OF THE MUSEVENI, KAZIINI AND KALEKYEZI "PRIVATE" ARMIES
CHANGE OF GUARDS - The phenomena of private armies dates back to the formation of the new post Iddi Amin Uganda army, the UNLA. Museveni who was the Minister of Defence and eyeing the presidency embarked on stealthy swelling his so called Red Brigade which was the armed wing of his FRONASA faction within UNLA. He recruited ethnic Bantu to counter the "northern" dominated UNLA. Most significantly, he retained a private army comprised of Rwandese refugees under the command of Fred Rwigyema who had been eliminated from the new national army. It's these same Rwandese who made the core of his NRA when he opted to fight the government in 1981.
Rwigyema rose to become the Army Commander, Minister of Defence and led the RPF attack on Rwanda in 1990. Paul Kagame who was Museveni's Deputy Director of Military Intelligence is the President of Rwanda. Back home, Museveni has curved a more private army, the SFC from his private army, the UPDF. Commanded by his son, his ethically dominated SFC's sole role is to counter any potential attempt to overthrow him using the regular forces.
Gen. Kaziini was a Nursery Teacher at Kabamba Infantry Training School in 1979 before he fled with the defeated Uganda Army to Sudan. Another version has it that he was among the eleven other UNLA soldiers who defected from West Nile region to Congo from where they joined the Sudan based Gen.Moses Ali led UNRF rebels. The UNRF hosted them and they were restricted to its headquarters for three years. In 1984, Kaziini found his way to Museveni's NRA rebels in the western region. He was assigned to Gen. Saleh where he, together with Dan Byakutaaga ( defected with 1.6b shillings in the late 1990s) to guard Museveni's mother.
After the fall of Kampala, Kaziini was made the Commanding Officer of NRA's 14th Battalion based in West Nile. In West Nile, he embarked on tormenting former UNRF combatants who had lost out on the war of liberation. Gen. Moses Ali led the priests against Kazini's harassment. Consequently, Museveni moved Kazini to Kampala where Kazini commanded the strategic Lubiri Barracks based 1st Battalion and later 301 Brigade. Soon he pounces on Gen. Moses Ali who had been accused of treason and held in the underground bankers of Lubiri barracks under torment and inhuman treatment by Gen. Kaziini. As Brigade Commander Kazini's forces almost clashed with the Makindye based Military Police over supremacy in controlling Kampala city. Museveni turned a blind eye and instead he later appointed Kaziini to command the Military Police (M.P).
The M.P docket gave Kaziini leverage to harass and humiliate other army officers. Still, Museveni kept a blind eye and instead elevated Kaziini to the position of Commandant General Headquarters. Gen. Kaziini spearheaded the exercise of removing the soldiers from town to the barracks and he used the opportunity to humiliate and harass even those more senior to him. Still, Museveni kept a blind eye and instead posted him to the strategic Mechanized Regiment (Tanks and APCs) in Masaka. Following the slaughter of the first Hutu President in Burundi, Kaziini took the initiative to deploy tanks to boost Museveni's then poorly armed Protection Unit (PPU). At Masaka, Kaziini had the extra task of monitoring the activities of Gen. Ssejusa who had withdrawn to his home in Ssembabule.
Gen. Kaziini humiliated the then Chief of Staff, Brig. Sam Nanyumba but Museveni kept a blind eye. Instead, he was breeding Kaziini to counter the Bush War commanders who were feared to be ganging behind Gen. Ssejusa against Museveni. Museveni moved Kaziini to Gulu under 4th Division which was being commanded by Chef Ali. They soon clashed before Museveni moved the latter to the Headquarters as Chief of Staff. Kaziini openly humiliated the Chief of Staff, Chef Ali and then Chief of Personnel and Administration, Henry Tumukunde. Museveni kept a blind eye and instead he appointed Kaziini as the Chief of Staff. As chief of Staff, Gen. Kaziini undermined the efforts of Geoffrey Muheesi and Charles Angina who were battling the ADF in the Rwenzori's. He would deliberately deny them logistics and finance. Museveni kept a blind eye and instead okayed Kaziini to take up the role of field command instead of the statutory administrative role.
Kaziini took over field command of operations against the ADF ending up in Congo. As Chief of Staff, he also doubled as the overall commander of Operation Safe Heaven (OSH). He recruited, trained, deployed, promoted, transfered, suspended, court martialled and even dismissed at will. He selectively identified, deployed and promoted rogue officers of his choice. With full approval of Museveni, Kaziini led forces into three rounds of bloody fighting with Rwanda in Kisangani where hundreds of civilians and soldiers lost their lives. He had replaced Col. Muzoora with his right-hand man, Col. Sula for the final battle against Rwanda in Kisangani. Museveni publicly declared that Muzoora had been removed because he had "gotten closer to the Rwandese". The truth is that Muzoora had advised against the attack. A joint probe team by Rwanda and Uganda army chiefs (Kayimba and JJ Odong) accused Kaziini of having caused the Kisangani fighting. Museveni kept a blind eye and instead sacked the then figure head army chief, JJ Odong and replaced him with Kaziini. The then Army Spokesman, Phenekas Katirima accused JJ Odong of "leaking secrets".
Upon getting rid of JJ Odong who was suspected to be close to Rwanda, and now Kaziini on the steering wheel, a plan to revenge the Kisangani defeat was designed. Some 7,000 youth recruited from western region and in particular Nyabushozi were trained at Bihanga. The office of the Chief of Operations and training was not involved in the exercise. Instead, Kaziini dealt directly with the 2nd Division Commander, Poteri Kivuna who hired Basajjabalaba for transporting the trainees while Col. Sula Semakula headed Bihanga camp. Operational plans were drawn from Agip Motel in Mbarara and College Inn at Wandegeya with full knowlege and backing of CMI. The plan was reversed by the intervention of British Foreign Secretary Claire Shorts.
With the full approval of Museveni, Kaziini went ahead to created the West Nile based 409 Brigade as an autonomous unit only reporting directly to him. It was meant to re-enter Congo and assist rebel leader Jean Pierre Bemba against Kabila. When Kaziini was finally sacked in 2003, a Mbabazi led High Command Probe Committee questioned Gen. Kaziini over the training of the 7,000 at Bihanga and the creation of 409 Brigade in West Nile thus the rumour that Kaziini intended to overthrow Museveni. It did not establish motive but recommended further investigations which never took place. Instead, three years later Kaziini was charged together with other senior officers for causing financial loss of 61M shillings through creation of ghost soldiers. He was convicted and sentenced to three years in Prison. He openly shed tears and was released on bail pending appeal but a few days later he was allegedly killed by a prostitute. What happened to his private army?
Gen. Kalekyezi the Lawyer joined the NRA guerrillas in 1982 and was among the group that was secretly trained in Libya. Throughout the Bush War, he did not feature anywhere in command positions but was an aide to Saleh. Upon coming to power he was attached to the office of the Minister for Defence. He later became the army's Chief Political Commissar from where he ventured into the Congo to command forces in Ituri region. Later, he became Museveni's Military Assistant before Museveni assigned him to head the notorious Anti Smuggling Unit. In 2005, he was made the IGP replacing Gen. Katumba wamala. The latter had been sent to the Police to create room for the rise of his juniors, Kaziini and Aronda to the office of Army chief. Katumba Wamala was starved of financial and logistical resources such that he resorted to mobilising civilians to buy pick up trucks for patrols. Museveni was very aggrieved by this initiative and publicly called it "nonsense" before returning Wamala to the army. Katumba took over command of the army after Aronda had completed its privatisation process and the curving out of an autonomous SFC.
In police, Gen. Kalekyezi had the task of privatising the force and turning it into a tool to suppress political dissent. With vast financial and logistical resources he had the leverage of recruiting, training, deploying, transferring, suspending and dismissing at will. With Museveni's full backing, Kalekyezi created militias who unleashed terror on Ugandans. It was not until recently when the Hima clique prevailed on Museveni over Kalekyezi's alleged Rwanda backed schemes to overthrow him that Museveni had Kale sacked. To appease the Hima, Museveni had to act.
Just like the Gen. Kaziini storm died down, the current one over Gen. Kalekyezi is soon settling. The so-called creation of a private army is just empty talk because last time an effective private army was created was in 1979/1980 by Museveni.
INFORMATION IS POWER AND THE PROBLEM OF UGANDA IS MUSEVENISM
Gen. Kaziini was a Nursery Teacher at Kabamba Infantry Training School in 1979 before he fled with the defeated Uganda Army to Sudan. Another version has it that he was among the eleven other UNLA soldiers who defected from West Nile region to Congo from where they joined the Sudan based Gen.Moses Ali led UNRF rebels. The UNRF hosted them and they were restricted to its headquarters for three years. In 1984, Kaziini found his way to Museveni's NRA rebels in the western region. He was assigned to Gen. Saleh where he, together with Dan Byakutaaga ( defected with 1.6b shillings in the late 1990s) to guard Museveni's mother.
After the fall of Kampala, Kaziini was made the Commanding Officer of NRA's 14th Battalion based in West Nile. In West Nile, he embarked on tormenting former UNRF combatants who had lost out on the war of liberation. Gen. Moses Ali led the priests against Kazini's harassment. Consequently, Museveni moved Kazini to Kampala where Kazini commanded the strategic Lubiri Barracks based 1st Battalion and later 301 Brigade. Soon he pounces on Gen. Moses Ali who had been accused of treason and held in the underground bankers of Lubiri barracks under torment and inhuman treatment by Gen. Kaziini. As Brigade Commander Kazini's forces almost clashed with the Makindye based Military Police over supremacy in controlling Kampala city. Museveni turned a blind eye and instead he later appointed Kaziini to command the Military Police (M.P).
The M.P docket gave Kaziini leverage to harass and humiliate other army officers. Still, Museveni kept a blind eye and instead elevated Kaziini to the position of Commandant General Headquarters. Gen. Kaziini spearheaded the exercise of removing the soldiers from town to the barracks and he used the opportunity to humiliate and harass even those more senior to him. Still, Museveni kept a blind eye and instead posted him to the strategic Mechanized Regiment (Tanks and APCs) in Masaka. Following the slaughter of the first Hutu President in Burundi, Kaziini took the initiative to deploy tanks to boost Museveni's then poorly armed Protection Unit (PPU). At Masaka, Kaziini had the extra task of monitoring the activities of Gen. Ssejusa who had withdrawn to his home in Ssembabule.
Gen. Kaziini humiliated the then Chief of Staff, Brig. Sam Nanyumba but Museveni kept a blind eye. Instead, he was breeding Kaziini to counter the Bush War commanders who were feared to be ganging behind Gen. Ssejusa against Museveni. Museveni moved Kaziini to Gulu under 4th Division which was being commanded by Chef Ali. They soon clashed before Museveni moved the latter to the Headquarters as Chief of Staff. Kaziini openly humiliated the Chief of Staff, Chef Ali and then Chief of Personnel and Administration, Henry Tumukunde. Museveni kept a blind eye and instead he appointed Kaziini as the Chief of Staff. As chief of Staff, Gen. Kaziini undermined the efforts of Geoffrey Muheesi and Charles Angina who were battling the ADF in the Rwenzori's. He would deliberately deny them logistics and finance. Museveni kept a blind eye and instead okayed Kaziini to take up the role of field command instead of the statutory administrative role.
Kaziini took over field command of operations against the ADF ending up in Congo. As Chief of Staff, he also doubled as the overall commander of Operation Safe Heaven (OSH). He recruited, trained, deployed, promoted, transfered, suspended, court martialled and even dismissed at will. He selectively identified, deployed and promoted rogue officers of his choice. With full approval of Museveni, Kaziini led forces into three rounds of bloody fighting with Rwanda in Kisangani where hundreds of civilians and soldiers lost their lives. He had replaced Col. Muzoora with his right-hand man, Col. Sula for the final battle against Rwanda in Kisangani. Museveni publicly declared that Muzoora had been removed because he had "gotten closer to the Rwandese". The truth is that Muzoora had advised against the attack. A joint probe team by Rwanda and Uganda army chiefs (Kayimba and JJ Odong) accused Kaziini of having caused the Kisangani fighting. Museveni kept a blind eye and instead sacked the then figure head army chief, JJ Odong and replaced him with Kaziini. The then Army Spokesman, Phenekas Katirima accused JJ Odong of "leaking secrets".
Upon getting rid of JJ Odong who was suspected to be close to Rwanda, and now Kaziini on the steering wheel, a plan to revenge the Kisangani defeat was designed. Some 7,000 youth recruited from western region and in particular Nyabushozi were trained at Bihanga. The office of the Chief of Operations and training was not involved in the exercise. Instead, Kaziini dealt directly with the 2nd Division Commander, Poteri Kivuna who hired Basajjabalaba for transporting the trainees while Col. Sula Semakula headed Bihanga camp. Operational plans were drawn from Agip Motel in Mbarara and College Inn at Wandegeya with full knowlege and backing of CMI. The plan was reversed by the intervention of British Foreign Secretary Claire Shorts.
With the full approval of Museveni, Kaziini went ahead to created the West Nile based 409 Brigade as an autonomous unit only reporting directly to him. It was meant to re-enter Congo and assist rebel leader Jean Pierre Bemba against Kabila. When Kaziini was finally sacked in 2003, a Mbabazi led High Command Probe Committee questioned Gen. Kaziini over the training of the 7,000 at Bihanga and the creation of 409 Brigade in West Nile thus the rumour that Kaziini intended to overthrow Museveni. It did not establish motive but recommended further investigations which never took place. Instead, three years later Kaziini was charged together with other senior officers for causing financial loss of 61M shillings through creation of ghost soldiers. He was convicted and sentenced to three years in Prison. He openly shed tears and was released on bail pending appeal but a few days later he was allegedly killed by a prostitute. What happened to his private army?
Gen. Kalekyezi the Lawyer joined the NRA guerrillas in 1982 and was among the group that was secretly trained in Libya. Throughout the Bush War, he did not feature anywhere in command positions but was an aide to Saleh. Upon coming to power he was attached to the office of the Minister for Defence. He later became the army's Chief Political Commissar from where he ventured into the Congo to command forces in Ituri region. Later, he became Museveni's Military Assistant before Museveni assigned him to head the notorious Anti Smuggling Unit. In 2005, he was made the IGP replacing Gen. Katumba wamala. The latter had been sent to the Police to create room for the rise of his juniors, Kaziini and Aronda to the office of Army chief. Katumba Wamala was starved of financial and logistical resources such that he resorted to mobilising civilians to buy pick up trucks for patrols. Museveni was very aggrieved by this initiative and publicly called it "nonsense" before returning Wamala to the army. Katumba took over command of the army after Aronda had completed its privatisation process and the curving out of an autonomous SFC.
In police, Gen. Kalekyezi had the task of privatising the force and turning it into a tool to suppress political dissent. With vast financial and logistical resources he had the leverage of recruiting, training, deploying, transferring, suspending and dismissing at will. With Museveni's full backing, Kalekyezi created militias who unleashed terror on Ugandans. It was not until recently when the Hima clique prevailed on Museveni over Kalekyezi's alleged Rwanda backed schemes to overthrow him that Museveni had Kale sacked. To appease the Hima, Museveni had to act.
Just like the Gen. Kaziini storm died down, the current one over Gen. Kalekyezi is soon settling. The so-called creation of a private army is just empty talk because last time an effective private army was created was in 1979/1980 by Museveni.
INFORMATION IS POWER AND THE PROBLEM OF UGANDA IS MUSEVENISM
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