UGANDA: Origin of NRA Brig. Tadeo Kanyankole woes

ORIGIN OF NRA'S BRIG. TADEO KANYANKOLE'S WOES

CHANGE OF GUARDS - This piece is a reaction to Charles Rwomushana's post on his Facebook page posted on February 26, 2019 at around 9.00 a.m. I commend the "former Head of Department of Political Intelligence in the President's Office" for copying and pasting the article verbatim from The Observer of January 30, 2014 as written by Edward Ssekika. The article is an insightful and informative piece into the military career of Brig. Kanyankole.

I am a bit concerned over some partS of the article that reads;

"After the NRA took power in 1986, Kanyankore was put in charge of the army shop, an appointment he tried to resist because he was not trained in business management. Was this a deliberate trap to catch him in a position for which he was ill-prepared? Perhaps yes, after all, the then NRA chief political commissar had alleged that Kanyankore was recruiting Catholic youths from western Uganda with the intention of overthrowing the young NRM government. Kanyankore was eventually arrested, charged in a case he least understood, convicted and sentenced to three years, imprisonment at Luzira, after which he was dismissed from the army he had nurtured, in disgrace. Surprisingly, even after serving his sentence, the then army commander refused Kanyankore to enter his office, when all he wanted was to say “bye” to him as a former bush war colleague. That army commander, like the chief political commissar, both ended up turning their backs on the same NRA/UPDF that the late Kanyankore had put on a professional pedestal despite the scarce resources and bad times."

The motive of Rwomushana's posting lies in the fact that he deliberately opted not to disclose the identities of the said NPC and Army Commander of the time whom he tries to link to Kanyankole's woes. Obviously, he is insinuating that it was Dr. Beisgye and Muntu who were the said NPC and Army Commander respectibely at the time.

Kanyankole's woes started in the last quarter of the Bush War and not after the NRA had captured power. Like many former soldiers who had served under the Iddi Amin regime before joining Museveni's NRA, Kanyankole was assigned the task of overseeing the training of others. He was assisted by other former Iddi Amin soldiers like Italikire Kiiza, John Many Kaganda and a couple of others. The training wing was under Nkurumah Unit that was commanded by Ssejusa. The two had serious misunderstandings that threatened Kanyankole's life. Some resemblance of calm came about when Ssejusa was appointed Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) leaving Kanyankole to take over command of Nkurumah Unit.

Although Kanyankole was one of the eight Member of the High Command (MHC), by the time the NRA opened the Western Front in 1985, Kanyankole had been rendered redundant (Katebe). However, overwhelmed by the huge numbers of recruits flocking the NRA after the fall of most of the areas of western region, Kanyankole resumed his role as the chief trainer this time assuming the title of Chief of Training and Recruitment (CTR) while Italikire Kiiza was the Commandant of the training wing. The NRA training wing was shifted from the Rwenzori Mountain to Semuliki Game Reserve in Ntoroko. However, when it was suspected that the government troops planned to attack the training wing from across Lake Albert, the recruits were vastly evacuated to Kicwamba Technical College in Fort Portal. After a few weeks at Kicwamba, the recruits were ferried to Ibanda and eventuality settled in Buhweju which also happened to be Kanyankole's home area.

In Buhweju, two training camps were set up at Nsiika Saza ground and Bitsya which was a tiny swampy place with deep ponds left bare by artisan gold miners. There was no suitable training ground, no adequate water and firewood for such a huge population of recruits. With the recruitment and training centre now deep in the heart of Ankole's Bairu stronghold, the old Bahima and Bairu differences were activated. Coincidentally, with the western region now liberated, top NRA commanders intensified their bickering, this time over power and influence. Museveni visited the Catholic dominated Buhweju in late 1985 and addressed locals where they asked him to fight the Protestants (UPC). Museveni accused Kanyankole of being behind the inciting of locals into such sectarian sentiments. It is in this regard that Kanyankole was accused of rejecting the recruitment of Bahima, Banyarwanda and protestants in preference for the Bairu and Catholics. The allegations went further to claim that Kanyankole was plotting to sell the revolution to the Catholic dominated DP.

Obviously, the authors of such allegations must have been Banyarwanda or Bahima. The army's Chief Political Commissar (CPC) was Amanya Mushega while the National Political Commissar (NPC) was Kahinda Otafiire (both Bairu). The overall commander of the western region was Fred Rwigyema. The Acting Director General of Intelligence and Security was Jim Muhwezi while the Director of Military Intelligence was Mugisha Muntu. This is not to mention the role of other key players like Paul Kagame, Aronda and others in the intelligence community. Kanyankole vehemently denied such allegations but argued that he had turned back some Banyarwanda and Bahima recruits who had physical disabilities like squinched eyes and lame.

Museveni did not immediately take action against Kanyankole. The NRA training wing was shifted from Buhweju to Bihanga Prisons. On the morning of his swearing in on January 26, 1986 Kanyankole was called to Museveni's residence in Kololo to take him through the presidential swearing in ceremonial drills. The group photo (attached) of Kanyankole standing close to Museveni during the first days of the Army Council sittings at State House speak for itself. However, Museveni was all along waiting for the right time to pounce on Kanyankole. As his colleagues were assigned to lucrative staff and command positions, Kanyankole even lost his career position of Chief of Training and Recruitment in August 1986. He remained on Katebe (un deployed) until ,1988 when he was assigned to head the non existent Army Shop. The Army chief was Elly Tumwine.

In 1989 during the reign of Saleh as Army chief, Kanyankole was arrested and incarcerated in Lubiri Barracks without trial for two years. He was accused of having mismanaged US$ 1m meant to procure clothing's for wives and children of soldiers. Interestingly, security officers ransacked Kanyankole's home for arms but got nothing. He was convicted by the Court Martial chaired by then Brig. Ivan Koreta and sent to Luzira Prison. After serving his sentence, Museveni dismissed him from the army with disgrace during the reign of Muntu as the army chief. It is rumoured that the said US$ 1m was diverted by some very powerful commander close to Museveni. However, as was the norm at the time for senior officers to acquire personal wealth, Kanyankole may have also put a few shillings to personal use.

This provided Museveni with the opportunity to pounce on Kanyankole. Kanyankole's case is similar to what befell ISO's Maj. John Kazoora. Defusing the pressure from colleagues, Kanyankole vehemently refused to go to Museveni and apologize so that he could be "rehabilitated". In 1999, Kanyankole died a pauper surviving on begging and small handouts from friends to even buy food. He never sold his soul to Museveni thus he died on his feet and not on his knees.

Dr. Besigye who was mainly pre-occupied with treating fighters, being Museveni's personal physician and running errands between the Bush and Europe was no where near Kanyankole's woes. At the time Kanyankole was accused of stealing the Army Shop funds, the National Political Commissar (NPC) was Eriya Kategaya. But even if it had been Dr. Besigye, the office of NPC had nothing to do with the army which had its own Chief Political Commissar (CPC). The NPC fell under the NRM Secretariat while the CPC and the Army Shop fell under the NRA.

Tadeo Kanyankole was a pioneer victim of Museveni's systematic control of the Bairu and Catholic influence in the security forces. Kanyankole was persecuted by Museveni and not the army. As army chief at the time, Muntu could not risk affording Kanyankole a befitting farewell or else he would have faced the wrath of Museveni. Muntu would have suffered what befell Col. Chihandae when he attempted to plead for his colleague and neighbour, Col. Kashilingi.

INFORMATION IS POWER AND THE PROBLEM OF UGANDA IS MUSEVENISM