UGANDA: Why Cheffe Ali never became Museveni's army commander

WHY BRIG. CHEFFE ALI NEVER BECAME MUSEVENI'S ARMY COMMANDER

UNLF - AD was an armed political group that took up arms during the reign of the Military Commission that was deputised by Museveni around 1980. As Minister of Defence in the post Iddi Amin government of Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF), Museveni's efforts to recruit his Banyarwanda into the new national army had been blocked. The civilian government of UNLF was overthrown by the 'men in uniform' together with their foreign backers simply because President Binaisa had transferred both Museveni from the strategic Ministry of Defence to Regional Cooperation and the then Army Chief of Staff, Oyite Ojok appointed as Ambassador to Algeria. President Binaisa was placed under arrest, UNLF dissolved and a Military Commission chaired by Paulo Muwanga and deputised by Museveni took charge of the government.

Some aggrieved top political leaders of the now defunct UNLF opted to wage a guerrilla war against the military junta that was deputised by Museveni. The political figures that came to be known as the Gang of Four took with them Museveni's FRONASA leutenant, Cheffe Ali alias Eriya Mwine and set up camp in the Rwenzori mountains. This was long before the December 1980 general elections in which Museveni was one of the contestants. Until his death, Museveni never forgave Cheffe Ali for having initially abandoned him and joined hands with the Gang of Four for an armed rebellion. By the time Iddi Amin was toppled in 1979, Cheffe Ali had been the most senior of all Museveni's FRONASA combatants. If he had waited and started the war against the Obote II government under Museveni's command, he would obviously have become the NRA's first Army Commander.

It was Cheffe Ali's initiative that saw the NRA guerrillas treck from Luwero to the Rwenzori Mountains in 1984 - 1985. After setting base, Cheffe Ali reactivated his earlier UNLF-AD era contacts in the region. His 11th Battalion overran the government forces at Rubona farm before he initiated talks that saw the first government troops battalion (31st Bn) join hands with the NRA in Fort Portal in July 1985. The following day, the Okellos overthrew the Obote II government. At the fall of Kampala in January 1986, Cheffe Ali's 11th Bn swept through Nakulabye, Makerere Nakasero, fought serious battle around Golf Course before overtaking Summit View on top of Kololo hill.

Despite his minimal academic background, the revolutionary, nationalistic, incorruptible, down-to-earth, politically astute and a military genius, Cheffe Ali only rose to the rank of Brigadier and a figurehead Chief of Staff. Museveni having subjected him to humiliation by Gen. Kaziini who accused him of conniving with Charles Angina to hide guns in the Rwenzori, died a miserable death in a rented house around Rubaga in the late 1990s. His soldiers who joined Museveni's NRA were neutralized, the last one being Brig. Kankiriho who died recently after he was accused of conniving with Gen. Ssejusa to overthrow Museveni.

Like it was the case with other armed groups that had been fighting the Obote II government, Museveni did undermine the operations of UNLF - AD. A one Emmanuel Kafuniza from Ibanda who had been a top mobliser for UNLF - AD narrated a firsthand account of events in The Monitor on June 5, 2016. As you will note, obviously there are some facta that Kafuniza deliberately left out; some combatants deliberately refused to join Museveni in Luwero because they argued that he had been responsible for overthrowing the UNLF government hence the acronym UNLF-AD.

MUSEVENI SCOUTS LUWERO
Kafuniza says Binaisa elevated Museveni to the post of Defence minister, and it was in this capacity that one Sunday morning, he came to Kafuniza and Nasasira’s room at International Hotel and asked them to escort him in his Land Rover 110 to Ngoma in Luweero where he was going to see his relatives.

“In Ngoma, we didn’t see any relative of his. I think he wanted us to look at the terrain. I even suspect he could have visited it earlier. On the way back to Kampala, he told us how good the terrain was for an armed struggle,” Kafuniza says.

“The day after their visit to Ngoma, Museveni was transferred from Defence to Regional Corporation. He came to our room and said, ‘did you hear the morning news? Binaisa has removed me from the ministry of Defence and made me a minister for Regional Corporation.’ I said he wants to follow in the footsteps of his predecessor Lule.”

The trio – Museveni, Kafuniza and Nasasira – immediately sought support from members of the 

NCC to reverse Binaisa’s decision.

“We went to Nile Mansions where most ministers were staying, going room to room. We started with Kabwegyere, Kamuntu, Kanyomozi, and others. Later, we went to Republic House to see the army commander, Tito Okello, who assured us that he will support Museveni in reversing Binaisa’s decision. Unfortunately, we lost by seven votes.”

Kafuniza says Binaisa was not acting alone; he was being pushed by some UPC agents.
“We swallowed the bitter pill for our leader at the time, having to leave the strategic position of Defence ministry. However, when we went to Republic House to solicit for Tito Okello’s support, we found buses which had ferried people from the north to be recruited into the army when they had denied access to some members of the Fronasa because of their Rwandan origin,” he says.
Kafuniza says after the transfer of Museveni, it became easier for the architects of his transfer to remove Binaisa.

“With Binaisa gone, the Military Commission took charge. Through Prof [Edward] Rugumayo, we tried to reach Museveni who was in Arusha for him not to join the Military Commission. But we could not,” he recalls.

Soon after the takeover, the Military Commission announced the general election and those who found they didn’t fit in the old parties – UPC, DP and CP – decided otherwise.
“The youth who could not belong to the parties decided to form a new political force, hence the UPM,” Kafuniza says. Its leadership was contested at KCC Hall (KCCA) between Museveni and Akena P’Ojok, but Museveni took it.

Kafuniza explains that people like Yonah Kanyomozi, Ephraim Kamuntu and others were ready to join the new party had Akena P’Ojok been made leader.
When the campaigns started, Kafuniza met with the Gang of Four leaders: Prof Rugumayo as chairman, Dan Nabudere, Yash Tandon and Omwonyo Ojok with Lt Kanyoro and Lt Joseph Nasasira, to forge a way forward.

“We covertly started preparing for an armed struggle. When we met Museveni with our plans, he said ‘while you are doing what you are doing, I don’t support it because the international community will portray us as warmongers. Why don’t we first give democracy a chance?”
But Kafuniza and his group did not wait for the elections, they took up arms.

“I and friends like Brg Chef Ali (RIP), Nasasira and his elder brother Augustine Kayonga, Tadeo Barisanga, and a few others went to Fort Portal and identified Rwenzori Mountains as a safe haven. People like the late William Nyakatura, [David] Rusa now a director in ISO, Balisaliza then headmaster of St Louis Kyegobe, gave us contacts to make a base in Rwenzori Mountain,” Kafuniza says.

“After the elections, Museveni called me to his residence in Makindye. I went with Joseph Nasasira. Museveni was with now Gen Tumwine, [Elly] Kihanda, Sam Magara, Prince Rubereza, Kentoma, Col Napoleon, Col Charles Kitarago and Ahmed Seguya. The nine of us planned the Kabamba attack to be carried out on February 5 [1981].”

“Sam Magara, Ahmed Seguya Kentoma, Col Napoleon, Col Charles Kitarago, Prince Rubereza and now Gen [Elly] Tumwine had just finished training from Munduli.”
After the meeting, Kafuniza says, “Museveni told me ‘It is time to make a way forward. I have briefed my commanders’. He told me to come with Magara and show him our bases in Rwenzori.”
After the meeting, Kafuniza and Nasasira jumped into a Datsun single cabin pick-up, with Magara driving. The late Kentoma, Col Napoleon and Col Kitarago were behind. Magara stayed in Bwizibwera and the rest proceeded to Rugazi Hill, Kafuniza’s home. The next day, they proceeded to their sub-base in Burunga.

“The next morning, we went to our RV [rendezvous] area to wait for Museveni, Rubereza, Magara and group coming from Kampala. They sent a one Kenjura from Rwakitura to deliver an RPG which Museveni had said he had at his home. Museveni had asked us how many guns we had and we told him four guns, six grenades three tortoise and three stick grenades. We were to use it during the attack on Kabamba,” Kafuniza says.

On the February 2, 1981, Kenjura came to deliver the RPG, but unfortunately, it was just an empty propeller.
“We went, seven people to the RV called Kyapakyarumengyere after Rwemiyaga on the evening of [February] 4. The following day, nothing happened. At night we became suspicious, so we changed to another spot to watch what was happening at our RV point,” Kafuniza says. They learnt later that the lorry bringing Museveni and the group had broken down in Masaka.

“When they didn’t show up, I advised my group to return to our sub-base in Burunga where we could better defend ourselves in case of an attack. On our way back to the base on the morning of [February] 6th, we heard anti-tanks. We knew the attack had taken place.”
Having missed out on the action, Kafuniza thought the attackers would follow the agreed plan and head to the Rwenzori Mountains.

“We waited for two months in the areas of Burunga and Ngara until we went to the mountain. They never came. During that time, we hit Lyantonde Police Station and got a G3 which was faulty and 20 rounds of ammunition,” he says.
“We went and hit Ibanda Police Station where I was identified. Two police officers who came with us to our base on my farm in Kiruhura District where others like the late Brig Nkachiroho, late Col Kagezi and the late China, later found us.”

Though Kafuniza and his group recruited more people, they had only six guns, two pistols and six grenades.
“In April 1981, we trekked through Dura Forest to the Rwenzori Mountains. While there, we kept hearing on radio about the raids Museveni’s group was making but with no direct contact. We heard of their raids in Kapeka, Wakiso and other places but they never contacted us, despite knowing where we were.”

In the mountain, UNLF-AD did not stay idle. It carried out raids on targets of interest and recruited fighters. “We hit Bundibugyo and Butuku police stations and amassed up to about 32 guns. We started training and doing political and military training,” he says.

Unfortunately for UNLF-AD, when it went into the bush it was abandoned by their political leaders.
“By July 1982, we could not get any help from our political leadership and our young recruits were disillusioned and hopeless. Some of them thought we had differences with Museveni who was by then making progress in the Luweero triangle. I and other three colleagues on the high command – the late Joseph Nasasira, Augustine Kayonga and Tadeo Barisanga – resolved to provide security for a number of them to go to Luweero.”

LINKING UP WITH MUSEVENI
Armed with three guns, more that 300 UNLF-AD fighters under the command of Jet Mwebaze left the Rwenzori Mountains to join the Museveni group in Luweero. “With that group gone, we disbanded the camp in the mountains and moved to my farm at Engarishya, where we buried the rest of our guns. We kept three guns and grenades for our protection,” he reveals.
According to Kafuniza, his group was a production line for the NRA in Luweero. After the Jet Mwebaze group, another one of about 200 lead by Chef Ali was also dispatched.

“The few who remained were deployed to work on farms of our supporters,” he says. Those who remained under Kafuniza’s command are the ones who helped in the Fort Portal attack.
“When the NRA moved to the west, Chef Ali came and picked them from my farm at Ngari and they went to Rwenzori where our first base had been. That’s why you hear of the Rwenzori II,” he says.

INFORMATION IS POWER AND THE PROBLEM OF UGANDA IS MUSEVENISM

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