Thursday, 31 January 2019

UGANDA: Understanding Gen. Kasirye's licence to shoot


Gen (Rtd) Kasirye Gwanga was a Corporal in the Uganda Army (UA) at the time Iddi Amin was ousted in 1979. Gwanda was among the thousands of former UA soldiers who were incarcerated by the victorious Tanzanian and Ugandan exiles armies. Most of the detained forner UA soldiers attributed their humiliating and inhumane mistreatment to Museveni who was the then Minister of Defence under UNLF. When they were freed in early 1980s, Museveni had already taken to the bush for his Bush War. He badly needed the services of these same former UA soldiers.

When Iddi Amin was ousted in 1979, his soldiers who hailed from West Nile region withdrew to their home and eventuality fled to Congo and Sudan. Those from other regions simply hid in their homes while some were tricked into surrendering to the Tanzanian and exiles armies. This last category endured the wrath of Museveni and his backers. A few found their way to Museveni's Bush War - the likes of Tadeo Kanyankole, Italikire Kiiza, Mzee Barihona, Ahmed Kashilingi and a couple of others.

Eventually many detained former UA soldiers were released (including Corporal Kasirye Gwanga) but they shunned Museveni's NRA and instead joined Andrew Kayiira's UFM. That's how even a Munyarwanda, Stephen Ndugutse alias Kalisoliso ended up with Kayiira's UFM instead of Museveni's Banyarwanda infested NRA. When the UFM was dispersed, Kasirye Gwanga did not join the NRA but simply maintained his earlier secret contact with the NRA. It was until around late 1985 when the NRA took control of Mityana that Kasirye Gwanga who had now mobilised a few former UFM fighters surrendered to NRA's John Kazoora.

At the time of NRA's capture of Kampala, Kasirye Gwanga was under the artillery unit that was shelling Kampala from Mutundwe Hill. Kasirye Gwanga came to prominence when he betrayed the Baganda/UFM attempted coup that saw Andrew Kayiira, some Baganda politicians and army officers detained over treason. Unknown to the plotters, Kasirye Gwanga and Drago had been feeding the then Brigade Commander Central Region, Gen. Ssejusa with details of the plot up to the time they were rounded up in Colline Hotel, Mukono. The treason trial failed because the judiciary was still sound but a few days after Kayiira was released, he was assassinated. The UFM and Baganda military agitation was buried together with Andrew Kayiira.

Since then Kasirye Gwanga never got any deployment in command positions despite the advanced military training and promotions. The only serious position he held was Director of Barracks and Stores (housing, accommodation, home appliances) under the Chief of Logistics and Engineering (CLE). At one time he headed local government in Mubende as L.C 5. He thrived on handouts from individuals in State House, CMI and the office of CDF.

Gwanga renewed his loyalty in the early 2000 at the height of the Rwanda/Uganda sour relations. He reported and kept CMI's Brig. Mayombo informed about everything that Rwanda's then spy chief, Col. Karegeya and the exiled renegade Uganda army officers would confide in him. That is how Museveni brought Gwanga on board as a Senior Presidential Advisor on Buganda. At one time, Gwanga retired from the Amy but when the tough got going he rejoined. Even his recent so called retirement is meaningless because his status never changed. What was his role in military service that he retired from?? It was just a reprimand for having shot and burnt a landgrabber's grader. For Mueeveni, Kasirye had set a bad precedent that could be adopted by other citizens to save their land. Gwanda is still armed and commanding his squad of army bodyguards, he is earning from Public Service and thriving on handouts from the army and State House.

Kasirye Gwanga has the license to shoot, maim, destroy, and kill just because he is used by Museveni to hoodwink the Baganda into thinking that they also have their own in the regime's top security hierarchy. Museveni is very much aware that Kasirye Gwanga has never had any ideological commitment to Museveni's regime but is just a symbolic opportunistic Muganda army General driven by survival instincts.

"Police yesterday registered the ninth case against Maj Gen Kasirye Ggwanga in the last 10 years of his shooting impunity but none has ever been investigated to conclusion."
Daily Monitor - 31/1/2019.

You now know the reason.


Monday, 28 January 2019

UGANDA: When Gen. Muntu plotted to split from Museveni's bush war NRA


"Internal contradictions developed because I remember when I returned from hospital I found the commanders were being influenced by the old culture where the commanders were everything. The Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and the young graduates were being branded “intellectuals.”

Disagreements develop

Some of the commanders had been trained in Munduli. [Tanzania] and had served in the UNLA, they used to have a practice called “size ya commander” (fit for the commander). You would go for an attack and charge things like new uniforms or boots and other things and the commander would say, “hiyo ni size ya commander” meaning you should hand it over because the size fits the commander.

It was a small thing but it would tell the thinking and this was early in the struggle. We challenged that.  It reached a time when where we had planned to split the camp. We linked up with NCOs, we were led by Enoch Mondo we wanted to pick up our things and leave at night.

We wanted to walk away but continue the struggle separately until this issue was resolved. It seems Museveni had heard of the unrest in the bush because before we effected our plan he came back. We held a meeting and throughout the meeting it was the intellectuals who took over the discussion of what direction to take.

We needed to chart a new direction. We said we were not careerists and that this was a political struggle executed through military means.  I think we won the argument because a number of things changed, things like Unit Disciplinary Committees were established, finance committees, we also started having regular baraza discussions where soldiers could express themselves without fear of reprisal from the commanders and policy and administrative committees and for fair and equal distribution of whatever came our way.

We felt we had now set up a new foundation. Corporal punishments were outlawed. Previously, a commander would just flog a soldier or order any punishment anyhow."
      Gen. Muntu in an interview with the The Daily Monitor - March 2010.

Gen. Pecos Kutesa confirms this in his February 2004 interview with The Daily Monitor newspaper thus;
       "When we got back to our colleagues in Luwero in December 1981, we found that there had developed a problem of command. We now had a group of intellectuals who had joined us from Makerere University, who questioned commands from illiterate officers. Mzee had the duty of educating all groups about the philosophy of the struggle and sanity returned."

Reknown NRA machinegunner, Enock Tumuheirwe Mondo who was supposed to lead the breakaway group was later to die in combat when he was marooned in a hail of bullets and bombs during the battle at Kalongero bridge in Luwero.

Gen. Muntu who rose through the ranks to become the Army Chief (1989 - 1998) disagreed with Museveni's continued hold on power and quit the army.  He turned down Museveni's offer of the portfolio of Minister of Defense thus;
         "He wrote to me a letter, shifting me from command and making me a minister.
I wrote back to him within that very short period thanking him for having appointed me the Commander, and for the period I served but turned down the offer he had given me."
      Gen. Muntu in interview with The Daily Monitor - October 2012.

Upon retirement he became a founding member of the leading opposition party, the FDC.  He rose to the party presidency before he recently quit citing irreconcilable internal contradictions thus is in the process of founding his own party.

The above trend of events suggest that Gen. Muntu is  defiant in character. More especially when he has good reasons.

change of guards

Saturday, 26 January 2019

UGANDA: What are these secrets that Rwanda must spy on Uganda???


CHANGE OF GUARDS - Following a Hutu revolution that dislodged the Tutsi monarchy from power in Rwanda in the late 1950s, tens of thousands of Tutsi fled to neighboring countries including Uganda.  As the Hutu consolidated their hold on power, the now exiled Tutsi made several fruitless attempts to militarily return to Rwanda and regain power.

Consequently, the Hutu regime in Rwanda picked interest in the activities of exiled Tutsi.  It infiltrated spies (both Hutu and Tutsi) into neighbouring countries to monitor the activities of exiled Tutsi.  Some of such spies ended up being integrated into local Ugandan communities where many still live to date.  Also at hand was the Bafumbira ethnic community of Kisoro district who are ethnic Banyarwanda but their territory was added to Uganda around 1904. These predominantly Hutu Bafumbira enjoyed a good relationship with the Hutu regime in Rwanda under Habyarimana.

Though it was the Rwandese Tutsi who predominantly joined Museveni's NRA, some Hutu Rwandese also joined but kept a low profile.  There is no doubt by the time the Tutsi RPF invaded Rwanda from Uganda in October 1990, the Hutu regime of Habyarimana in Rwanda had been fully made aware of such designs.  The RPF invasion of 1990 was more of a Tutsi refugees affair as a number of inflirergrated Rwandese both Tutsi and Hutu kept their distance.  For the RPF, these were unpatriotic. The RPF invaders considered the Hutu Bafumbira of Kisoro as hostile to their cause.  It was just a handful of Tutsi Bafumbira led by Bishop Halerimana who actively associated with the RPF.  This is the background to the current alleged links of Kisoro's strongman, Philemon Mateke with the dissident FDLR dissident group.

A year after capturing power in Rwanda, in 1995 Museveni granted Ugandan citizenship to all the Rwandese in Uganda.  He gazetted the Banyarwanda as one of the indigenous communities of Uganda.  This undermined the plans of many Banyarwanda who had intended to return to Rwanda following the dislodging of the Hutu establishment. In fact, even some of those who had initially returned to Rwanda started returning and settling in Uganda.

Following the bloody clashes between the armies of Rwanda and Uganda in the eastern Congolese city of Kisangani, bad blood developed between Kigali and Kampala.  Each country embarked on supporting each other's armed dissidents thus allegations of spying on each other became the order of the day. The matter was resolved by the mediation of foreign powers like the U.K.

A decade later, Museveni gained an upper hand by allegedly harboring and offering support to fresh Rwanda's dissidents.  Rwanda on its part has no viable Ugandan dissident group to offer support in retaliation.  It relied on reactivation of its intelligence collection efforts in order to monitor the activities of its dissidents.  That's how it enlisted the services of the Uganda Police under Gen. Kalekyezi to monitor the activities of its dissidents in Uganda. 

Despite Museveni's attempt to dismantle the Gen. Kalekyezi led Uganda Police spy network for Rwanda, Rwanda continues to intensfy its efforts to gather intelligence about the activities of its dissidents in Uganda.  The current Rwanda spy saga is beyond the traditional spying that countries conduct on each other.  Normally countries spy on each other so as to gain economic and military advantage.  There are no economic and military state secrets between Rwanda and Uganda.  It is just that the former wants to monitor the alleged activities of its dissident groups that are said to be harboured and facilitated by Museveni.

Ugandans would only have known what is going on if Parliament would put government to task to explain what is going on.  However, unfortunately, Museveni privatised tbe same Parliament.


Friday, 25 January 2019

UGANDA: When Museveni's NRA reached Acholi land (PHOTOS)


This year's 33rd NRM anniversary is being celebrated in Kitgum.  As locals join the celebration, it is vital to make a recollection of the events when Museveni's NRA first set foot in Acholiland in 1986.

A few years ago, Ambassador Olara Otunnu spoke out on atrocities by Museveni's insurgency in the Luwero Triangle and his army's counter-insurgency operations in northern Uganda and called for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate Gen. Yoweri Museveni and his Generals. This ruffled feathers within the Museveni regime particularly the power centre of the regime, the army high command.

Long time Museveni confidante and then coordinator of Uganda’s intelligence services, Gen. David Tinyefuza was quick to warn he would “crush” Otunnu if he continued to question the National Resistance Army’s (NRA) past and roles in atrocities in Luwero and northern Uganda.

In an address to the mourners at the burial of NRA/UPDF commander Brig Chefe Ali, at Burunga, Kazo, in Mbarara district, President Museveni’s younger brother and one time Army Chief, Presidential Advisor on Defense and then commander of the Reserve Force (RF), Gen. Saleh, eloquently told mourners that “If it was not for Brigadier Chefe Ali, no UPC or Acholi would be alive” (see “Chefe saved UPCs, Acholi – Saleh” Mornitor 14 July 1999).

On Sunday September 29, 2013, The Daily Monitor ran a story titled;
By Tabu Butagira

Col. Mande contended that the long-running insurgency in northern Uganda was provoked by plunder of the region and revenge killings by the victorious National Resistance Army troops upon taking over power in Kampala in 1986, a former senior NRA commander has said.

Here below, find excerpts of the interview;
................the second incident was when I led the capture of Gulu in 1986 and got in contact with the late Lord Andrew Benedicto Adimola and Father John of Alokolum Seminary. Remnants of Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) had approached them seeking to negotiate their surrender to us and I gave them assurances that we would not kill them. The first officer who came to negotiate was now Brig. Charles Otema Awany, the UPDF Chief of Logistics and Engineering, Charles Kareba and the late Lt. Col. Okoth. I gave them food and assured them the NRA policy was never to kill a prisoner of war or a person who had surrendered willfully. They went and told their friends who surrendered in large numbers. I called the President and showed him all the weapons they had brought back willfully; and he said that was a good move. These guys were ready to join the government; so, I put them in Pece stadium in Gulu town. As I was doing this, Gen. David Ssejusa a.k.a Tinyefuza was posted as Brigade commander and I was the commanding officer, and he got instructions, I don’t know from where, but he gave instruction that I should stop handling the Acholi people with kid’s gloves. That meant to molest them, but how could I molest people that had come out willfully?

Q: Which brigade was this?

A: By then NRA formations were not properly constituted. It was named a brigade but was just a group of battalions under one brigade called 157th brigade. I was in the 15th battalion but the 19th battalion, 13th battalion and elements of the 1st battalion had fused to capture Gulu. When I refused to accept what my conscious told me were wrong orders, Tinyefuza said I had led a mutiny and I wanted to use UNLA soldiers who had surrendered to overthrow government. An Intelligence briefing was prepared that I was linking up with DP elements in Gulu to undermine the NRA authority. Gen. Salim Saleh and Brig. Matayo Kyaligonza were sent to quell the purported mutiny. I told them there was no mutiny, but that I questioned instructions which broke the code of conduct of the NRA. To be specific, vehicles and soldiers of my battalion had been deployed by the Brigade commander (Tinyefuza) to take property which was rather acquired wrongfully from the population to south of Uganda and to take some of the soldiers they rounded up to Kibulala prison farm in Ibanda district. Those soldiers that were taken south have not been traced.

Q: How many were these soldiers?

A: They were ferried in five lorries; they could have numbered 200.

Q: And you say they were never seen again?

A: No, they were not seen. Those who survived being taken to Kibulala vanished from the place they had willfully assembled at in Gulu, they went back to hide and the Brigade commander gave orders to round them up. In the process, I saw suspected UNLA soldiers tied Kandoya (hand to back), people lost lives and others had to defend themselves. That is how the war in northern Uganda was provoked. I sent the President a message [about the developments] and he said I should stop being an alarmist.

Q: What did your message say?

A: The message was very clear that we were committing crimes, we had provoked the war, things were being moved to southern part of Uganda and he needed to intervene immediately to stop this. I had so many causalities already of my troops and facilities that could help them were just busy ferrying looted properties.

Q: What properties?

A: Anything that they would land on, they would claim the UNLA had stolen it from Luwero and Kampala; it could be a fridge, a sofa set, any machine; a car, anything. Even Lacor hospital lost a generator. They were on rampage. I was warning the president that we were going to start a war that we may never finish and that is when he called me an alarmist and he gave me a transfer to Karamoja, and later to Jinja. I expected he would have transferred Tinyefuza.

In July 1986, remnants of the UNLA started forming spontaneous resistance groups and units in Acholi to fight back the NRA over its counterinsurgency operations.

According to Col. Mande, the northerners with guns began individual defiance but one Capt Ojuk volunteered to organise the group for formal resistance. The late Alice Ouma Lakwena of the Holy Spirit Movement later assumed command of the group before it morphed into the Joseph Kony-led Lord’s Resistance Army insurgency.


UGANDA: Deported Rwandese spy leaves behind thousands of 'siblings'


CHANGE OF GUARDS - The Museveni/Kagame bickering took a new twist this week with the expulsion of a one Anne Mirenge who was one of the top executives of a leading mobile telecom company, MTN.  She is accused of using her position to spy for Rwanda thus compromising state security.

Rwanda accuses Museveni of harboring, aiding and facilitating its dissident group under renegade former army chief, Gen. Katumba Nyamwasa.  A number of senior security officers including the former Police chief, Gen. Kalekyezi (another ethnic Munyarwanda) have been incarcerated on charges of forcefully returning Rwandese refugees to Rwanda.  The actual accusation is that they were feeding Rwanda with information pertaining to the activities of its dissidents in Uganda.  Most intriguing is that the charge sheet mentions   "...........forcefully repatriating Rwandese refugees AND UGANDANS back to Rwanda."  What gullible Ugandans have not interrogated is who are these Ugandans who were forcefully taken to Rwanda!!!

The simple answer to the above puzzle is that; for Rwanda, every Munyarwanda is a Rwandese while for Uganda, some Banyarwanda are Ugandans.  For the Banyarwanda, they believe they are all Rwandese. The big question is what distinguishes the Banyarwanda of Rwanda from the Banyarwanda of Uganda???  Take the example of Museveni's sensitive Ministry of Defence where the Permanent Secretary is Rosette Byengoma, the Under secretary Finance and Administration is Edith Buturo while Ngabirano Kabiriti is the In-charge Logistics (see photos).  Are they Banyarwanda, Ugandans or Rwandese???  Is support for or opposition to Rwandese dissidents the yardstick for determining the Munyarwanda of Rwanda and that of Uganda???

In 1995 Museveni opportunistically made Banyarwanda one of the indigenous tribes in Uganda and is now dancing to the tune.  Therefore, as Uganda deports Anne Mirenge to Rwanda, it ought to know that she leaves behind tens of thousands of her 'siblings'.


Tuesday, 22 January 2019

UGANDA: @MugishaMuntu as army chief and Museveni's ghost soldiers


CHANGE OF GUARDS - Since his Bush War days, Museveni sought to build an army whose top command owed personal loyalty to himself through patronage and a sense of entitlement.  In a March 2010 interview with the Daily Monitor, Gen. Muntu gave a firsthand account thus;

      "That sense of entitlement that first emerged in the bush, which still lingered and later emerged to derail the objectives for which we went to the bush.  It was so stark as the war progressed and we were sure we would take over power people started talking about what they were planning, where they wanted to live, or saying ‘I will be this, I will live in this neighbourhood.’ It became intense when we took over power. After taking over our intentions were to all go into barracks but that was heavily resisted as soon as we arrived here. People started running to live in Kololo, Nakasero and I think that is where we lost it................The moment officers went into houses in Kololo, Nakasero etc, that was it.

I think that started promoting the sense of acquisition and that went into business and the feeling of everyone getting in to get something for himself. It has now gone into what we see today.  We discussed it several times but it soon became a status symbol and part of the status quo. Nobody wanted to reverse that and I don’t know why. There used to be an argument between traditional careerists officers (and those who thought different of the purpose of the struggle). A kind of warlord mentality emerged—that you fight to take power you must be recognised for it. That sense of entitlement.

As we moved on, President Museveni’s long term plans and the warlord mentality found a meeting point. He found it difficult to deal with or punish those that participated. Eventually he became a key representative of that very mentality. He says he killed his animal, there are those who said “hii ni size ya commander” which he said he opposed. I ask myself, were those the ideals that motivated our struggle?"

Most commanders who had been restrained from stealing by the presence of Rwandese and other committed cadres found their way around in the early 1990s.  The incorruptible departing Rwandese who had dominated vital departments like intelligence, supplies and Finance left in 1990.  The equally incorruptible new Army Chief, Gen. Muntu who had assumed office in 1989 was at a loss of allies with whom to fight the vice.  Around 1994 he attempted to fight the vice but was let down by Museveni.  In the same interview with the Daily Monitor of 2010 he had this to say;

        "On ghost soldiers, we tried to manage the situation but we were failed. I had appointed a unit led by the Late Col. Sserwanga Lwanga deputized by Col. Bogere but when I wanted to start arrests a debate emerged that the same commanders we were going to arrest were the same who were fighting the war against Kony. The Army Council said don’t arrest. At one time “they” tried to establish a unit from outside to do a head count but it did not do much."

Col (Rtd) Fred Bogere in his February 2018 interview with The Observer sums it up thus;

       "After that, I moved on to tackle the problem of ghost soldiers. I worked out a concept which I shared with the army commander. He asked me to write a work plan which he said he needed to discuss with me, Koreta and my director Odongo. My operation plan was passed and we got service support from the airforce that gave us helicopters; we needed machine guns to protect us.

It was left to the army commander to appoint somebody to head it. He sent a message appointing Col Sserwanga Lwanga (deceased) deputised by me. That was around 1994. We started in Mbale because of the information about ghosts in that area. We would move with money and pay soldiers ourselves. We recovered a lot of money; about Shs 186 million.  We found a discrepancy of about 34 percent on average. We moved on to the second division.

The commander there in Lira, Brigadier Peter Kerim, knew how Muntu and Sserwanga worked. He surrendered all those that were regarded as ghosts. He made our work simpler.  Other units followed suit; by the time we moved there, they had almost clean payrolls. This army best knows me for this. How I wish we had pushed on with it because it had made good strides.
Politics came in; they claimed that we had not done well despite what we had recovered. The commanders started saying that they were using the money to pay vigilantes and Local Defence Units. But these people were not supposed to be paid but, rather, given food when they moved with troops.

They somehow convinced the president and continued sending these monies we had discovered were for ghosts. What I think the commanders did was to relax their pursuit of the enemy and instability increased. When they were called, they said, ‘the people who used to help us are no longer paid.’

In the same interview, Col. Bogere goes ahead to describe Gen. Muntu's leadership credentials thus;
      "In terms of organising the army for the good political order of the country, an army that is answerable to the people, not an army of an individual, nobody rivals Muntu...........that is his way of doing things; he is a very systematic officer who handles things on principle. He has no people he carries with him wherever he goes. His nature is institutional-based. He comes into an institution and whoever he finds there is the one he works with.  He only called in the current Joint Chief of Staff [Joseph] Musanyufu to be one of his assistants to join me and present-day General Katumba Wamala as ADC because the army commander’s office had a lot of work by then."

That is how the scourge of corruption in the army and in particular creation of Ghost Soldiers found a fertile ground and ruined the army.  In 1998  Dr. Besigye authored a 12 page critique of the failing army leadership:

        "Right from 1986, NRA/UPDF Command has been ineffective – to varying degrees at different times. This situation, however, has been progressively getting worse, especially, over the last 9 years (1989-1998). Failure to establish the exact strength of the force may be cited as one of the signs of this.  Billions of shillings are lost in payment for non-existent strength, undermining provision of essential logistics and services…................Adequate authority is not conferred onto the Army Commander by H.E. The President/C-in-C.......after 1986, the CHC became President, an office that came with enormous tasks such as the economy, foreign relations and political work; but the President nevertheless maintained control of the Army.............even where the Army Commander attempted to assert his would-be authority, subordinates would still be inclined to seek the confirmation of the President."

Around 1996 Museveni ignored all the available institutions meant to fight corruption in the army and instead appointed a probe committee comprised of civilians under a certain Nakayenga and deputised by a one Kagina.  This was at the instigation of his close cofidant Gen. Kazini who at the time was the Commander of the northern Uganda based 4th Division.  The Nakayenga committee failed miserably and seven years later in 2003 Gen. Kazini told the Mbabazi-led probe committee on Ghost Soldiers thus;

     "You see we discovered there are ghosts, no army in 4 Division at the time. We made a report to the C-I-C (Commander-in-Chief) through the AC (Army Commander) at that time and he brought somebody called Nakayenga. They found ghosts in 1996, and you remember one paymaster (Lt. Osele) killed himself because he was cornered.

He was sending Shs 400m to the Director of Finance, Maj. Bright Rwamirama, at that time every month, even more.  We found that the army was not on ground and we scaled down. There was merging of units. It’s on record. Merged including Brigades, scaled down because the army was not on ground. 405 Bde was deleted from the books at that time under Lt. Col. Dradiga…At that time we didn’t know how many Bdes were supposed to be in UPDF and how many Bdes were cut off because by the time I became COS, by establishment we could see only Bde formations 501 and 503; the rest could appear as battalion formations without Bde.

They were there but few. The parade was supposed to be done at Chwero by Nakayenga. They went there, they didn’t find soldiers. Then when they were going to fly out, Dradiga threatened to shoot an RPG [at the] helicopter of Nakayenga. We had to intervene with mambas. He didn’t fire at it but threatened and when the woman (Nakayenga) came, she went to the C-I-C and said she has given up the work, can’t continue because she is going to lose her life."

The vice continued unabbetted until July 2003 when under pressure, Museveni appointed a probe committee to investigate the issue of ghost soldiers in the army.  Headed by then Minister of Defence, Amama Mbabazi, the committee was comprised of Gen. Saleh, Gen. Ssejusa and Brig. Kyamulesire.  The committee was mandated to establish how the scam had started and how it was affecting counter insurgency operations.  The committee concluded its work in three months.

It established that the vice had started around 1996 and had reached its climax around 1998 at the height of the northern Uganda insurgency.  That is the period when the army was randomly recruiting auxiliary forces to bolster its counter insurgency operations.  Kazini was the Division Commander in northern region while Gen. Saleh was the leading the Pacification of Northern Uganda.  Kazini had arrested most paymasters and given responsibility of handling payments to Battalion Commanders who embarked on inflating of payrolls.

Appearing before the same committee, Gen. Kazini had this to say;
COMMITTEE: So you are sure there are ghosts?
KAZINI: Yes. For sure there are ghosts in the army but controlled now.

COMMITTEE: Why are some people saying that you are the one who encouraged ghosts?

KAZINI: I don’t know. I don’t think I was encouraging ghosts. It’s me and it’s on record in message books [who] started this question of fighting ghosts. I am the third [fourth?] AC (Army Commander). There was Afande [Elly] Tumwine, [Salim] Saleh, Gen. [Mugisha] Muntu, and [Jeje] Odongo… all these things were there. Whether they were sleeping, who knows? So absurd to say it’s me. May be I got into people’s ways of …"

It is worthy noting that as earlier narrated above the issue of probing into Ghost Soldiers had been initiated by Gen. Muntu in 1994 during his tenure as Army Commander.  That is why despite the committee finding that the vice had been created around the time he was the Army Commander, he was not even called to testify before the committee. The committee found that a total of USD 324m had been lost during a period under review.

Consequently, Museveni suspended 28 senior officers that had been implicated.  Gen. Kazini, Tumukunde, Gutti, Poteri, Lakara and others.  Museveni ordered for their cosmetic trial before the Court Martial.  A few years later, they were all cleared, promotted and redeployed as they continued to enjoy their loot.

Therefore, endemic corruption by the Museveni regime started from the army with Museveni as the patron. While Gen. Muntu had sought to cure the problem of Ghost Soldiers in 1994, nine years later in 2003 Museveni only carried out a post mortem of the same which he used to purge his officers.


Sunday, 20 January 2019

UGANDA: Why Museveni won't dare blackmail @MugishaMuntu over counter insurgency atrocities - Warning, GRAPHIC PHOTOS


CHANGE OF GUARDS - Uganda's longest serving army chief (1989 -1998), scandal free and incorruptible, Gen (Rtd) Muntu is set to launch a new political party to wrestle power from Museveni whose 33 years military dictatorship is detested by Ugandans.  However, as has always been the norm, Museveni must be considering how best he will blackmail Gen. Muntu.  He often accuses his former comrades in arms turned political opponents of past incompentence, war attrocities and corruption scandals.

In 2006 during his Third Term campaign trail in Apach District, Museveni accused his main challenger, Dr. Besigye of having deserted Uganda and fled to South Africa.  He said;  "He left us fighting the LRA.  He is an accomplice in the gruesome Barlonyo massacre.  Col.  Besigye and his group were on the side of those who caused the Barlonyo massacre." 

Museveni's leutenants have repeatedly made unsubstantiated allegations linking Dr. Besigye to purchase of junk helicopters and undersize uniforms when he was the army's Chief of Logistics (CLE).  In February 2006 while addressing NRM supporters in Jinja, Gen. Saleh said that "it was Dr. Besigye as the CLE who inspected and recommended that the helicopters were in good condition."  Dr. Besigye has repeatedly challenged the regime to institute criminal proceedings to no avail.

Around July 2005 while addressing a refrendum rally at St. Kagwa Primary School in Bushenyi, Museveni castigated Muntu for having left military service;
        "A young man like Muntu; how can he leave the army to start running around like he is doing now? Now, what made him leave the army? Were the wars over in Uganda? He is now talking endlessly."
At the time, Muntu was the opposition FDC chief mobilizer.

In 2012 Gen. Muntu assumed the presidency of the major opposition party, the FDC.  Museveni got worried that he might have to contest with Gen. Muntu in the February 2016 general elections.  During the 27th NRM anniversary celebrations in Kasese, Museveni accused Muntu of having failed to effectively plan for the army during the northern Uganda insurgency.

     ".........the first problem NRA faced after capturing power was the delay in the modernizing of the army, after being reduced from 100,000 to 50,000 officers and men. Some quarters took the views that we should spend less on the smaller army. We, therefore, ended up with an under-equipped and smaller Army. This made our people in the North to suffer under Kony and the cattle rustlers of Karamoja for much longer than was necessary.  When the Army was reduced in 1991, its leadership should have straight away adequately equipped it."

In 2013 Gen. Ssejusa fled the country to the U.K where he launched stinging attacks on the regime.  During the NRM 28th anniversary at Mayuge on January 26, 2014, Museveni declared intentions to probe his army's atrocities during the northern Uganda insurgency. He said;
         "……......there are incidents to be ashamed of. Apart from the Mukura incident and the Bucoro pit incident which were reported, there were other incidents that are coming to light now, ….. I don’t know why the people did not report those incidents. At Kamunyu wanainchi were killed by elements of our army for no reason at all after the army had been attacked by the rebels; there were incidents of looting property including cattle, and other incidents of indiscipline reported in Nwoya. I am going to follow up all those incidents, unearth the culprits if they are still alive so as to hold them accountable and compensate the victims or their descendants.”

He was blackmailing exiled Gen. Ssejusa who was making alliances with the exiled northerners.  Fearing indictment in international jurisdictions, in December 2014 Gen. Ssejusa mysteriously returned from exile.  First, it had been the then army chief, Gen. Katumba Wamala who in January 2014 disclosed that the army would investigate NRM atrocities in Teso thus;
“….we will go back to those areas and find out whether the population has some issues to raise.”

To date, no probe ever took place.  Museveni's army counter insurgency operations in northern and eastern Uganda took place during the reign of Gen. Tumwine 1986 - 1988, Gen. Saleh 1989, Gen. Muntu (1989 - 1998),  Gen. Jeje Odong, Gen. Kaziini, Gen. Aronda and Gen. Katumba.  Most of the heinous crimes took place between 1986 - 2006.  Throughout all this time Museveni was the Commander in Chief and Minister of Defence. 

In 1991 Museveni bypassed his then Army Chief, Gen. Mungu and instead deployed his then Minister of State for Defence, Gen. Ssejusa to conduct the notorious Operation North.  After a lengthy brutal campaign, Museveni responded to local and international outcry by recalling Gen.  Ssejusa from the said operation and instead detailed Gen. Muntu to proceed to the northern region to clean up the mess.

In 2004 Museveni succeeded in having the ICC indict top LRA insurgents.  In July 2004 at Okwang village, 24kms north  east of Lira he told Journalists that;
            "I am ready to be investigated for war crimes … and if any of our people were involved in any crimes, we will give him up to be tried by the ICC and in any case, if such cases are brought to our attention, we will try them ourselves.”
In June 2005 Museveni told the UN news agency IRIN that;
      " The ICC is free to investigate UPDF soldiers for any war crimes and crimes against humanity." 
He welcomed the ICC involvement in hunting down LRA's Joseph Kony saying that it helped in dealing with Khartoum.
      "Khartoum is fully aware of the consequences of dealing with somebody under the ICC indictment."

In 2010 the then ICC chief Prosecutor, Louis Moreno Ocampo said that the ICC was analysing complaints against the Museveni army.   Unfortunately, the ICC opted to only investigate the LRA.

On 6th April 2012, while speaking at the memorial service for the late John William Eluru in Teso, Museveni said that
“the government would conduct investigations on all atrocities allegedly committed by his NRA during the period of insecurity in Eastern and Northern Uganda in the 1980’s in a spirit of embracing national reconciliation”.

In March 2015 when the current ICC Prosecutor visited Uganda to drum up testimony against LRA's Dominic Ongwen before the ICC,  she was confronted with the question of atrocities committed by Museveni's army and she responded thus;
          "At the moment, I can't be able to say I will investigate or not be able to investigate UPDF. At an appropriate time, I will come up with an appropriate statement on the situation.  The ICC has the mandate to try war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. If the actions of the government troops amount to these crimes, the ICC has a right to look at them."

From the a foregoing, it can be authoritatively argued that Museveni uses the threat of probing the northern insurgency war atrocities to blackmail his former comrades in arms turned political opponents.  However, this time round if he dares to apply the same blackmail on Gen. Muntu, the the latter is most likely to challenge him to institute the probe not only for the northern Uganda insurgency but also for other armed conflicts including the Bush War and Kasese. Of course, for obvious reasons, Museveni can't and will never institute such a probe.  Otherwise, such a probe would highly implicate him as the chief accomplice and advocate.

Therefore, blackmail using war atrocities will not apply and other means will have to be devised to counter Gen. Muntu.


Thursday, 17 January 2019

UGANDA: Why Museveni is closly monitoring Gen. Mugisha Muntu's new party - @MugishaMuntu


At age 23, a young university student after writing his last paper opted to head to the bush to join Museveni's guerrilla war in 1981. Though he had been the Vice President of the Students Guild on the Museveni's UPM ticket, as a son of a prominent veteran UPC founding member, Muntu was the least expected to fight the same UPC government.  No wonder in the bush he was initially treated as a spy and placed under surveillance.

After being smuggled to Kampala for treatment following a fatal shooting at battle and defiantly rejoining the bush, Muntu had dealt a heavy blow to the spy suspicion and by the time Museveni captured power in 1986 Muntu was the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI).  Under his direct command were other spies like Aronda, Fred Bogere and Paul Kagame (current President of Rwanda).

By the time Museveni appointed Muntu as overall army chief, Muntu had long left intelligence services and had held command positions notably at Chief Political Commissar and 5th Division Commander.  As Army Commander, Muntu replaced Museveni's young brother Gen. Saleh who was accused of plotting a coup with the "uneducated and disgruntled" Bush War army officers. Gen. Saleh had replaced Elly Tumwine who had been sacked because of incompetence.

Museveni's choice of Gen. Muntu was dictated by the latter's not being power hungry and he was to command the army for the next nine years (1989  - 1998).  His tenure of office witnessed the worst of Museveni's purge of his Bush War army  officers that he suspected were not loyal enough thus the Katebe (rendering redundant) syndrome.

While Muntu wanted to form a professional national army, Museveni was hell bent on creating a personal army.  In August 2012, during a rally in Kamuli district Muntu broke down and shed tears mid the sentence thus; “When I recall the times I was forced to arrest my friends and relatives……..” Who was forcing him and who were those friends and relatives?

Muntu was sacked after he openly opposed Museveni's manoeuvres to hold on power.  His subsequent retirement from the army and outright rejection of Museveni's offer of the position of Minister of Defence was a defiant show of how resolute, incorruptible and principled Muntu is.

Museveni saw no threat in allowing Gen. Muntu to retire because in his estimates Muntu had no following in the army.  This estimate was premised on the fact that the army had been infested by thieves and nepotists whose loyalty could not be aligned to the incorruptible and non sectarian Gen. Muntu.

Since then, Gen. Muntu has been an active opposition political actor.  Last year he announced a departure from the biggest opposition party, the FDC citing lack of internal cohesion.  He is in advanced stages of registering and launching his new political party,  National Alliance for Transformation (NAT).


While Museveni's lieutenants are excited that the emergence of Gen. Muntu helps neutralize Dr.  Besigye's "FDC militancy", Museveni is personally concerned that Gen. Muntu might prove to be the worst.  While the common rhetoric of " those who know Museveni's secrets" has over time been watered down by the past candidatures of Dr. Besigye and Amama Mbabazi, Gen.  Muntu comes with the background of a former top spy - an attribute Museveni takes more seriously.  While Mbabazi also had a strong spy background, his candidature was driven by power thirst, opportunism and revenge for being sacked.

While for reasons outlined earlier, it would on the surface look like Gen. Muntu lost following within the security forces, it takes just a second for a prudent spy to penetrate and rejuvenate the network.

Moreover, the Joint Chief of Staff, Gen.  Musanyufu was a spy under Muntu's DMI before be went on to become his ADC during his tenure as army chief.  The army Spokesman, Brig. Karemire was a spy under Muntu's DMI.  Then Lt. Katumba Wamala was Muntu's ADC.

Muntu's brother in-law, Brig. Leo Kyanda is the Chief of Staff of the Land Forces.  There are a couple of former army cadres who though they succumbed to thefts, they still believe in Gen. Muntu's leadership but moreso are opposed to the Muhoozi project.

At the time when Muntu was the army chief, the Museveni army did not have external engagements save for the peace mission in Liberia thus Gen. Muntu did not have a lot of interactions with foreign armies and the region in particular.

However, in neighboring Rwanda the core of the security forces originated from the army that was being commanded by Gen. Muntu in 1990.  The President and Commander In-Chief, Paul Kagame served under Muntu in DMI while then Sgt. Patrick Karegeya was his ADC.  The four years (1990 - 1994) war in Rwanda was fully backed by the Museveni army under the command of Gen. Muntu.  However, typical of his character, Gen. Muntu has never prided in his close association with the Kigali establishment.

While Museveni is enjoying the monopoly of supporting the dissident Rwandese groups like RNC, Kigali on the other hand has not been associated with any formidable opposition in Uganda.  The alleged links with the recently sacked Museveni's Police Chief, He . Kalekyezi remains speculative.

In 2001 amidst souring relations, Kampala accused Kigali of financially supporting Dr. Besigye's candidature.  Rwanda was declared an enemy state before the matter escalated to allegations of a "Kigali backed" PRA rebel group.

Gen.  Muntu's current chief mobiliser, Alice Alaso had his own brother, Lawyer Sam Okiring allegedly captured and incarcerated on allegations of being a member of PRA.  It was alleged that he was captured by Gen. Kalekyezi while brandishing a Light Machine Gun (LMG) in Mongulalo, Ituri, DRC.  Okiring was released on Amnesty before he fled to Canada where he later died.

Will Kigali jump into supporting Gen. Muntu's new political organisation??? That is the question that is giving Museveni sleepless nights.


Wednesday, 16 January 2019

UGANDA: Will Museveni's Bebe Cool succeed where Gen. Saleh' Brian White failed?


Uganda's military dictator's Muhoozi Project (a scheme to have his son Gen. Muhozi succeed the presidency) suffered a setback following the coming in the political scene of a more youthful and popular musician, Bobi Wine.

The Kyadondo East constituency legislator, shot to the limelight when he proved to be a rallying point for the majority youth who also happen to be eyed by the Muhoozi Project.

First, it was Museveni's young brother, Gen. Saleh who propped up the mysteriously wealthy socialite, Bryan White who initiated a number of economic empowerment schemes targeting the urban youth.

Despite his uncontrolled dishing out of cash, Bryan White made little headway.  He was viewed as a kind of Mafia.  The final blow came when he got involved in a series of scandalous conducts like repeatedly shooting and injuring Ugandans with impunity.

Bryan White proved no match for Bobi Wine as the latter's rating was on the rise both locally and internationally.  When toilored schemes to intimidate him through trumped up treasonous charges did not help either.  That is when Museveni opted to personally step in by bringing on board another famous singer, Bebe Cool.

Bebe Cool who has made no pretence of his membership to the regime, is now the new kid on the block whose sole task is to neutralize the influence of Bobi Wine more among the youth.  Museveni very well knows that the issue is not Bobi Wine or Bebe Cool; the youth who are the most affected victims of his 33 years of his military dictatorship are just desperate for change of leadership.

For Museveni, it is not that he is relying on the endorsement of the youth if he is to have his son succeed the presidency.  His son's presidential bid is already catered for by the vital military constituency.  His major worry is that Bobi Wine may mobilize the youth to take the direction of the Arab Spring.


Tuesday, 15 January 2019

AFRICA: When Museveni criedt o the British for help against "strangling" by Kagame (PHOTOS)


CHANGE OF GUARDS - Hypocrisy is when an African military dictator dresses up his security personnel in civilian clothes and sends them to demonstrate at the British High Commission against alleged "interference in the internal affairs of his country". Last week the UK parliament debated 33 years of Museveni's military dictatorship. Back in Kampala, he has reacted by unleashing militant protests at the British High Commission. Next we may witness a concocted terror attack on the British installations and interests in Uganda.

However, in 2001 when his regional military aggression was challenged by the " ideologically bankrupt" Kagame, Museveni cried like a baby for help from the same British government.
On November 6, 2001, more than two months after Museveni’s cries, the two leaders (Museveni and Kagame) met in UK under the mediation of then Prime Minister Tony Blair and Ms Short. convened the meeting, which sought to address the concerns raised by Ugandan and Rwandan authorities.

Museveni’s letter (August 28, 2001)
Rt. Hon. Claire Short, salutations from your friends in Uganda. I hope your trip around the Great Lakes region was pleasant and fruitful. I am embarrassed to have to communicate with you about the deteriorating situation in the bilateral relations between Uganda and the government of Rwanda, led by president Kagame.

We have no doubt that Rwanda is planning aggression against us either using proxies or, even, directly. There are some Ugandan army officers who ran from here, jumping bail or fleeing potential prosecution for a number of crimes, to Rwanda. Since some months these officers, who we hear were given amnesty in Rwanda, have been frantically telephoning many serving army officers in Uganda asking them to betray their country by spying for Rwanda and fighting our government and people.

Furthermore, they have been recruiting Ugandan youth and taking them to Kigali for military training. We are now sure that they have opened three training centres around Kigali with the full support of the Rwanda government. We hear that they have also opened another centre for the same purpose in Rutshuru, a part of eastern Congo they control.

Meanwhile, their intelligence is very aggressively inquiring about the strength of various army units of ours and so on.
You remember, just before you came, I went to Rwanda and met Mr Kagame at the border, on the Rwanda side. In that meeting we agreed that the dissidents of the two countries entering either country should not be supported by the host government, but they should also not be allowed to carry out any hostile activities against their home country.

The prohibited activities included propaganda, not to mention military training and spying. Unfortunately, the Rwanda government is doing the exact opposite. I had hoped to talk to Mr Kagame in Arusha and in the recently concluded SMART Partnership meeting that took place here. As Mr Kagame did not come to either, I managed to talk to him only on telephone. I am soon sending our Foreign minister to raise these matters again.

Right honourable minister, we have just defeated the protracted terrorism organised against us by Sudan, both in the west of Uganda and in the north. We cannot countenance nor tolerate another round of terrorism this time organised by Mr Kagame whom we sacrificed so much to stand with when the whole world was either against their cause or indifferent to it.

I am, therefore, writing to you for two reasons:
1. First of all, to inform you about the sad and childish developments here which, nevertheless, are very grave for this region.

2. Secondly, to request you to show understanding to our Intention to raise our defence spending beyond the 1.9% of GDP we had agreed with the donors.
You remember, I have always held the view that given the instability of this region, it is naive and inviting trouble to underspend perennially on defence. 1.9% of GDP has, recently, been translating into about US$110 million per annum.

This figure could be alright if we had finished the capital development of our army involving training of officers, NCOs and technical staff (pilots, tank crews, artillery crews, etc.); buying or making arrangements to receive requisite equipment in case of conflict given this unstable region with all sorts of adventurers with distorted concepts about society; and building barracks for our army to have decent accommodation..........

Eighteen years later, Museveni warns the British to mind their own business.


Sunday, 13 January 2019

AFRICA: Blood is thicker than water - Museveni's about-turn on Nkurunziza


CHANGE OF GUARDS - Following the three rounds of deadly clashes between Museveni and Kagame armies in Eastern DRC's Kisangani during Congo's 2nd War, the conflict was shifted to the capitals of the two countries. Both Museveni and Kagame demonstrated their resolve to ouster each other from power through support for respective dissidents. By late 2001, the situation was threatening to escalate into a full scale war between the two countries. Museveni appealed to the British Minister for Overseas Development, Claire Short who mediated the conflict.

A catastrophe was averted and relations seemed to have improved but Museveni still harboured intentions of ousting Kagame. With the emergence of the Rwandese dissident RNC under Gen. Kayumba Nyamwasa, Museveni grabbed the opportunity to once again hit Kagame. This time round, he found an ally in Burundi's Nkurunziza. The Tutsi RNC is seeking allies in both Museveni and Nkurunziza. Another Rwandese dissident group, FDRL which Kigali links with the 1994 Genocide is also more linked to the Hutu dominated government of Nkurunziza. The RNC is seeking to enter into alliance with FDRL and other groups and it's only Nkurunziza who can unite them. On the other hand some groups like FDRL can't trust Museveni owing to his role in dislodging the Hutu from power during the 1990 RPF invasion from Uganda.

In this regard, Museveni has been cordially working with Nkurunziza. However, as had been the case with Congolese dissidents in the late 1990s (RCD Kisangani and RCD Goma), Musevebi has been manipulating both RNC and FDRL. Around mid December 2018, top FDRL dissidents were arrested by Congolese authorities as they returned from Uganda where they had been state guests. Museveni advised Nkurunziza to make a formal complaint to him (as Chairman of EAC) against Kagame's alleged support for Burundian dissident groups. He was only to turn around and rebuke him leaving the RNC in a dilemma that prompted a top RNC official, Theogene Rudasingwa to critique Museveni.

1. The Nkurunziza government had issued an international arrest warrant for former President Pierre Buyoya for his role in the assassination of the first democratically elected Hutu president of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye in 1993. Museveni who was a close ally of the then minority Tutsi leadership in Burundi gave shelter to some of the junior Tutsi army officers who had carried out the assassination. Some sources also suggest that he sent troops to help Buyoya battle the Hutu insurgents. He now fears that reviving the case will criminally implicate him.

2. On a lighter note, he thinks he can tame Kigali's aggressiveness by playing harsh on Nkurunziza.


In his new year message, Rwanda's Kagame hit at both Museveni and Nkurunziza.
"Some neighbours have tried to revive the danger posed by FDLR, RNC, and other negative forces. This jeopardizes the otherwise good progress in East African integration as well as regional security. For one neighbour, we expect it. However, we are surprised by another neighbour, where the evidence we have, and which they must also have, shows clear complicity, despite public denials. This matter is being handled, and we continue talking with our neighbours in the spirit of African solidarity.”

The seemingly bad blood between Museveni and Nkurunziza negatively affects the Rwandese dissident groups who are trying to bury their ethnic differences.


AFRICA: Blood is thcker than water - Museveni's about-turn on Nkurunziza

Yoweri Museveni, Paul Kagame, Pierre Nkurunziza

“Some neighbours have tried to revive the danger posed by FDLR, RNC, and other negative forces. This jeopardizes the otherwise good progress in East African integration, as well as regional security.”

“For one neighbour, we expect it. However, we are surprised by another neighbour, where the evidence we have, and which they must also have, shows clear complicity, despite public denials,” Kagame said, “This matter is being handled, and we continue talking with our neighbours in the spirit of African solidarity.”

Change of Guards