UGANDA: BEHIND MUSEVENI'S EXTENSION OF HIS SECURITY ROADS TO EASTERN DRC (photos)

 

By CHANGE OF GUARDS

In August 1998, Museveni militarily invaded DRC and his imperialistic military expedition that ended around 2003 resulted in the immense loss of life, destruction of property and plunder of natural resources. The 2005 International Court of Justice (ICJ) verdict ordered Uganda to pay compensation to DRC to a tune of $ 10b. It's now 15 years down the road, Museveni has been reluctant to effect the payment. Instead, he still has a hand in the insecurity that has continued to rock eastern DRC that is fuelled by illegal mineral exploitation and snuggling where Uganda is the major conduit route. He has been playing a delaying tactic while he manipulates successive leadership of DRC. Since coming to power, Felix Tsikedi has demonstrated closer diplomatic ties with Rwanda's Kagame who is not on good terms with Museveni. 

Rwanda is reportedly enjoying a free ride in the eastern DRC that has enabled it to dismantle bases of its armed dissident groups who are allegedly supported by Museveni. The same eastern DRC has for decades harboured bases for Uganda's dissident ADF armed rebels. Museveni has been bothered by the hostile terrain around the Rwenzori Mountain on its western border with DRC. He has put in place special units dubbed Alpine Brigade and now the Mountain Division. The French army has been at hand to offer specialised training in manoeuvring the mountainous terrain. 

Uganda has consistently been accused of being a major conduit route for the smuggled bloody minerals from DRC. With the installation of a state of the art gold processing plant in Uganda, there has been an unexplained surge in volumes of gold exports by Uganda. 

In 2019, President Felix Tsekedi held a meeting with Museveni in Uganda where a pact to boost security, trade, tourism and social welfare was signed. Museveni offered to contribute towards the cost of improving the road conditions from the Uganda border into eastern DRC. A few days ago, Museveni moved his Cabinet to endorse a 243.7b (US $ 65.8m) supplementary budgetary request that has already been presented to Parliament for rubber-stamping. In his recent Independence Day speech, he vehemently defended the move arguing that "Ugandans need DRC" because of the huge export earnings to DRC. Being a war monger, Museveni has prioritised repairing and construction of highway roads more especially those that not only link major urban centres but also link to neighbouring countries so as to ease mobility of troops and war materials. His multi trillion road construction project is funded by loans and tax payer money. 

With the military being his power base, he has prioritised road construction as a component of his strategic regime security plan. He is basing this prioritisation on his personal experience during the Tanzania/Iddi Amin war in 1979 when the Tanzanian troops got bogged down by poor road infrastructure in the Kagera region. During his Congo expedition, the troops advance was undermined by the almost non existence of roads in eastern Congo. However, this was an advantage to the Congo government as the situation proved to be an encumbrance for the swift advance by the invading Uganda and Rwanda forces. During the northern Uganda insurgency, his troops had trouble moving heavy military equipment through the border area into southern Sudan. He spent billions of tax payer's money on construction of what he termed as security roads linking Kitgum to Ngomorom at the far end. 

Because of superb roads, Habyarimana's Hutu dominated government in Rwanda was able to swiftly move to the border with Uganda and halt the Tutsi RPF invasion and maintained constant supply to its forward bases that kept the invaders around the border area for the next four years. In the mid 1990s, Uganda's ADF rebels overran and occupied Kisoro and it was the Rwanda army using good roads in Rwanda that quickly came in to dislodge them. Because of the poor roads to Kisoro at the time, Uganda could not easily move its troops to Kisoro. Museveni has been at the forefront of pushing for incorporation of  DRC into the East African Community but in actual sense he is harbouring a secession agenda for eastern DRC. 

In military terms, mobility refers to the ability of a weapon system, combat unit or armed force to move towards a military objective. Combat forces with a higher mobility are able to move quickly around and across more hostile terrain than forces with a lower mobility. Mobility is a vital component of modern battlefield; as the ability to deliver weapon systems or combat units to their objective quickly can often mean the difference between victory and defeat. During World I, combat units could only move as far as a soldier could walk, resulting in a stalemate and inability to outmanoeuvre the enemy. By the outbreak of World War II, the development of tanks had improved mobility. Tracked and other mechanised vehicles eased movement of troops to and from the battle front. Since the end of World War II, armies have continued to develop their mobility. By 1980s, intercontinental travel shifted from sea to air transport enabling military forces to move from one part of the world to another within hours or a few days instead of weeks. 

Mobility is also referred to as a combat multiplier - a highly mobile unit can use its own combat strength of less mobile units. This was the case with the German Panzer Divisions during World War II when they were considered the equivalent of of two or three infantry divisions partly due to their superior mobility and partly due to inherently greater fire power. Mobility has also been defined in terms of three generally recognised levels of warfare; tactical, operational and strategic.
Tactical mobility is usually defined as the ability to move under fire during a combat engagement. Operational mobility is the ability to move men and materials to the decisive point of battle. Strategic mobility is the ability to move an army to the area of operations. During World War I most armies lacked tactical mobility but enjoyed good strategic mobility through the use of railroads thus leading to a situation where armies could be deployed to the front with ease and rapidity; but once they reached they became bogged down by their inability to move under fire. Operational mobility is a concept that begun during the period of the mechanisation of armed forces. It became a method of managing the movement of forces by strategic commanders from the staging area (place where troops or equipment in transit are assembled or processed) to their tactical area of responsibility ahead of an attack or invasion. 

These military/security roads have been built and used in several countries for purposes of strategic mobility by the military and later developed into public roads. Gen.Wade spearheaded the construction of a wide network of security roads in Scotland during the Jacobite unrest in the 18th century to facilitate movement of troops as part of the overall military strategy for controlling the highlands by linking the different forts. The imperial Russian authorities in the Caucasus constructed military roads that linked the northern Caucasus to the Black Sea via Klukhorski. A modern road was also built in the second half of the 19th century during Russo-Turkish war and campaigns to conquer the mountain tribes of the Caucasus. The US army built roads in eastern Europe to counter Russian aggression. The Roman Empire built roads that were used to suppress and exert control over local populations. In Israel, the Jewish National Fund (JNF) together with the Ministry of Defence, Agriculture, and regional councils builds security and agricultural roads for easy passage of Israel Defence Forces (IDF).

Indeed Eastern DRC needs an improved road network and Uganda stands to benefit but for Museveni to offer funding for the same is highly suspect. Those imperialistic designs are very common with African dictators and even Libya's Gadaffi used to be very generous to some African countries and entities. Despite the so-called prioritisation of road construction in Uganda, the situation of the most vital feeder roads and those in urban centres including the capital Kampala is appalling. From the aforegoing, it can be concluded that the urge for Museveni to exert his influence on eastern DRC is for his strategic security interests. An improved road network in DRC makes it easy for him to fulfil his imperialistic ambitions the same way the colonialists built the Uganda Railway from Mombasa to the border with Congo in Kasese and Pakwach. 

INFORMATION IS POWER AND THE PROBLEM OF UGANDA IS MUSEVENISM