EAC federation so that he hands over Uganda's Presidency to his chosen successos. That is why he opposed Ghadafi on the idea of African Union. With Tanzania's reluctancy to fast track the EAC federation coupled by presure to relinguish the presidency in Uganda, Museveni is desparately trying to secure a faster regional federation without Tanzania. In his calculation, if he already has the support of Rwanda, Kenya and South Sudan. In future he expects to bring on board Somalia and the yet to be created state of Kivu in eartern DRC.

Therefore, Tanzania's deployment into DRC against Rwanda/Uganda backed M23 was a fatal blow to Museveni's schemes. The situation is worserned by recent expulsion of Rwandese from Tanzania. To Museveni the federation and the Swahili language was also meant to cover up for the Banyarwanda identity especially the pastroll comunities that are randomly scattered all over the region. These pastrol communities of Tanzania's Kagera Region had assisisted Museveni during the fight against Amin. Now they are securing the southern border.

Monday, 16 September 2013


Colonial boundary demarcations placed Kisoro district on the Ugandan side and Ruhengeri province on the Rwanda side. The people of Kisoro became Bafumbira while those of Ruhengeri remained Rwandese of the Bakiga Hutu ethinic group. Late President Habyarimana was a Mukiga Hutu. In Kisoro among the Bafumbira are both Hutus and minority Tutsis. Rwandese migrantion into Uganda in search of land hightened during the early 20th Century. This migration involved both Tutsis and Hutus searching for pasture and arable land respectively. This group settled and assimilated with local communities in the western and central regions. Majority especially the Hutus lost their Rwandese identity while the Tutsi kept their identity a closely guarded family secret. In the early 1990s during a funeral vigil
at Gen Aronda's residence on Buganda Road, close family mourners broke into Kinyarwanda hymns leaving many other onlookers bemused.
In 1959 a new wave of Tutsis fled Rwanda into Uganda as refugees. They were settled in refugee camps in Tooro and Ankole. Those with the means managed to leave these camps, acquire land, education and accumulated wealth. The economicaly disabled remained in the camps but enjoyed equal social services with nationals. Uganda's weak immigration laws made it easy for both the Rwandese immigrants and refugees to access goverment jobs in the civil and security services. It was not easy to distinguish a Munyankole Hima from a Rwandese Tutsi on one hand and a Ugandan Mufumbira from a Rwandese migrant or refugee on the other hand. Museveni knowingly used these refugees in his NRA wars.

In 1990, Rwandese Tutsi refugees in the NRA invaded Rwanda. Many remained in the NRA where they continue to serve todate. The RPF invaded through a hostile teritory of Uganda's Kisoro district where the majority Bafumbira are Hutus and were sympathetic to the Habyarimana regime. Many other Rwandese Tutsis in Congo, Tanzania, Burundi and even the diaspora flocked into Uganda to join hands with the RPF invasion. The likes of ICC's Ntaganda and Nkunda who are now climing to be Congolese were in the RPF fighting the Hutu government of Rwanda. After the RPF took over power many Rwandese Tutsi in Uganda simply moved en masse with their cattle and returned to Rwanda. The government, UNHCR and other aid agencies were not involved in the repatriation. Earlier on, these Tutsi refugees has kind of been naturalised by the NRM regime. Imagine a refuge camp where most of the adult males are members of the army of the host government. Deputy Army Comander, Director of Medical services, Director of intelligence, Brigade and Batallion Comanders, District commissioners etc were all registered refugees and would visit the camp in military helicopters and escorted by machine guns.

Those who had established themselves outside the camps did not bother to return but are well represented in the Rwanda government by some family members. It is very common to find scenarios like a Ugandan Nurse in Mulago Hospital having a brother who is a Colnel in the Rwanda army while another brother is a State Attorney in Uganda and the father is a teacher in Uganda as an uncle is Rwanda's Ambassador to Canada. That is why during the early days many top Rwandese Tutsi officials in the Rwanda government would invest their savings and send their children to school in Uganda. Also, many of those who had returned to Rwanda en masse returned and settled in Uganda after finding the going not easy in Rwanda. During the time Kagame was a Vice President in Rwanda, Kayihura and Aronda would facilitate him to sneak out of Rwanda, visit Museveni or even transit through Uganda before sneaking back without the knowledge of the then figurehead Hutu President of Rwanda. In this way, when Museveni brought on board the likes of Kaihura and Aronda at the helm of security in Uganda, definetely the souring relations between the two countries were cemented.

It has always been speculated that Museveni is a Rwandese. During the new constitution making process, Museveni managed to push through a provision that introduced Banyarwanda as one indigenous tribes of Uganda. The deal was sealed and Saleh who had all along been refered to as his half brother now became a full brother. Amazingly, no Munyarwanda is willing to openly identify him/herself as one. They commonly identify themselves as Banyankole. Calling him a Munyarwanda amounts to secterianism. Beyond Kigezi, Ankole and some parts of western Uganda, the communities there cant differenciate betwen Hima and Tutsi pastrolists instead they simply generalise them as Balaalo. These gun wielding 'Balalos' have been a problen to the host comunities. Museveni only sends in his NRA Generals to quell the land conflicts without explaining how and why these Balaalos came to be armed with automatic rifles. No doubt, as is the case with the Banyamulenge of Congo, these Banyarwanda of Uganda owe their allegiance to the Tutsi regime in Rwanda.

Sunday, 15 September 2013


No doubt, Museveni's 27 years grip on power has heen enabled by his strong personal control of the security forces. It is the security forces that have fought off over two dozenes of armed groups, facilitated election rigging and brutally suppressed peaceful protests. His purpoted retirement from the army was a hoax. He is active member of the NRA who continues to don the NRA combat uniform (not the ceremonial uniform for retirees) and more often carries an AK 47 assault rifle. The 1995 constitution renamed his NRA as UPDF but behind the scenes it remains NRA as a military wing of his NRM party. Members of the NRA continue to be identified either as Resistance Officer (RO) for commissioned officers and Resistance Army (RA) for non-commissione officers. Museveni's army number is RO/1. The same applies to the registration of all the motorvehicles used by the NRA as their number plates bears RA. With total personal control of the army, Museveni is convinced that nothing can dislodge him from power.

Hower, to counter the potential of internal rebellion from within his NRA, he decided to create a more loyal elite force (SFG) that is now commanded by his son. It started in 1986 when he took over power and created his personal sucurity unit, the Presidential Protection Unit (PPU). Under the command of his long time body guard Akanga Byaruhanga and assisted by Aronda whose special role in Museveni's security detail has never been very clear, the PPU expanded into a semi-autonomous unit by mid 1990s. The PPU established its own training school at Kasenyi, recruited directly from the prefered Ugandan communities. It eliminated the undesired members by sending them to the main stream NRA for redeployment. It expanded its structures to include marine, mechanised, intelligence and air defence. The first lady picked interest in the unit by advocating for improved welfare by introducing an extra pay on top of the usual NRA pay rate populary known as '89' and welfare projects for members of their families. Members of PPU adopted the name Maama (mother) in reference to the First Lady. However, she was disappointed when she learnt that the unit had tightly kept a top secret from her. A young girl and daughter of Mzei Nyindombi of Kebisoni in Rukungiri who had been working in State House as a House Keeper had been turned into a wife by Museveni. Upon getting pregnant the girl had mysteriously disappeared from the main State House. She was house in a nearby house under tight security under cover that the house was housing SPLA's John Garang. In that way, it was easy for Museveni to sneak in there. With time the secret leaked to Janet prompting bitter family misunderstandings but Museveni outrightly rejected Saleh and Muhozi's mediation. The Second Lady was shifted and temporarily housed in Bugolobi, Kampala before she got her permanent home at Museveni's second country home at Kisozi Ranch. They now have a number of children. Akanga Byaruhanga paid the price for failing to to protect the secret. Years earlier, the First Lady had also raised eye brows when she was going on a foreign trip and she refused the plane to take off the Entebbe Airport unless her favourite body guard Kagoro Asingura was allowed to travel with her. Upon return from the trip, the suspicious Museveni ordered that Kagoro leaves PPU within an hour. Kagoro, his family and property were hoarded into a waiting lorry and dumped at the army headquarters. Kagoro went back to school and is now a Lawyer and a Senior Officer in the NRA.

In 1993, learning from experience of slaughtering of Burundi's President, Museveni who had put Kazini incharge of the Mechanised Unit, had tanks brought to secure State House. After the death of Akanga Byaruhanga, Geofrey Muheesi was one of the the few officers who took over command of the PPU. His tenure was shortlived because it was during the time Tinyefuza was suspected of moblising NRA officers against Museveni. The PPU expanded to become a brigade by strength and was rebranded the Presidential Protection Brigade (PGB). Kazini spearheaded the recruitment of home boys (Himas and Basongora) for the PGB. At one time Kazini publicly thanked the people of Nyabushozi (Museveni's home area) for providing a whole Division of recruits to the NRA. At the same time, the PGB was producing loyal officers to take over command of strategic command positions in the main stream NRA.

When the First son, Muhoozi came to the scene he embarked on private recruitment into the PGB. Reacting to public concern, Museveni stated that Muhozi was a member of the axaulary Local Defence Unit (LDU). As usual Ugandans went to sleep and by time they woke up, Muhozi was a Brigadier in the NRA and commanding a 10,000+ strong elite force rebranded Special Forces Group (SFG). With the SFG controlling the vital units of the NRA, Museveni is confident that no internal armed uprising can dislodge him as had been the case with past goverments.


Friday, 13 September 2013


The NRA court system traces its origin from the bush days when the main law was the NRA Code of Conduct. There was the Unit Disciplinary Commitee (UDC) at all unit levels to try minor offences committed by non commissioned officers from the respective Unit. Then there was the Field Court Martial meant to try capital offences arising during field operations. Then the General Court martials (GCM) that tried commissioned officers and catered for all capital offences that arose from all units. The Code of Conduct was replaced by the NRA Statute that retained the earlier court structure but only created the Court Martial Appeal Court.

With Operation Wembly, JATT, and CMI crackdown on the opposition, around 2001 Museveni set up a parallel General Court Martial headed by Gen. Tumwine to handle the victims of that bloody crackdown. After a brief misunderstanding with the main court martial headed by Guti, the Tumwine court martial took over the role of the NRA General Court Martial. It had members of the court who are army officers but laymen in legal issues, court legal advisors who are lawyers and army officers, then the defence team who are also lawyers and army officers and then the prosecutors who are either lawyers or paralegals.

All those different players in the General Court Martial are appointed by the Museveni. Around those dark days the major legal officers were Maj. Kabandize, Maj. Moses Wandera, Maj. Wakandya, Capt. Oryem, Capt. Kanyogonya, Lt. Harry Rurekyera, Cpl. Ceaser the O.C Special Investigations Bureau at Makindye Barracks. These so called Legal Officers were from the Directorate of Legal Services but CMI took over the role of directing them since some of them masquaraded as Prosecutors.

These officers who had for a long time established themselves within NRA legal circles, thrived on kickbacks from shoddy contracts, innapropriate procuments and briberies from the financial swindlers. When the GCM started handling victims of wanton crack down, these officers were at hand to fleece from the victims relatives and friends with promisses of facilitating their release.

The role of the Tumwine court martial was to relieve the safe houses (torture chambers) by simply reading charges of terrorim to the accused (plea taking) and then send them on indefinite remand. The terrorism law was even not yet in place! This way, no one would complain that the victim is illegally detained. The major detention facilities were Kigo Prison which had been taken over by CMI who could deposit and remove any victim at will for further torture even at past midnight.

To conceal their attrocities, the NRA Military Police and CMI guards took over security of Kiggo Prison. Another nortorious detention facility was the Military Police barracks at Makindye. Within the Barracks there were two sections i.e the underground cells commonly refered to as Go-down located a few metres from the main gate by turning left. This Go-down was also used by the Iddi Amin regime as a torture chamber. The Go-down housed hundreds of civillians incomunicado for over four years until when their list was leaked to the press around late 2005 when they were allowed visitors. They would often helplessly riot and soldiers would take positions on top on roof tops in full public view but Ugandas would not bother to find out why.

Then there is the wing for soldiers comonly refered to as Zimwe because its perimeter wall was constructed by Zimwe Construction. It had four structures with eight wards that were formerly Buganda kingdom cotton stores. The PRA Ituri group was housed in one of these wards. These ones were allowed vistors but not to attend court. Then there was the nortorius Quarter Guard solitary cells located at the main entrance. It is these detention facilities that Museveni alluded to when he made a public prnouncement "I have put them in a secure place where they cant escape".

Shortly after this pronouncement, within the next six months two different successful jail breaks took place at Makindye that saw about 15 victims regain their freedom. Because the second incident of June 2006 had involved sporadic gun fire, the public got alarmed and the panicy NRA embarked on reducing the numbers by dispersing others to different regional prisons. Both Kiggo Prison and Makindye barracks are among top revenue earners for the Buganda Kingdom government from Museveni!

The Tumwine court martial could not conduct any hearing because the innitial aim of the crack down had not been to bring justice but to suppress and scare the opposition. Also, a public trial would reveal the gruesome torture that had been metted on victims and more so implicate the NRA in fanning insecurity through its policy of 'deminifying the gun' into wrong hands. Those victims with politiacal related cases were coersed to seek amnesty while the fate of those on terrorism lay on the mercy of the Demi God, Tumwine. He imprisoned and intimidated civillian lawyers.


Wednesday, 11 September 2013


Right from the days of FRONASA, Museveni intenden to rise a personal army that would propel him to the Presidency. That is why he undermined the creation of a national army after the ovethrow of Iddi Amin. During the bush war, he personally controlled the recruitment, training, deployment and promotion of NRA personnel. No doubt the NRA at the time was generally an army of Bantus commanded by Himas. When he took over power, he personally decided who was to be active in the NRA. He diverted those he didnt want to be close to his NRA to civillian positions. The Mushegas, Otafiire, Kategaya, Mukwaya, Kigongo, Besigye, Kigongo and many others. Still within the mainstream NRA, those he did not want were purged as early as the late 80s. Kihanda, kyaligonza, Kashilingi, Kanyankole, Matovu, Drago, Katungi aka Sucide, Rwamukaaga and several others fell victim. There is another category that was simply kept in the NRA and promoted to top ranks with no further training or exposure deployment to match the ranks. The likes of Tumwine, Joram Mugume, Tinyefuza, Andrew Lutaya, Otafire, Ali Bamuze, Taban Amin and a few others are in this category. Mayombo's case was unique in that he was fast tracked without the corresponding training and exposure. The only difference between civillian David Pulkol and civillian Brig. Mayombo is that the former being a Karamajong he knew how to fire a gun and the later simply had a military rank. If Museveni needed Mayombo why didnt he accord him the training opportunities that were available to Aronda and Muhoozi.

Upon coming to power in 1986, the NRA embarked on a nationalwide recruitment drive. But 27 years down the road the NRA's top leadership continues to be dominated by Museveni's home boys. Between 1986 and 1990 a sufficient number of educated Ugandans joined the NRA. A good number of Professional soldiers from the previous armies we incorporated into the NRA just to keep them in check instead of utilising their skills. Among the many educated civillians who joined the NRA between 1986 and 1990 are the likes of Dr. Sabiiti Mutengesa, Charles Byaruhanga, Guma Gumisiriza, Henry Isoke, Miterrand Bitumbika, Eyotia Eya, Mugume Baguma, Luke Otagwa, Richard Ziiwa, Herbert Mbonye, Kashure, Wilson Muhabuzi, Eng Sabiiti, Semaganda, Kasibante and many other university graduates. There are also many university graduates who upon joining the NRA were delibarately diverted to ISO and ESO. In 1986 two female MUK graduates, Rose Kabuye and Agness Kasaami enilisted for military training at Kabamba training school. Upon completion of training, an NRA General employed Agnes and fathered a kid with her. Ever since NRA's first female University graduate was never heard of again. Museveni prefers to showpiece Col. Proscovia Nalweyiso because she is totally an illiterate. Rose Kabuye who went to RPF, the last time I checked she was a Major and head of Protocol. Therefore its not true that its the first son Muhozi Keinerugaba who attracted and recruitted university graduates into the NRA. Enough graduates were there except that the ones he recruited were for the PERSONALISATION project.

Before 1990, basic military training for recruits was coducted at more than five major training schools on top of different NRA units being mandated to recruit and train. For Officers, Cadets were trained in Tanzania and Nigeria before Jinja took up the task. For Non Comissioned (NCOs), there was no training at all. Many NCOs got comissioned without attending Cadet and rose through the ranks i.e Mugira, Mayombo, Bantariza and many others in the NRA and ISO. Many NCOs did not have the opportunity to either attend Cadet or be outrightly comissioned. Several people used bribery to buy ranks or be selected for either officer training or overseas training. Many benefited from the institutionalised patronage based on tribalism. In the absence of established structures for training and promotion coupled by Museveni's frequent changes in the NRA's top leadership, the phenomena created personal loyalities. It is common to find the Tinyefuza officers, Kazini Officers, Muhoozi officers or the Tumukunde, Mugira, Muhwezi or Mayombo intelligence officers. This factor partly explains the phenomena of 'Katebe' while the career development of some individuals was destroyed.

During the 2001 and 2006 general elections, Museveni requested for another term so that he professionalises the NRA. Unknown to Ugandans, Museveni was simply buying time so as to bring his son on board. He has now personalised the NRA and has curved out a more personal army, SFG under the comand of his son. It is this SFG that will eventually swallow the NRA and tightly guard his life presidency. Museveni has reverally warned politicians to keep off his NRA, in particular his former Vice President Bukenya who ignorantly sent his son for Cadet training but died mysteriously. Bukenya suspected foul play but HOW COULD WE AFFORD TO HAVE TWO FIRST SONS!

Monday, 9 September 2013

UGANDA: Gen. Noble Mayombo, Rwanda, PRA and Black Mambas


Inside Uganda, CMI dedicated all its intelligence collection efforts on the alleged threat from 'a neighboring country' in reference to Rwanda. Noble Mayombo, the then CMI has inherited a gang of rogue operatives a terrorist security outfit that had been created by Henry Tumukunde. Noble Mayombo had not had any training or exposure to any intelligence or military operations was 'an innocent lamb in a slaughter house'. Museveni intended to destroy his growing popularity. The system he purpoted to head was instead driving him and he was simply a spokesman. The allegedly Rwanda-funded presidential candidate Dr. Besigye escaped and fled into exile. Earlier on he had been manhandled at the famous Entebbe Airport Fracass involving Mayombo's young brother, Okwir Rabwoni. Tinyefuza seated in Mayombo's office at CMI made a telephone call to the then head of JATT Kayanja Muhanga (brother to Andrew Mwenda) thus "Kayanja, just tie up Besigye and bunddle him in a car". Kayanja Muhanga is now the Comander of the NRA Military Police and as Museveni recently deployed soldiers at the airport, it was Kayanja in the lead ready to pounce on Tinyefuza aka Sejusa!

A number of Dr. Besigye supporters were targetted for harrassment, arrests, torture and detentions. Eng. Gakyaro, Capt. Dan Mugarura, Mugisha Kyarimanya and many others faced treason related charges. The eldery Manenero arrested together with his son Patrick Manenero witnessed the son being tortured to death on July 22 2001 at the CMI Hqs by Capt. Herbert Makanga who was heading the Rwanda Desk that was codenamed "Romeo".

Rwanda had an upper hand interms of intelligence gathering. Because of the popularity of the uprising there were some selfless individuals who were determined to operate behind the enemy lines to acquire and provide the necessary intelligence that would bring about change of regime. During one of the meetings mediated by Britain's Claire Short, Kagame tabled information pertaining to the extent of the aid that Museveni was giving to the Rwandese dissidents particulary Alphonse Fuluma. Such humiliating details included the house, guards, finance, type of computer and the outstanding arreas of electricity and water bills. A few metres from the venue of the closed door meeting between the belligerent Presidents, were their respective intelligence chiefs, Patrick Karegeya and Noble Mayombo. In line with the issue at hand both the well placed Rwandese Head of External Security and the misplaced Ugandan CMI had fed their Commanders In-chief with intelligence briefs. Both were Lawyers and had the same rank but Mayombo was a Hon. M.P and a layman in intelligence. Karegeya had been detained by Obote after being arrested while trying to join the bush, served as ADC to Muntu and later headed NRA's Counter Intelligence before going back to Rwanda. What had happened to Museveni's ESO? The overwhelmed Museveni left the meeting more convinced that the 'threat' was more serious than he thought. Since then he branded Karegeya "the bad boy" and successfully looked for a way of detaching him from Kagame. Karegeya is now in exile.

CMI arrested a number serving and retired members of the NRA over allegations of providing intelligence to Rwanda. Capt. Sande Mutesasira of CMI was tortured to death. Cpl. Sula Gwebanyumyanga (Mayombo's driver), Peter Kizimula and Paddy who had retired were leaked by one Mukalazi tortured and detained for years. Gulu based Privates Sam Rwibengeya and Babu were linked to Mzee Yosa a former Deputy Director of Iddi Amin's SRB, were tortured and detained. Muzei Yosa died in detention. Lt. Porokoro and Lt. Motil from the PPU were arrested and detained for years. A former DMI officer and then Uganda Wildlife Authority's Law Enforcement officer, Tugume Sam together with Peter Agom (CMI) and Sgt John Barigye (ISO) were arrested and detained for years. The incident prompted either country to expell diplomats attached to their respective embassies. Private Kato Francis (CMI) and Ronald Kasekende a student of Makerere university were arrested by the CMI's Rwanda desk codenamed 'Karandi' headed by Lt. Geofrey Buryo and held in the JATT headquarters. Kasekende jumped over the fence into the Danish Ambassador's residence but was rearrested from there by PPU.

CMI created a commando squad called Warriors but after they raided the High Court to rearrest PRA suspects, the public named them Black Mambas. The squad was trained by Israel arms dealers, Amos Golan and Barak under their company Silver Shadow in Entebbe. Later they supplied handcuffs and pistols to CMI. The consignment was consigned to Brig. Mayombo and delivered by Ethiopian Airlines.

PRA's Michael Tuape who had been dispersed by the Congolese Lendus in March 2003, was picked up by Radio Okapi and taken to Kinshasha from where Simon Mulongo of Ug Embasy brought him to Kampala. Advocate Lt. Bakarweha through his brother (MUK Law lecturer) negotiated his surrender to NRA.

Saturday, 7 September 2013


Following the Kisangani defeat, the NRA shifted the battle front to Kampala. Verbal artillery flying between the the two capitals worsened the situation. Col. Kyakabale now exiled in Rwanda had recklessly made a public declaration of war. The NRA was bent on avenging the Kisangani defeat. The NRA Chief of Staff and former Commander of the NRA Congo Operation Safe Heven (OSH), James Kazini organised a retaliation. With full blessing of Museveni, troops and heavy artillery were positioned on strategic rised grounds along the Uganda/Rwanda border notably Ngoma in Ntugamo and Kyamugasho in Kabaale. A plan to recruit and train a force that would back up the invasion of Rwanda was hatched. The hasty recruitment drive covered only western region partly to deny PRA potential recruits. Business tycon, Hassan Basajjabalaba was contracted to transport these recruits to the former prison ground of Bihanga just behind the backyard of Museveni's Rwakitura country home. The facility had earlies been used as an arms depot for the RPF during the 4 years war of return to Rwanda and now it was a training ground for forces to dislodge them from power. Seven thousands of trainees were hoarded into the tiny training wing while a similar number also underwent training at the NRA 2nd Division Headquarters in Mbarara. Kazini replaced the head of the training wing, Col James Sebagala by his puppet Col Sula Semakula. The recruitment and training bypassed the usual NRA department of training headed by Brig. Muheesi. The flow of funding and logistics for this crush programe moved from Kazini (the Chief of Staff) to Col. Potel Kivuna who was the 2nd Division Commander in Mbarara.

Besides the training of recruits, Kazini assembled a War Team headed by Col. Mugyenyi Gavas and assisted by Captain Njumba and a few others to draw a war plan. To conceal their activities they operated from College Inn Hotel in Wandegeya. The Army Commander, Gen. JJ Odong was not made aware of these plans. When Museveni appointed Kazini as the Army Commander to replace JJ Odong, the then NRA spokesman Maj. Keitirima publicly stated that "the outgoing Army Commander had been leaking army secrets". During the handover ceremony, JJ Odong stated that "the higher a monkey goes up the tree, the more it exposes its behind". He further cautioned that "let us not be like grasshoppers who start biting each other and forget the one who put them in a bottle." Indeed Kazini climbed higher and the last time he exposed his behind was in a sitting room of a prostitute where his slain body lay. The Justice Porter Commission into NRA conduct in the Congo had recommended disciplinary action against Kazini for "shaming the name of Uganda". Instead Museveni rewarded him with an elavation to the position of Army Commander.
Museveni knew about and blessed all these designs by Kazini.

The Congolese betrayed patriotic Ugandans who had taken up arms against the Museveni dictatorship. After the first set back near Aboro Hills in Ituri, the boys were not detere. Kayihura must have beem amazed by the mere sight of a senior Lawyer and High Court Advocate, the late Sam Okiring (RIP) wielding a Light Machine Gun (LMG) in the forests of the Congo. The presence of two Doctors, Dr. Julius Muhumuza and the injured Dr Wilbroad Okung must have sent him whispering into Museveni's ear that the "this is a mass uprising". But moreso, the composition of the rebel rank and file that had a national character. Compared to his NRA in 1981 that had westerners, the group was composed of people from all corners of the country. The captives while still recovering from the shock of being stabbed in the back by their congolese hosts coupled by the onsight slaughter of some of their comrades, they just revealed to CMI all the information that they had except one issue. None of them could accurately pinpoint Dr. Besigye as having been their leader. The nearest they came was to state that while they were in Kigali they had at one time been told to expect a very distinguished guest but the visit was cancelled at the last hour. On that basis they simply speculated that it could have been Dr. Besigye. With this development, CMI and Museveni in particular were very upset and dissappointed ar they had nothing to incriminate Dr. Besigye - their main target. Interestingly, before even Museveni could recieve the interrogation report, a draft copy of the same was already being studied having been flown out through Entebbe airport.

The two captive Doctors sneaked out of CMI's hands and fled the country. The rest were detained without trial in the hope that they would confess and seek amnesty that would be used to implicate Dr. Besigye. The boys never gave in. The purpose of this revealation is to show that the situation then gave rise to a popular armed uprising that was national in character. It is now a decade since then and the situation has grown from worse to irreparably worst. History will repeat itself.

Friday, 6 September 2013


In 2001, many Ugandans got disgusted with the state inspired harrassment and persecution for their support of the now exiled opposition leader Dr. Kiiza Besigye. They resorted to armed rebellion by taking advantage of the hostility between Rwanda and Museveni. Efforts to link with the LRA insurgents in the nothern region were made with the intention of involving them to bring about regime change and end the suffering of the people in that region. Leading opposition members facilitated these efforts. Winnie Byanyima and Beti Kamya facilitated the procurement and passing on of satelite phone sets and other communication gadgets to the the LRA. Unfortunately, the LRA top leadership did not uprehend the proposed alliance and had the opposition liaison man, Opoka killed thus ending any contact with LRA. A well organised popular network was set up throughout the country.

Towards the end of 2001, recruits composed of former civillians, former soldiers and deserting army officers were leaving Uganda and crossing to Rwanda via Kabale and Rwentobo in Ntungamo. In Rwanda, the recruits were housed in safe houses in different parts of Kigali city. Unlike the Museveni rebellion of 1981, within such a short time the dissidents in Rwanda had attracted Doctors, Lawyers and other proffessionals in their ranks. However, the dissidents in Rwanda made some blunders. The errant Kyakabale had publicly announced the formation of a rebel group. All the rank and file were allowed free access to telephose services whereby the reckless ones would randomly call some of their former colleagues in the NRA. In the process it became an open secret within the NRA that the dissidents were making contacts with serving officers. This development prompted the CMI to intensify its telephone conversation monitoring mechanism that scared away a number of serving officers. Col. Waswa aka Balikalege and Col Peter Kerim among others were contacted. When he was contacted, Kasirye Gwanga as usual informed the authorities and he was given a go-ahead to continue with the links while updating his masters. Kasirye Gwanga even maintained contact with Rwanda's Director of External Security.

The dissidents would get all the intelligence they needed from Uganda through the established framework of Rwanda's external intelligence structures. With the availability of timely and accurate intelligence, the dissidents had the most lethal weapon that gave Museveni sleepless nights. Most disturbing was that even Dr. Besigye who was in exile in South Africa would while appearing on radio talk shows demonstrate that he was updated on developments within the NRA. This development accounted for the so called 'spy scandals' during that period. Museveni got convinced that the opposition and the dissidents in particular had invaded his power base, the army. The outraged and desparate Museveni ran to the UK government to seek their indulgence. The UK Secretary for Oveseas Development, Claire Short mediated talks between Kagame and Museveni. After a few rounds of talks, it was agreed that the two countries should relocate the respective army officers that they were harbouring against each other. Rwanda relocated Col. Mande, Col. Kyakabale, Capt. Kabali Masembe and a few other officers to Sweden. Uganda relocated Major Fuluma and Maj. Mupende to Canada. Tension seemed to ease abit but it was not over. During one of the follow up trips to the UK, Col Mande came face to face with Noble Mayombo in the transit lounge of JK Airport in Nairobi as the former was heading for Sweden.

Col. Edison Muzoora who had not been formally declared by Rwanda, took over command of the rebel dissidents in Kigali. The dissidents were transfered to Kabuga a few kilometres outside Kigali for military drills. Around February 2003, Col. Muzoora led a team of dissidents to establish bases in Ituri province of Congo. At the time Rwanda had taken over control of that area. Earlier on ISO Chief Brig Henry Tumukunde had infiltrated the group by sending in Maj. Tom Mugizi and Capt Kiwanuka. Because Muzoora had earlier been in Ituri as a sector Commander during the NRA orchestrated Hema-Lendu clashes, the Lendu militias, local Hema leaders and Bosco Ntaganda attacked their bases. Some were killed, a few escaped and the captured ones handed over to Kaihura who had been in waiting for the catch. Muzora was evacuated by helcopter back to Kigali. The captives were brought to Kampala and detained without trial because among other reason their confessions did not mention Dr. Besigye. Maj. Mugizi and Capt Kiwanuka were temporarily hidden in a safe house next to Gwanga's Makindye residence. Later on Mugizi was briefly asigned to the Passport office before proceecing to South Africa. The project continued under Muzora but with the coming on board of Aronda and Kaihura coupled by internal division in the Rwanda army, around early 2006 Rwanda abandoned the entire project and dissidents scattered.

Thursday, 5 September 2013


Around 2002 amidist growing fears that some Ugandans could resort to armed rebellion, Museveni gave orders for a shoot-to-kill of suspected armed criminals. As I write this piece, Museveni has again issued a similar order as part of his ongoing counter insurgency operations. An operation codenamed Operation Wembly was inniated as an extension of CMI's JATT. It targeted the areas that were suspected to be the likely recruiting beds by the opposition. The western, central, eastern regions were targeted leaving out the west Nile, Northern and Karamoja regions. The objective of Operation Wembly was to arrest and detain all former soldiers, army deserters, suspected robbers and petty thieves. The idea behind the operation was the fear that such people would be easy prey to recruitment by a new threat of armed rebellion by the opposition. Iddi Amin had done the same during the 1970s against Kondoism (armed robbers).

At the time Katumba Wamala was the Inspector General of Police. The police had not been militarised as is the case now and according to Museveni, it was not friendly to his NRA regime. He had warned them that "unless you learn to vote wisely, your welfare way not improve". Innitially, it was supposed to be under the Police but Katumba Wamala tactically dodged it. Instead, Col Elly Kayanja was assigned to head the operation. It established its headquarters at Killement Hill Road just behind the MTN head office. Musana and Bageya were some of Kayanja's top assistants. Regional Coordination centres were established in Mbale at the Military Military Police barracks headed by Lt. Siraje, at Kamukuzi in Mbarara headed by Capt. Rwakanuma and Capt Rudahigwa, Fort Portal headed by Cadre Amon Rutenta and Masindi by Lt Abel. The rogue Col. Kayanja recruited other rogues and vagabonds in the city who extorted, stole, robbed, tortured, killed their victims. The drunk Col. Kayanja would even visit the detainees past mid night in the company of his wife to witness the torture. The wife would also interview the helpless detainees just for fun. Operatives like Kiwana, Kawere and others had a licence to kill with impunity. Detainees were used to carry dead bodies of torture victims into vehicles and the following they would be brought News papers with headlines and photos of such victims that they had been shot dead while they were robbing.

As usual, Ugandans had unsuspectingly graced the operation because of the rampant wave of armed robberies that had thrived for a long time. Later on when it became public knowledge that the operation was orchestrating attrocities, there was public outcry that attracted local and international condemnation. Museveni moved very fast to rebrand it Violent Crime Crack Unit (VCCU). An ASP Magara was put in charge of VCCU deputised by CMI's Charles Tusiime Rutarago aka Makanika. It was just the old wine in a new bottle since most of the operatives were retained. Musana is the current head of VCCU's successor RRU/Flying Squad. The head office at Kilement Hill was abandoned and instead another one was established in Kireka army barracks. Attrocities by VCCU became worse save for arbitrary killings. Worst methods of torture were applied - Kandoya, Livepool (water boarding), beatings, squeezing of genitals etc. The worst was the 'Sauna' where over 30 victims would be hoarded into a very tiny concrete sealed block structure that had no ventilation at all. Every morning on opening it atleast two or three deadbodies had to be found among the detainees. This concrete structure was located about 200 metres fron the main entrance on the right hand side before you reach the stores. It is alleged that it was used during Iddi Amin's time for torture purposes.

To further counter the growing criticism, Museveni formed a special Court Martial headed by Elly Tumwine. This court was parallel to the formal Court Martial that was headed by Andrew Guti. Friction ensued but soon after the Tumwine Court swallowed the formal court martial. This Tumwine court had only one mandate - to legitimise the detentions without trial of both JATT and VCCU detainees. Kigo Prison that was managed by CMI and Makindye Barracks became the main detention centres. What is interesting to note is that during interrogations victims were only asked if they had ever undergone military training and if yes when and where. It had been found out that in one way or the other, allmost all cases were either directly or indirectly linked to the NRA. It is the NRA's haphazardous method of recruitment, training, terms and conditions of service, mchakamchaka programe (deminisfying the gun), issuing out of arms to both soldiers and civillians that accounted for the surge in crime. For example one of the suspects, Pte Sentongo Gyavira had within a period of three years been recruited, trained and deserted twice with two guns from the NRA. That is why the court martial never heard and concluded any Wembly case.

Wednesday, 4 September 2013


Following Tom Lubanga's ultimatum, the NRA to left Bunia via Mahagi port. Rwanda's RCD-Goma had taken upper hand in Ituri. They had been amassing troops and equipments using airfields located in Bule, Aboro Hills, Mongbwalu and Boga. They had taken controll of the militarily strategic Kanyabayonga with which a well dirrected artiller fire power can cause substancial damage hundreds of kilometres inside Uganda. The development came at a time when Museveni was alleging that the Dr. Besigye linked shadowy PRA rebels were assembling in Eastern Congo. Museveni had assigned Kale Kayihura to Bunia. Kayihura personally admits as to having held hostage by Tom Lubanga in Bunia.

Kayihura convinced Bosco Ntaganda to break away from Tom Lubanga. MONUC resisted Kayihura's urge to attack Lubanga's UPC. Kayihura organised a secret squad that ambushed and killed UN peace keepers including a Kenyan Major. As expected, the incident was blamed on the UPC and as a consequence the UN gave Kayihura a green light to suppress Tom Lubanga's UPC. With the the help of Bosco Ntaganda and some ethinic Lendu local Chiefs like Kiiza, the NRA suppressed and neutralised Tom Lubanga's UPC ending its influence in Bunia. It in this encounter that Museveni claimed that the shadowy PRA rebels were neutralised with some killed by Lendu militias while another 28 were captured and taken to Kampala. Around March 2003, Kale Kayihura publicly conveyed Museveni's appology for the NRA's mistakes and thanked them for having chased Tom Lubanga's UPC from Bunia.

Now Uganda's proxy, Bosco Ntaganda remained the victorious and leading player in Bunia. He was being assisted by local Hema and Lendu leaders who had by now burried their ethinic differences. Earlier on local Hema leaders like Chef Kahwa Mandro, Kisembo and others who had switched allegience to Rwanda before the fall out, had by now fallen back to Uganda's backing. The NRA had trained Chef Kahwa's militias at Kyankwanzi in Uganda. Museveni had tasked Chef Kahwa to talk peace with the Lundus in Kapendruma - a location alleged to have been hosting the shadowy PRA bases.
Kayihura now concentrated on coordinating the recruitment and trainin of a Hema militia force. Recruits would be flown through the Entebe Airport and taken to the Semuliki Game Reserve for training under the 53rd Bn that was by that time under Lt. Col. Kimbowa. Another training camp for the Hemas was set up at Kasenyi in Congo under Chef Kisembo. Three months later, the NRA presumably withdrew from Congo but some NRA military Intelligence operatives among them a one Bashir were facilitated with satelite phones and retained in Bunia attached to Bosco Ntaganda.

Earlier in 2001, the NRA Gbadolite based 19th Bn led the Congolese MLC militias to intervene in the Central African Republic (CAR) capital Bangui to surpress an uprising led by former President Andre Kolingba. They successfully put down the mutiny though they comitted a number of attrocities. The former President Andre Kolingba together with his son were taken hostage by the NRA, flown to Kampala and kept in a CMI Safe House in the Muyenga surburb. Because his son spoke English, he helped alot in translating for his French-speaking father during their stay in Uganda. The exited Museveni flew to Gbadolite to welcome back the victorius NRA and ordered for them plane loads of fresh meat from Kampala. Ofcourse Bemba's MLC militias were too weak to militarily intervene in CAR and it was the NRA that did the job. In 2005 when the MLC intervened again in the CAR to suppress another mutiny led by Froncois Bozize, the NRA had presumably withdrawn from Congo. The truith is that the NRA still had its forces within MLC who greatly boosted the success of the intervention. Again, the MLC militias like the Congo army did not have the capacity to militarily intervene in a foreign country and successefully suppress a mutiny.

Unfortunately the ICC decided to indict only MLC's Bemba. The same applies to Tom Lubanga and Bosco Ntaganda. Without the NRA, they would not have become warlords. Like was the case with all the ten militia groups, they were assisted by the NRA to recruit, train, arm and execute their operations. The NRA directly comitted horrific attrocities in the Congo. Innocent civilians and soldiers lost their lives, public and private property was destroyed and looted, women raped and chidren defiled. NRA's Capt Okum used explosives in Kilomoto gold mines in Isiro and ended up killing over 90 local miners who were burried by the collapsing tunnels. He was briefly helf for stealing a pick up truck but set free later. Col. Sula Semakula forcefully took explosives from a mining company Baric Gold and usf them in gold extraction. The ICJ ordered Uganda to pay reparations to Congo but who could enforce it! It is this impunity that makes Museveni to once again poke his nose in DRC with M23. The mysterious deaths of Kazini, Mayombo, Wapakhabulo, Kerim has links too.

Tuesday, 3 September 2013


Once the RCD-ML flown in from Kampala took charge of security in Bunia town, Prof. Wamba protested by mobilising his forces that included Ex-FAZ (Mobutu army). Bosco Ntaganda attacked and overwhelmed Prof. Wamba's forces though with heavy losses on both sides. Civilian casualties and destruction of property was high. Prof. Wamba was only saved from being killed by Col. Charles Angina who took the initiative to move the only tank in Bunia town from the airport to Wamba's residence. 

But Kazini ordered Capt. Tinka of NRA Military Police to side with RCD-ML forces who were under the command of Bosco Ntaganda against Prof. Wamba's forces. CMI's Pte. Odong had been planted on Prof. Wamba's security detail in order to spy on him. Prof. Wamba's militias who had completed military training in Uganda were flown back directly to Gbadolite and handed over to Bemba's MLC. NRA's 53rd Batallion that had earlier been ordered to head for Bafasende was recalled back to Bunia from half way the journey.

When Bosco Ntaganda murdered an Ex-FAZ Intelligence Officer of the Prof. Wamba faction, the situation in Bunia town became more tense between the pro-Mbusa and pro-Wamba supporters. The population protested and demanded for the arrest of Bosco Ntaganda. NRA's political leader Col. Otafire took Bosco Ntaganda to Kampala where he was kept in Mbuya Barracks. Museveni sent Col. Otafire to convince Prof. Wamba to abandon leadership but the Prof. was defiant. Museveni took a decision to topple Prof. Wamba. The Prof. together with some of his government officials were flown to Kampala and held there. This marked the end of Prof. Wamba's RCD-Kisangani faction. Prof. Wamba's personal Physician - Dr. Kabeya was hospitalised in Mulago Hospital from where he escaped and fled Uganda together with his CMI guard, Pte. Bogere.

Now that Prof. Wamba and his RCD-K faction had been phased out, Mbusa's RCD-ML took full control of Bunia. With NRA's facilitation, Mbusa's RCD-ML faction entered into alliance with Bemba's MLC but the Lendu FNI refused to join the coalition. In the further northern part of Ituri NRA's Col. Peter Kerim was in charge of coordinating the NRA's support for the FPDC of Thomas Unen Chen. Also, the NRA had created the FAPC of Jerome Kakwavu in areas of Mahagi and Aru. The alliance of RCD-ML and MLC soon collapsed due to disagreements over revenue sharing and appointment of a Governor by the NRA.

The NRA suspected that Mbusa Nyamwisi was making contacts with Kigali and Kinshasha to seek new alliances. The RCD-ML battalion that had earlier been armed by the NRA in Bombo deserted in big numbers. Museveni, worried that the UG-engraved AK 47 rifles could in future act as evidence of NRA's armament of militia factions, ordered for an operation to recover these arms. Col. Angina who spearheaded the house-to-house search operation assisted by CMI Officers namely Capt. Tinka, Lt. Geoffrey Babumba, Lt. Kashilingi and Pte. Kijara only succeeded in recovering just a few arms. With loss of confidence in Mbusa Nyamwisi's RCD-ML, the NRA moved to weaken it.

NRA facilitated Tom Lubanga (ICC inductee) to form the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC). With the Hema business tycoon Tibasiima Atenyi as the chief financier, the UPC was a Hema militia group. The NRA flew back Bosco Ntaganda from Kampala to Bunia to take charge of the UPC militias as Army Commander. Recruitment and training of Himas intensified. Earlier, the NRA 53rd Bn had ordered the RCD-K appointed neutral Governor to leave but he had resisted using MLC forces backed by Kazini. 

The formation of the Hema dominated UPC and the reappointment of a Hema governor confirmed the suspicion of the Lendus and other agriculturalist communities that the NRA was bent on propping up a Tutsi like situation. UPC's ultimatum for RCD -K to leave Bunia only intensified the massacres between the Hema and Lendu ethnic communities. Tom Lubanga being a Mugegere by ethnicity and Bosco Ntaganda seen as a Rwandese, both were not popular among Congolese. The Rwanda backed RCD-Goma had by now expanded its operation towards Ituri region. Tom Lubanga and his UPC switched sides and registered the backing of Rwanda. UPC mobilised Congolese in Bunia for a mass uprising demanding for independence. Tom Lubanga issued an ultimatum for the NRA to leave Bunia.


Monday, 2 September 2013


For the first time since taking over power, Museveni faced a real challenge to his presidency during the 2001 general elections. To Museveni, for Dr. Besigye to contest against him amounted to high treason. As a retired NRA Colonel and Museveni's physician during the bush war, Dr. Besigye's contest threatened to stray into Museveni's power base - the military. During the election campaigns Dr. Besigye had claimed that he had 90% of the army's support. Museveni reacted by warning Dr. Besigye to desist from even a mere mention of the NRA or else he would send him "6 feet underground". Since then Museveni has sofar sent Dr. Besigye 3 feet underground. Indeed within the NRA there was alot of excitement by those who felt that Dr. Besigye was the Messiah to save the 'sinking boat'. The loyality of some NRA serving officers was put under scruitiny. Those on 'Katebe', the retired and the Veterans were not spared. The likes of Shaban Bantariza, Peter Kashure and others fell victim. A warning shot was fired into the head of Capt Makoko Segatunga who would openly campaign for Dr. Besigye. He was shot by unknown assaillants at his home in a Kampala surburb of Natete.

The elections took place at a time when tension between Uganda and Rwanda were high following the military clashes in Kisangani. It was feared that Rwanda had financed Dr. Besigye's election campaigns. Rwanda was declared a hostile country. The army got involved in electioneering through intimidation, harrassment of the opposition and multiple voting. CMI's Maj. Oula drove stright into an oqosition crowd leavimg many injured. Museveni was declared the winner and Dr. Besigye went to court. All the Justices unanimously agreed that the election had not been free and fair but majority contended that the irregularities had not been substantial enough to warrant nulfication of the exercise.

Museveni, mindful of his own designs after the 1980 elections, feared that Dr. Besigye could resort to armed rebellion. He was placed under full-time security surveillance, his movements curtailled and eventually placed on house arrest. Opposition supporters were harrassed by goverment agents. Dr. Besigye managed to beat the 24 hours security surveillance by escapeing from house arrest and fled the country.

Around this time the Speaker of Rwanda's Parliament- Joseph Sebarenzi fled to Uganda. He and his family were housed by CMI in a safe house in Ntinda, Minister's village, next to Mayanja Nkangi's residence. His wife would be escorted by CMI operatives to take the children for medical attention at a clinic on Bombo road. Later on Rwanda's Major Alphonse Fuluma fled to Uganda. He fled with a Mercedez Benz and a female maid. He was taken care of by CMI. He was housed in a 'safe house' owned by Brig Muhoozi Kainerugaba that is next to Brig. Kasirye Gwanga's residence in Makindye. Tight security was put in place that included the mounting of portable Ingler Missiles. He was facilitated with all the necessary communication gadgets including a desk top computer. He was linked to Dr. Tajudeen of the Pan African Movement with whom they would often meet at the later's residence in Kabalagala, a Kampala surburb. He featured as a leader of the Rwandese dissidents in Uganda. Many other Rwandese who had fled Rwanda like Major Mupende were housed in a safe house in Bweyogerere while others were in Mbarara. Rwanda intensfied its intelligence collection efforts against these dissidents. In one incident a lady suspected suspected to be a Rwandese agent managed to enter the Bweyogerere safe house. The CMI operative - Pte Rwambarale who was on duty that day was arrested, charged and dismissed from the NRA. All those in the NRA who were suspected to have any link with RPA were placed under scrutiny. In particular, those who had earlier worked with the RPA officers when they were dominating NRA's intelligence services were targeted. That is how even the Secretary for Defence - Dr. Ben Mbonye was dislodged from the Defence Ministry.

During the crisis, NRA officers like Col. Mande, Lt. Col. Kyakabale and a number of other junior officers fled to Rwanda. Museveni now believed that the opposition and Dr. Besigye in particular intended to start an armed rebellion. To counter this threat, he designed measures that would deny them recruitment grounds. He sanctioned the operations of the nortorious Operation Wembly to ruthlessly deal with suspected robbers. He sanctioned the proliferation of security agencies that saw the birth of CAP, PIN etc. He sanctioned an intensive recruitment drive into the NRA in the western region. These conscripts were meant to be part of the force that was being prepared to invade Rwanda and change the regime. Both NRA and RPA intensified their intelligence collection efforts culminating into the rampant 'spy scandals' that characterised souring diplomatic relations during the 1990s.


Sunday, 1 September 2013


Having succeeded in replacing Col. Edson Muzoora with Kazini's puppet - Col. Sula Semakula, the stage was set for renewed clashes between RPA and NRA for the control of Kisangani. Kazini had mobilised all the necessary resources for the onslaught. Unknown to NRA, the RPA had superior intelligence about all details of NRA's combat readiness. RPA's intelligence gathering stretched right from the NRA's Ordinance Depots, the army headquarters, the rear base at the Old Entebbe Airport upto the ground in Kisangani. Therefore, the RPA was more than ready for routing the NRA once and for all.

Kazini whom Museveni had retained as the oveall commander of the NRA in Congo, secretly established his command post at Kaparata hill overlooking the Tsopo Bridge in the outskirts of Kisangani city. He had a helcopter ready to evacuate him when the going would get tough. The three days of fighting in May 2000 saw the RPA have an upper hand and left the NRA raptured. Still, Kazini was not done and in June he provocked a more serious battle that lasted six days. The visibly loosing Kazini desparately resorted to the Alice Lakwena style of Combat engagement. In a series of voice calls on army radio messages he would arder his field commanders to amass troops arguing that "even if it means all of them getting killed". The destruction to human life and infrastructure was appalling. The RPA exercised alot of restraint to avert the stuation from sliding into catastrophic proportions for the NRA as it very well knew that these were designs of Kazini with Museveni's backing Finally, the the shattered NRA was defeated and it left Kisangani by road as it could not access the airport.

The RCD-Kisangani goverment of Prof Wamba set up bases in the town of Bunia. The Kampala political attaches - Otafire, Mayombo and Waphakhabulo tried to reorganise the RCD-Kisangani. Kazini who was not confortable with the presense of the the three Kampala political leaders sought to weaken Prof. Wamba by formenting internal rivarly within RCD-Kisangani. He helped Prof. Wamba's former Minister- Mbusa Nyamwisi to split from the RCD-Kisangani and form the RCD-ML. The NRA was by now helping with recruitment, training and arming of militants for the three groups i.e Prof. Wamba's RCD-K, Mbusa Nyamwisi's RCD-ML and Bemba's MLC. Earlier on Prof. Wamba's body guard - Bosco Ntaganda who had been injured during the Kisangani clashes had been flown by the NRA to South Africa for medical treatment. After treatment, Bosco Ntaganda had remained in Kampala under CMI. When tension between Wamba and Nyamwisi reached a boiling point, the NRA flew Ntaganda back to Bunia and put him in charge of Wamba's security detail. Prof. Wamba rejected the Ntaganda group that also included Mugabo and Mukalai among othes. Wamba argued that the Ntaganda group were Rwandese being planted on him to spy and assasinate him.

With the help of the NRA, Prof. Wamba's former Minister of Finance - Tibasiima Akiiki welcomed and shelttered the Ntaganda group and used them to put in place a Hema army. A recruitment centre was set up in Bunia town at the former NBC bank building. A training school was set up at Rwampara near the airstrip and run by the NRA Military Police. The agricultralist Lendus who are arch rivals of the pastrolist Hemas also took steps to rise an army and the NRA was at hand to help them too. At this moment Mbusa Nyamwisi who is a Mugegere by tribe had sided with the Lendus and Bangiti tribesmen. Several rounds of Clashes between Lendus and Hemas left tremendous loss of human life, destruction and displacement.

Uganda was not yet done with the loss of Kisangani. The Commanding Office of the NRA Bunia based 53rd Battallion, Maj. David Muhoozi flew a Bafasende Based Businesman - Roger Lumbala to meet Museveni in Kampala. After the meeting, RCD-National was born with Lumbala as its President. The plan was for the NRA to help RCD-K to rise a force that would be backed by the NRA to dislodge RPA from Kisangani. Museveni ordered 53rd Battallion to proceed to Bafasende for this task. Its departure from Bunia town left a big security gap. Only one Tank, a small squad of NRA intelligence operatives and Military police was left to secure the fragile Bunia town. 53rd Bn was an elite unit and part of the Presidential Protection Unit. Roger Lumbala recently fled the DRC where he was a Senator and is now in Kampala with the M23 peace team.

Prof. Wamba accused Bosco Ntaganda of training militias to overthrow him. Tension rose high between the rival congolese factions in Bunia town. A battalion of recruits trained for the Mbusa faction at Nyalake in Bunia under NRA's Col. Burundi was hastly flown to the NRA headquarters in Bombo. In Bombo they were issued with uniforms and AK 47 assault rifles manufuctured from NRA arms industry in Nakasongola and clearly engraved UG. They were flown back to Bunia and placed under the Command of Commander Claude who was a Nande by tribe.