Monday, 30 December 2013


The current security crisis in Southern Sudan is a good lesson for both Museveni and those opposed to his 27 years dictatorship. Of recent both Ugandan oposition and the general population have developed a conscesus that its only use of force that can put an end to Museveni's dictatorship. No doubt, forceful removal of Museveni implies the use of arms as is the case in Southern Sudan. It means disabling and allienating the dictator from the armed forces. It is the role of a few elites whether civillian or military to effectively utilise the existing armed forces. In such a situation, the much aclaimed "the people"
does not matter. Its the men in uniform and their handlers who matter.

However, drawing lessons from the current Southern Sudan crisis, advocates of forceful removal of Museveni should organise a decisive plan of action that can dislodge Museveni within a period of between one hour and the next one week. On the contrary a poorly planned and protracted armed action will simply play into the hands of dictator Museveni thus throwing the country into carnage.

Like everyone else, Museveni is very much aware that the situation in Uganda is more more riper for armed confrontation than Southern Sudan. He has stocked all sorts of military arsenal and succeeded privatising the armed forces by positioning his ethinic cohorts at the helm of strategic military positions. Drawing from the experience of recent events in Southern Sudan, he is going to intensify intelligence surveillance on his own Military Commanders. His Southern Sudan counterpart had similar arrangements but has only been saved by external intervention coupled by poor planning by the armed opposition. It is this desire for a regional military alliance that explains the idea behind Museveni's desperate push for regional intergration. The current events in Southern Sudan have sent him more panicking than Silva Kirr. His NRA units now in Southern Sudan will soon devise a means of committing a big massacre that will be blamed on the rebelling group. This will be designed to brand the belligerents as terrorists and at worst subjected to indictement by the ICC inorder to cripple their genuine fight against Silva Kir's dictatorship.

Above all, Museveni's military intervention in Juba is dictated by his historical urge to contain his own nothern Uganda Luo influence. He did the same move in Kenya but of recent Railla Odinga has warned him to keep off Kenya's internal affairs. Earlier he had wanted to keep the Southern Sudan occupied with war with Khartoum but this could not work for him. For his designs, the current situation in Southern Sudan fits well if only it can keep the new nation unstable securitywise.

Therefore, a Southern Sudan like situation is innevitable in Uganda and there are lessons to learn.


Tuesday, 24 December 2013


Right from the regimes of Obote 1, Iddi Amin, Obote 11 and now Museveni, Uganda had been a key ally of the struggling Southern Sudanese people. Starting with the Anyanya rebellion in the 1960s and 70s to the SPLA during the 80s and 90s, successive Ugandan goverments offered support to the Southern Sudanese struggle.

However, its during Museveni's reign that Uganda's support took discrimatory dimensions - "our southern christian brothers". According to Museveni, the struggle was against the Arab Islamic regime of Kharatoum that was bent on spreading Islamic Fundamentalism orchestrated by Hassan Ali Tourabi. The truith is that Museveni opportunistically wanted to detach the people of northern and West Nile regions from any dirrect link with their cousins in Southern Sudan. Northern and West Nile regions had rejected the Museveni government right from its inception and had gone into armed rebellion with rear bases in Southern Sudan. The Museveni government refered to the people from northern Uganda and west Nile as Anyanyas in reference to the Southern Sudan liberation struggle.

Khartoum decided to offer retaliatory support to Uganda dissidents based in Southern Sudan. Relations between Kampala and Khartoum deteriorated to the extent that during the early 90s the NRA assaulted the Sudan embasy in Kampala with armoured personel carriers (APC) leading to shivering diplomatic relations.

The USA threw its weight behind the Uganda's support for the SPLA. A full fledged supply line was established and coordinated by the Gen. Joram Mugume the then NRA Chief of Combat Operations (CCO) and Fred Tolit the then Director of Military Intelligence (DMI). Actually Fred Tolit was just a figure head DMI meant to hoodwink the Acholis. He was a mere head of the Sudan desk concerned with matters of Southern Sudan and the LRA. The real DMI was instead his deputy, Aronda Nyakairima. Worst of all, Tolit was viewed as a General Tinyefuza confidant since its the later who had brought him to the fore.

This did not deter the Ugandan armed groups from getting support from some sections of the SPLA fighters. One of the deceptive ways was for the SPLA to pretend that the LRA had overan its camps and seized arms. As the South was heading towards gaining full autonomy from Khartoum, the legendary SPLA leader John Garang had to die in a helcopter crash provided to him by Museveni. No doubt, like all revolutionaries an autonomous state of Southern Sudan under Garang would have sought to support other liberation movements that already had bases in its teritory. Garang had a softer approach towards Khartoum - Museveni's arch enemy and a bait for USA support. Garang's successor, Silva Kiir set up a Museveni client regime in Southern Sudan. Being an internal figure, Johm Garang would not have taken orders from Museveni without question. In return Museveni has been fighting hard to have it incorporated into the East African Community solely in order to secure the northern border.

It is against this background that Museveni has had to move very fast to to intervene and save his client regime of Silva Kiir. In the same vein of keeping the ethinic Luo influence in check, Museveni intervened in Kenya against a Railla Odinga victory. Earlier, during the early 90s, he had denied Kenyan dissident Col. Odong's FERA bases in Uganda against the Arap Moi government.


Saturday, 14 December 2013


Twenty seven years now, Museveni has manifestly demonstrated beyond doubt that he has no intention of relinquishing power peacefully. He has always relied on the military and the power of money to retain power. He has enjoyed the company of non militant political opposition players to legtimise his hold on power.

It is groups like the recently concluded Uganda Conference in the Hague that Museveni enjoys. The actions of such groups fit into his popular proverb "Kahenddkye teita Mbogo" (mere wishing of a buffallo to break its leg does not guarantee its death).

It is only Dr. Besigye who came on the scene as a threat to Museveni's hold on power. However, since Dr. Besigye has for a decade now not transformed the armed option into reality, he joins the likes of Semogerere, Bwanika, Mayanja, Mao, Agrey Awori, Otunu, Miria Obote etc. The only difference with Dr. Besigye is that he has done alot of mobilisation of Ugandans and the international community by exposing Museveni's hidden agenda.

Being a former NRA, Ugandans had anticipated Dr. Besigye to break into Museveni's power base - the Military and dislodge Museveni from power. He had stated that use of military force remained an option and this generated alot of hope for Ugandans who believe 99.9% (apart from Mao and Muntu) that Museveni can only be militarily dislodged.

Dr. Besigye now remains a key opposition leader with majority following but who cannot capture power because he has no army. With time most of his simpathisers are to revert back to the Museveni camp. With public resources at Museveni's disposal, fence sitters will be lured back and come 2016, he will win with 95%.

Ugandans are so disgusted and desperate that they are ready to support any armed uprising that can dislodge Museveni. The level of despair is so great that even if it was Joseph Kony's LRA, they are willing to support it.

It is in the midist of this uncertainity, that Gen David Tinyefuza came to the scene a few months ago. With his group, they have not wasted time but instead they have outrightly told the world that Museveni will not leave power peacefully. They are running short of making a declaration that the group will use force. Thats what Ugandans want to hear and the earlier they arm Ugandans the better because Ugandans are more than ready.

Unlike Besigye and Muntu, Tinyefuza has the capacity to eat deeper into Museveni power base - the military leaving it crumbling. Once it crumbles, it is only Tinyefuza who can reorganise it into a peoples' army by taming the politically ambitious Generals to avert the country degenerating into fragmentation. Most important is that a Tinyefuza led military assault will eat into his predominantly elite Hima NRA command structure.

During his service, Tinyefuza demonstrated his capacity to reason beyond tribal/ethinic leanings. His only weakness is that when it comes to combat, he forgets that he is a General and fights fiercely like an ordinary soldier - the Fred Rwigyema way. With such a scenario, Museveni will be left with no option but to put Gen. Saleh in-charge of NRA. Again, Gen. Saleh is dissatisfied with the status quo but only holding on to Museveni for protection against the ICC for the Congo expedition.

Although Museveni delibarately denied Tinyefuza the opportunity to advance his military knowledge, there is no match for him in the NRA. He is a genius as far as political and military campaign is concerned. Besides Saleh, Gen. Tumwine is as a civillian General as Gen. Otafiire.

Armed with current intelligence and exploiting the situation on the ground that has been prepared by Besigye and group, once Tinyefuza and group rolls into action, the war theatre wont last long before Museveni is dislodged and Uganda regaining its lost glory.


Friday, 6 December 2013


Fellow Ugandans,
As we mourn the departure of of Cde Nelson Mandela (RIP), let us take cognisance of the unwithering determination of the anti-apatheid activists, the SA masses and the international community. It is their concerted efforts that kept the struggle alive and was a lifeline to the incacerated thus leading to Mandela's release and rebirth of a new SA.

Cde Mandela has passed on at a time when our own icon of democracy and human rights, Dr. Kiiza Besigye is under incerceration without the due court process. Regratably, to the great pleasure of the brutal Museveni regime, our enthuathism for the struggle he is spearheading seem to be dwindling. We have left him vulnerable. That being the situation, the repressive regime is trying to exploit his vulnerability by innitiating negotiations over his freedom.

As a tribute and to honour the values for which Cde Mandela stood for, let us reflect on the fate of Dr.Besigye. Leaders should moblise the masses to observe a vigil close to Dr. Besigye's residence. Let us also rename Dr. Besigyes residence where he is incercerated as ROBEN ISLAND.