Friday, 29 November 2013



1. Voting paterns have since time in memorial indicated that Kampala City is an opposition stronghold. To Museveni, opposition is an enemy who should be fought and defeated.

2. Museveni has been taking over personal control of public bodies that generate huge revenues. Kampaka City like other public bodies generates alot of revenue. Therefore, he is interested in the KCCA revenue for personal use.

3. Kampala City has the most expensive pieces of land held by Baganda and the Buganda Kingdom in particular. In his efforts to economically criple them he has to seize their land under cover of developing the city.

4. Despite intense presure, Museveni has no intention of relinguishing power. In his strategic security plan that keeps him in power, militarily security Kampala City is his focal point. He fears that an opposition Mayor Lukwago can ally with Dr. Besigye to lead massive protests to storm the city centre in an attempt to take over government the Tunisia and Egypt way. Museveni knows that if the masses dared, he would brutally crush them but is mindful of repercussions from the ICC. Once he succeeds in his sceme to undermine the ICC operations in Africa, then he will have a free day in crushing such popular uprisings. Removal of street vendors, relocation markets and car parks, and boda boda raiders from the city centre are some of the schemes in this regard. Such sectors are dominated by the economically disadvantaged sections of the society who are desperate for change.

5. Dislodging Lukwago from the Kampala Mayorship has been a gradual process ever since he took over office. Desgination of KCCA, appointment of both the KCCA Executive Director and a Minister in-charge of Kampala have been part of the protracted scheme to undermine the authority of the Lord Mayor.
Until Thursday this week, Museveni has scored 3-0 against Lukwago at the 85th minute. The relief that the High Court granted to Lukwago on the same day can be equated to a penalty which if well planned can only afford Lukwago one goal. At the end of the match, Museveni will win with 3-1. However, what can only save Lukwago is a 'storm' that will see the match cancelled indefinetely or lightening to strike the entire Museveni team. Otherwise, the Thursday's Jubillant processions through Kampala can be said to have been a farewell one for the Lord Mayor Lukwago. That is why there was no scuffle between the Police and jubillating processions. With Museveni's Cadres Judicial officers strategically positioned in the highest court hieracy, outgoing Mayor Lukwago will get no tangible court redress.

6. The Lukwago Must Go Task Force is chaired by Frank Tumwebaze. He is deputised by the KCCA E.D and composed of all Division RDCs and Internal Security Officers. A number of Law Firms headed by the one of Edwin Karugire are providing the legal expertise. O. Opondo and Nyombi Tembo are mere spokespersons.
The Task Force is backed by a strong Security sub-committee headed by Aronda and deputised by Kaihura. This sub- committee is composed of among others, all the Chiefs of Intelligence, Commander of the SFG, Commandant of Military Police and all the DPCs in Kampala region.

The Task Force is keeping Museveni updated throughout. It has its operations base in Kololo from where the E.D is partly managing KCCA business.

Therefore, the desperate Museveni has lost all shame and is acting like a wounded buffallo. Next he will seek to replace the Kabaka.

Thursday, 28 November 2013



Fellow countrymen and women,

I humbly seek your approval in appealing to members of the legal fraternity to boycott courts of law in Uganda. This move will be a show of solidarity with the Lawyer who fell victim to Police brutality at City Hall in Kampala early this week. The boycott should demand for an explanation, apology and security guarantee from the executive arm of government.

If you sincerely believe that the said Lawyer is an innocent victim of a series of state inspired brutality, you can sign the petitition by way of adding your voice in form of a positive comment. For those who are not members of UAH, you are urged to make your voice heard by use of any other means available to you.

By taking thd path of a boycot, this particular incident and other past, present and future similar incientr will be highlighted. On the contrary, silence to such heinous crimes by the state is what the tyranical regime in Kampala has thrived on.

Your approval of this petitition will make a very big difference in the struggle to free the country from Museveni's tyrany.

To all Lawyers in Uganda the message is; TODAY ITS HIM AND TOMOROW ITS YOU.

Thank you.


Monday, 25 November 2013


Colonial agents like Emin Pasha, Samuel Baker and Capt F. D. Lugard set up colonial armies in Uganda using Sudanese Nubians. Later on the trend of enlisting the Luos and Nilotics gained ground throughout the colonial era. It is not true that the colonial administration preffered those ethinic groups to serve in the army at the exclusion of other ethinic groups. It is a fact Bantu ethinic groups were reluctant to join military service. A number of southerners served in the pre-independence army. Buganda's king Muteesa and Tooro George Rukidi were soldiers. Many other ex-service men (Kawonawos) of the KAR from among the Ugandan Bantu communities even fought in the World War II.

By the time Uganda gained independence in 1962, though the new Uganda Army was dominated by the Luos and Nilotics, a significant number of Bantu speaking had enlisted into the army. The misconceptions that surrounded the events of 1966 that saw the army invade and send the Buganda King Mutesa into exile aggravated the situation. The consenquental abolition of Bantu Kingdoms by the UPC government led by Milton Obote - a Luo left the army tagged to the Nilotics and Luos. In particular, the Baganda found no pride in serving in the army. NRA's Brig. Kasirye Gwanga has publicly stated that he cant render his military service beyond Karuma Bridge - to Northern Uganda.

This trend of events was not confined to military service alone but affected the Police and Prisons services too. Since security service was voluntary, those Bantus who enlisted into security services made very successful careers. There is no evidence of any government policy that aimed at eliminating Bantus from security services. Circumstancial evidence shows that the Bantus did and continue to find military service a vigorous and tiresome exercise. Interestingly, the Bantus embraced the less tiresome intelligence or secret services during the post independence regimes. Several Bantus including Rwandese migrants made succesful careers in Secret Service. Museveni too after University enlisted in the Intelligence services under the Obote I government. With time, the Nilotics/Luos developed a liking for security services coupled by their traditional worior-like nature. That is why they even dominate the private security services - a service viewed by Bantus as demeaning. The former are generally prefered by property owners as being reliable and trustworthy.

During the time of Amin a number of Bantus made successful careers in the security services. There was nothing like his elimination or restricting of Bantus from security services. After the fall of the Iddi Amin government though military service was voluntary, the Bantus still shunned enlisting in the military. This is what Museveni set out to exploit by preaching the secterian gospel of how leaders from northern Uganda were building a Luo/Nilotic army as a power base. He embarked on building a secterian southern Bantu army. However, a number of Bantus had embrraced the new post Iddi Amin national army including the Rwandese refugees and immigrants. Upon launching his five years bloody rebellion, Museveni took a good number of these Bantus/westerners to the bush. By the time he took over power in 1985, his NRA was a purely composed of Bantus from central and western Uganda.

The defeated former soldiers from West Nile, Northern and North eastern regions were refered to as Anyanyas. The NRA propaganda was that it had reversed the colonial trend of the Nilotics/Luos domination of military service. The NRA got overwhelming enlistment from the Luo/Nilotic regions. The insurgency in these regions that ensued left people economically stranded. With no education facilities in place many children and youths had no option but to join the NRA in order to provide for their families. NRA's reprisal harassment and arbitrary arrests on suspicion of being insurgents also led many to enlist in the NRA. Some defeated former UNLAs too enlisted as fresh recruits and others even forfeited their previous ranks. The auxillary forces formed by the NRA in these regions helped boost the NRA strength too. Surrendering former insurgents from various armed groups in these regions have also been joining the NRA.

Since coming to power, the state of welfare in the NRA has been appalling due to the thieving leadership that enjoy the Museveni's protection. Lower ranks of the NRA hailing from the peaceful and economically prosperious southern and western regions would desert in big numbers. For the impoverished NRAs from West Nile, Northern and North Eastern region, the rate of desertion was very low. During the re-enlistment of former combatants (Veterans) for the Congo expedition, the turn up from the Luo/Nilotic regions was overwhelming and many were retained in the NRA.

Currently they dominate the lower rank and file of NRA. Their rise to command positions has been systematically contained. SFG is their no-go area.


Friday, 15 November 2013


It is not clear if Kazini was ever a soldier under the Iddi Amin regime. What is clear is that during the Obote II government he was with the Moses Ali rebel group in Sudan as a Museveni agent. In 1984 he escaped from Sudan to Nairobi. In 1985 he was connected to the NRA when it was in control of western Uganda. Kazini together with Dan Byakutaaga then aides to Salim Saleh and were stationed in Mbarara charged with security of Museveni's mother.

Upon taking over government, Kazini was appointed the C.O of 14th Batallion based in Arua. In Arua, he used his position to harass former members of the Moses Ali group who had lost out on the war. Moses Ali who was a Cabinet Minister intervened and Capt. Kazini was transferred to Kampala as a C.O in Lubiri barracks. During that time Moses Ali was detained for years in the underground cells of Lubiri barrack under the constant torment of Kazini.

In 1989 he was made a Major and appointed the C.O of Military Police replacing Lt. Col. Oliver Odweyo whom he had framed up with allegations of treason. Odweyo later died in detention. During this time, he jumped out and instead reported about a smuggling racket that involved senior officers including his own brother, Col. Jet Mwebaze. He came to prominence when he brutally suppressed a riot by Moslems of the Tabliq sect in Kampala. During the same time, he used his position to antagonise with many senior army officers through uncalled for harassment. Military police in Makindye almost clashed with the Lubiri based NRA under Kazoora.

In 1991 as a Lt. Col he was posted to the Masaka based Mechanised unit to replace Col. Kiiza Besigye. He felt insecure and harassed his qualified Deputy David Lyangombe who was put on Katebe. He took the initiative to deploy tanks to the Presidential Protection Unit to boost Museveni's security following the murder of the Burundi President. He dismissed from the army some junior officers on accusations of having inquired about the tanks sent to the PPU. At the same time, he was tasked to coordinate the monitoring of Gen Tinyefuza's alleged subversive activities in Sembabule. He was being assisted by his unit I.O Capt. Godfrey Lule and DMI's Banson Mande under Aronda's supervision.

He was moved to the army headquarters as the Camp Commandant. At his, he antagonised with all senior officers including civilian MOD employees. Because of his high handedness, the operations of the GQ almost came to a halt before Museveni intervened. Museveni sent him to West Nile to handle the WNBF of Juma Oris and UNRF II of Bamuze. In West Nile, he was soon embroiled in settling his historical personal grievances with West Nilers. He was replaced by Katumba Wamala to take charge of West Nile.

In 1996, he was made a Colonel and sent to Gulu under Chief Ali who was the 4th Div. C.O. Kaziini’s role was not clearly spelled out. He was made the 4th Div. C.O but not to include Katumba Wamala's West Nile region. Katumba Wamala successfully handled the West Nile rebellion. Chief Ali was made a figure head Chief of Staff. Shortly after Kaziini was sent to Kasese to fight ADF rebels. Soon he undermined Chief Ali using the latter’s ADC, Nuwe Kyepaka by alleging that Chief Ali was involved in subversion.

Kazini was made a Brigadier and appointed Chief of Staff (COS). As COS, he undermined Charles Angina's efforts to fight the ADF in Rwenzori mountain by denying him logistics. As COS, he spearheaded the invasion of Congo where he replaced Muheesi. Shortly after he was made the commander of Operation Safe Heven (OSH) in the Congo.

His role in the Congo is well documented. He oversaw the killings and plunder in both the Congo and Central African Republic. The UN, the Justice Porter Commission and the joint Uganda/Rwanda investigation team found Kaziini culpable of orchestrating atrocities in the Congo. Instead, Museveni promoted him to Maj. Gen and made him the overall Army Commander (AC).

As COS and AC, he helped a lot in privatising the army through irregular recruitment, promotions, deployments and appointments. At the same time sidelining and persecuting into exile the unwanted ones. By relieving him of duties in 2003 and his subsequent court martialing, Museveni was trying to delink himself from the latter’s misdeeds in the Congo. 

The flimsy charges of creating ghost soldiers was a sham. That is why the court martial granted him bail upon an exceptionary presentation of a civilian surety and then allowed to proceed to Ghana for a course. The three years’ conviction was a mere design meant to hoodwink the Ugandans and donors. His alleged subversion never existed. The 7000 recruits were raised, trained and deployed with Museveni's blessing. 

The Brigade in Arua was under Museveni's former body Guard Sam Kavuma and it was a standby force to help Congo's Bemba topple Kabila. Up to the time of his death Museveni had assigned Kazini to South Sudan.  

It's ICC's ringing bells that made Kazini a dead scapegoat.


Wednesday, 6 November 2013

Andrew Mwenda - a member of NRM?

First published on Change of Guards Blog on November 6, 2013

Throughout the 80s, 90s and until recently Museveni's major 'obstacle' to his autocratic designs has been the free press. Gross abuse of human rights, corruption and abuse of office have been exposed by the independent press though operating in a very tough environment.

While at The Monitor, Andrew Mwenda distinguished himself as a Journalist who could withstand Museveni's intimidation. Besides his superb superior capacity to provide an accurate analysis of political and economic situation from a geopolitical and global perspective, he excelled in security matters. In that way, he gained a lot of fame at local and international level. But more so, he won the confidence of whistle blowers and patriotic individuals who through him volunteered a lot of sensitive information. 

Behind the scenes, Andrew Mwenda was in bed with the first family. He engaged as a fiancé the first lady's cousin sister, Fifi who lives in the USA. He became closer to the first son Muhoozi as a friend. His elder brothers Major Baguma of ISO and Col. Kayanja Muhanga formerly of JATT and now the Commandant of Military Police are Museveni's close confidants in the NRA. His sister Margret Muhanga was in the New Vision before she became the NRM woman representative for Kabarole district. He husband was the NRM district chairman before being appointed as the head of the National Forestry Authority. His mother was an NRM local council leader and is now a leading low NRM opinion leader in Kabarole. His father (RIP) was historically a UPC member until the NRM came on the scene but still he did neither showed open support nor opposition to the NRM.

Starting with getting closer to former Rwanda's head of External Intelligence, Col. Patrick Karegeya during the height of tensions between Uganda and Rwanda, Mwenda caught the attention of Paul Kagame. After he quit The Monitor at a time when Col. Karegeya had fallen out with Kagame, Mwenda was thought to be feeding Kagame with information pertaining to the movements and activities of the dissident army Generals. The run-away Generals had to cut off all links with Mwenda. Later, using his magazine The Independent he openly tooted up the task of whitewashing the Kagame administration in a public relations campaign. It is believed he brokered a deal that saw relations between Museveni and Kagame rejuvenated to the present honeymoon in Eastern Congo and the EAC.

The likes of Mwenda are what are refered to in intelligence as Agents Provocatuers. They disguise as ardent critics so as to attract, trap and compromise (expose) dissenters. Therefore, is Mwenda a top member of NRM or an opportunist?